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The purpose of this dissertation is to explore whether there is a common (or minimum) 
standard of habitability between tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers in South African 
law, and crucially to determine whether a common standard of habitability for these 
categories of inhabitants in South African law can be derived from the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“Constitution”). The dissertation aims to also 
investigate whether the obligation to ensure such a standard of habitability for 
dwellings in all three categories of inhabitants rests on the owner, the state, or the 
occupant of the dwelling. 
To determine whether dwellings are habitable, the dissertation considered the 
meaning of “habitability” in the context of each type of inhabitant. In the context of 
tenants, the dissertation found that habitability in terms of the common law is 
essentially based on the premise that the dwelling to be leased must be in a condition 
that is reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was rented. However, the common-
law fit for the purpose requirement will change to habitability when the Rental Housing 
Amendment Act 35 of 2014 (“RHAA”) comes into effect. In terms of the RHAA, the 
habitability requirement implies that the dwelling must be safe and suitable to live in. 
Furthermore, the dwelling must offer the tenant adequate space, safeguard him or her 
against the elements and other threats to health, assure the tenant, his household and 
visitors physical safety, and the dwelling must be structurally sound. In the context of 
usufructuaries, a dwelling is habitable if it is fit for human habitation. This means that 
the dwelling must be free from defects and suitable for occupation. In the context of 
occupiers, habitability is read into constitutional rights such as adequate housing, 
security of tenure and human dignity. In this regard, a dwelling is habitable for 
occupiers (in terms of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (“ESTA”)) if 
occupiers reside in adequate housing that provides secure tenure and accords with 
standards of human dignity. 
Concerning the question, on whom the obligation rests to ensure habitability, the 
dissertation found that in the context of tenants and usufructuaries the obligation to 
ensure that the property is habitable rests on the owner of the property. Concerning 
occupiers, it is not clear who must ensure the habitability of the dwelling. It is argued 
that the obligation to ensure that the property is habitable should primarily be on the 
owner. This is because the owner is enjoined by section 25(6) of the Constitution 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
iii 
through ESTA to accommodate an occupier on his or her property. As such, an owner 
who permits an occupier to use the property as accommodation incurs an obligation 
to ensure that the dwelling is habitable. However, where it is unreasonable for the 
landowner to ensure habitability, for instance, due to financial hardship or lack of 
resources, the state should be called upon to ensure that occupiers live in habitable 
conditions. 
The dissertation concludes that there is currently no common standard of 
habitability across all three categories. This is because the categories of comparison 
are so individual that requiring a common standard will not work in all three contexts. 
However, it is argued that the Constitution forms the minimum standard that eventually 
forms the baseline in all the categories. This is because the Constitution arguably 
applies in all categories of comparison. As such, there should, at the very least, be 
some standard of habitability, which is informed by the Constitution and should be 
complied with in each individual category of inhabitant.




Die doel van hierdie verhandeling is om vas te stel of daar ŉ minimum gemeenskaplike 
standaard van bewoonbaarheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg bestaan, sover dit 
vruggebruikers, huurders en okkupeerders betref. As hoofsaak word ondersoek of so 
ŉ gemeenskaplike standaard van bewoonbaarheid vir hierdie kategorieë van 
bewoners in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg, afleibaar is uit die Grondwet van die Republiek 
van Suid-Afrika, 1996 (“Grondwet”). Verder word ondersoek of die regsplig om so ŉ 
standaard van bewoonbaarheid vir bovermelde kategorieë bewoners te verseker, op 
die eienaar van die bewoonde eiendom, die staat of die bewoner van die woning rus. 
Die verhandeling oorweeg die betekenis van “bewoonbaarheid” in die samehang 
van elke kategorie bewoner, ten einde te bepaal wanneer ŉ woning as bewoonbaar 
beskou kan word. Betreffende huurders, bevind hierdie verhandeling dat 
bewoonbaarheid ingevolge die gemenereg gebaseer is op die uitgangspunt dat ŉ 
woning geskik moet wees vir die oogmerk waarvoor dit verhuur is. Wanneer die 
Wysigingswet op Huurbehuising 35 van 2014 egter van krag word, blyk dit dat die 
vereiste dat huurbehuising geskik moet wees vir hul huuroogmerk, vervang gaan word 
met ‘n bewoonbaarheidsvereiste. Volgens die Wysigingswet impliseer die 
bewoonbaarheidsvereiste dat die woning veilig en geskik moet wees om in te woon. 
Verder moet die woning ruim genoeg wees, beskerming bied teen die elemente en 
teen ander gesondheidsgevare, die huurder se huishouding en gaste se fisiese 
veiligheid waarborg en moet dit struktureel volstaan. In die samehang van vruggebruik 
is ŉ woning bewoonbaar indien dit geskik is vir menslike bewoning. Die woning moet 
sonder defekte en geskik wees vir bewoning. In die samehang van okkupeerders word 
bewoonbaarheid ingelees onder grondwetlike regte soos geskikte behuising, 
verblyfsekerheid en menswaardigheid. In hierdie verband is ŉ woning bewoonbaar vir 
okkupeerders ingevolge die Wet op die Uitbreiding van Verblyfsekerheid 62 van 1997 
(voorts op die Engelse akroniem “ESTA”) indien okkupeerders woonagtig is in wonings 
wat verblyfsekerheid bied en in lyn met die standaarde van menswaardigheid is. 
Wat betref die vraag oor wie die regsplig dra om bewoonbaarheid te verseker, 
bevind hierdie verhandeling dat die eienaar van die eiendom hierdie plig dra in die 
geval van huurbehuising en wonings onder vruggebruik. Wat okkupeerders betref is 
dit nie duidelik wie die bewoonbaarheid van die woning moet verseker nie. Die 
argument word gemaak dat die plig om bewoonbaarheid te verseker hoofsaaklik op 
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die eienaar rus, siende dat die eienaar ingevolge artikel 25(6) van die Grondwet deur 
ESTA verplig word om ŉ okkupeerder op sy of haar eiendom te akkommodeer. Waar 
dit egter onredelik sou wees om van die eienaar te verwag om bewoonbaarheid te 
verseker, byvoorbeeld weens finansiële druk of ŉ tekort aan hulpbronne, moet die 
staat beroep word om bewoonbare omstandighede vir okkupeerders teweeg te bring. 
Die gevolgtrekking in hierdie verhandeling is dat daar nie tans ŉ gemeenskaplike 
standaard tussen al drie kategorieë van bewoning in ons reg bestaan nie. Dit is omdat 
die huidige kategorieë se onderskeie eienskappe so eiesoortig is dat ŉ 
gemeenskaplike standaard van bewoonbaarheid nie in al drie kontekste sal werk nie. 
Die verhandeling voer wel aan dat die Grondwet die bron is vir ŉ uiteindelike minimum 
gemeenskaplike standaard wat die basislyn vir al drie kategorieë van bewoning vorm. 
Dit is so omdat die Grondwet in al drie kategorieë toepassing vind. Gevolglik moet 
daar op die minste een of ander standaard van bewoonbaarheid nagekom word, wat 
deur die Grondwet ingelig word en waaraan elke kategorie inwoners moet voldoen.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1 1 Introduction to the research problem 
Tenants,1 usufructuaries2 and occupiers3 are all categories of inhabitants that occupy 
property belonging to another. The condition and maintenance of the dwelling that 
 
1 Section 1 of the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 (“RHA”) defines a tenant as “the lessee of a 
dwelling which is leased by a landlord’’. See generally, G Muller, R Brits, JM Pienaar & Z 
Boggenpoel Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 6 ed (2019) 509; C Visser, JT 
Pretorius, R Sharrock & M van Jaarsveld Gibson South African Mercantile and Company Law 
8 ed (2003) 171-172; S Viljoen The Law of Landlord and Tenant (2016) 42; R Sharrock 
Business Transactions Law 8 ed (2011) 310; G Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale and Lease 4 ed 
(2014) 329. 
2 A usufruct relationship gives rise to the following: an owner gives the usufructuary the right 
to the full use and enjoyment of a dwelling in such a way that the dwelling is not destroyed 
through such use and enjoyment on its return to the owner. See generally AJ van der Walt 
The Law of Servitudes (2016) 464; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA 
Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The Law of South Africa 24 2 ed (2010) para 581; RP Pace “Usufruct” 
in RP Pace & WM van der Westhuizen (eds) Wills and Trusts (SI: 21 1995) para 68.1; CG van 
der Merwe & MJ de Waal The Law of Things and Servitudes (1993) 210; Muller et al Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 383; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Servitudes and 
Other Real Rights” in F du Bois (ed) Willie’s Principles of South African Law 9 ed (2007) 591 
604; MM Corbett “Usufruct, Usus and Habitatio” in HR Hahlo MM Corbett, G Hofmeyr & E 
Kahn (eds) The Law of Succession in South Africa 2 ed (2001) 366 366; MJ de Waal 
“Servitudes” in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern Cross Civil Law and Common Law 
in South Africa (1996) 785 809-810. 
3 Section 1 of ESTA provides that an occupier means:  
“a person who resides on land which belongs to another person, and who has or on 4 
February 1997 or thereafter had consent or another right in law to do so but excluding a 
person using or intending to use the land in question mainly for industrial, mining, 
commercial or commercial farming purposes, but including a person who works the land 
himself or herself and does not employ any person who is not a member of his or her family; 
and a person who has an income in excess of the prescribed amount”. 
See generally JM Pienaar Land Reform (2014) 302; A Mahomed, P Benjamin, B Barry, S 
Magardie, P Naidoo, N Yazbek, M Mokhoaetsi, J Ntuli & V Mngwengwe “Tenure Security in 
SA Law” in A Mohamed (ed) Land Tenure Law (RS: 1 2013) 2-3; H Mostert, JM Pienaar & J 
van Wyk “Land Reform” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The Law of South Africa 14 2 ed Part 
1 (2010) para 127; Sharrock Business Transactions Law 885; JM Pienaar & J Brickhill “Land” 
in S Woolman, T Roux, J Klaaren, A Stein, M Chaskalson & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional 
Law of South Africa 3 2 ed (RS: 6 2014) 48-29; Muller et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The 
Law of Property 701; TE Scheepers & W du Plessis “Extension of Security of Tenure Act – A 
Bone of Contention” (1998) 61 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 473 474; T 
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these inhabitants occupy are ordinarily seen to be the responsibility of the landowners 
that make the properties available for occupation.4 However, this responsibility is not 
equally clear in all cases, and this issue forms the crux of the research in this 
dissertation. A pertinent question that may arise in these contexts is whether there is 
a common (or, at the very least, a minimum) standard of habitability for these types of 
inhabitants, and on whom the obligation rests to ensure such a standard of habitability 
for these dwellings. If the dwellings are not in a habitable state, tenants, usufructuaries 
and occupiers are arguably confronted with two equally unsatisfactory alternatives, 
namely: (1) homelessness, if they choose to vacate the uninhabitable dwellings; or (2) 
continue to live in a dwelling that is an unsafe, undignified and inadequate building for 
which they may or may not be paying rent, depending on the particular relationship.5 
In this regard, tenants ordinarily pay rent for the dwellings they inhabit, while 
usufructuaries and occupiers, in most cases, do not.6 
To determine whether dwellings are habitable, the meaning of “habitability” needs 
to be assessed. In this regard, there are various rights that tenants, usufructuaries and 
 
Mbhense “Does ESTA still Protect Occupiers of Farm Land in South Africa?” (2014) De Rebus 
22 23; Landbou Navorsingsraad v Klaasen (LCC83R/01) [2001] ZALCC 43 (29 October 2001) 
SAFLII <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2001/43.html> para 21; Kiepersol Poultry Farm 
(Pty) Ltd v Phasiya 2010 3 SA 152 (SCA) para 7; Nhlabathi v Fick [2003] ZALCC 9 (8 April 
2003) SAFLII <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2003/9.html> para 12; Sibanyoni v 
Holtzhausen (LCC143/2015) [2019] ZALCC 11 (9 May 2019) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2019/11.html> para 17; Kusa Kusa CC v Mbele 
(LCC39/02) [2002] ZALCC 58 (20 November 2002) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2002/58.html> para 8; Molusi v Voges NO 2016 3 SA 
370 (CC) para 4, particularly footnote 6; Nkosi v Bührmann 2002 1 SA 372 (SCA) para 20; 
Dlamini v Joosten 2006 3 All SA 1 (SCA) para 1, especially footnote 3. 
4 Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W); Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC). 
5 Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) para 1; Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 
32 and 52; Erasmus v Mtenje (LCC 202/2017) [2018] ZALCC 12 (12 June 2018) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/12.html> paras 8-9 and 12-14; W du Plessis, JM 
Pienaar & N Olivier “Land Matters: New Developments 2007(2)” (2007) 22 South African 
Public Law 548 570. 
6 Usufructuaries ordinarily do not pay rent (or some form of equivalent) because they are 
generally granted the usufruct to derive an income or enjoy benefits from the property 
belonging to another. Whether occupiers will pay rent will depend on the consent to occupy 
the dwelling given by the owner or person in charge. 
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occupiers are entitled to at the commencement of their occupation.7 One of these 
rights is the right to use and enjoy the dwelling, which the landowner promises to give 
temporarily, in respect of tenants.8 Likewise, in the case of usufructuaries, the 
landowner also gives the usufructuary the right to use and enjoy the dwelling.9 In the 
context of occupiers, the landowner equally promises the occupier, in terms of the 
Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (“ESTA”), the right to reside on and 
use the dwelling that is subject to the occupier-owner relationship.10 
Tenure security is another potential element of habitability. Traditionally, there are 
many ways in which people may enjoy tenure in South African law (some of which are 
illustrated by the categories of inhabitants arising specifically in the context of this 
dissertation), namely lease, servitudes, and statutory tenure in terms of ESTA.11 For 
the most part, the tenure security of tenants is regulated by the terms of the lease 
agreement,12 while the tenure of usufructuaries is secured and regulated by the terms 
 
7 Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) para 28; Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 
26; Muller et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 383-384. 
8 Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale and Lease 342-352; Viljoen The Law of Landlord and Tenant 139; 
Muller et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 509; Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 
SA 578 (W) para 28; Poynton v Cran 1910 AD 205 221; Pretorius, Sharrock & Van Jaarsveld 
Gibson South African Mercantile and Company Law 174; K Lehmann “Letting and Hiring of 
Property” in F du Bois (ed) Willie’s Principles of South African Law 9 ed (2007) 906 907; C 
Hugo & P Simpson “Lease” in R Zimmermann, D Visser & K Reid (eds) Mixed Legal Systems 
in Comparative Perspective Property and Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2005) 302 
331; AJ Kerr & G Glover “Lease” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The Law of South Africa 2 
ed (2007) para 2. 
9 Van der Walt The Law of Servitudes 464-471; Corbett “Usufruct, Usus and Habitatio” in The 
Law of Succession in South Africa 366, 373; Van der Merwe & De Waal “Servitudes” in The 
Law of South Africa paras 581 and 585; RP Pace “Usufruct” in RP Pace & WM van der 
Westhuizen (eds) Wills and Trusts (1995) para 68.1; Van der Merwe & De Waal The Law of 
Things and Servitudes 210-212; De Waal “Servitudes” in Southern Cross Civil Law and 
Common Law in South Africa 810-813; Muller et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of 
Property 383-384; Van der Merwe & Pope “Servitudes and Other Real Rights” in Willie’s 
Principles of South African Law 604-608. 
10 Section 6(1) of ESTA. See further Mahomed et al “Tenure Security in SA Law” in Land 
Tenure Law 2-11 – 2-12; Mostert, Pienaar & Van Wyk “Land Reform” in LAWSA para 134. 
11 Mahomed et al “Tenure Security in SA Law” in Land Tenure Law 2-2. 
12 Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 2011 5 SA 19 (SCA) para 28; Viljoen The 
Law of Landlord and Tenant 156; Mahomed et al “Tenure Security in SA Law” in Land Tenure 
Law 2-2. 
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of the usufruct agreement.13 The tenure security of occupiers is in turn regulated by 
ESTA.14 Habitability may also encompass the right of the inhabitant to make 
improvements. Tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers are entitled to the right to make 
improvements in terms of the common law and statutory law to protect and preserve 
the dwelling to make it habitable.15 The purpose for mentioning the entitlements that 
ordinarily go with these categories of inhabitants is to show that they give rise to certain 
responsibilities on the part of landowners immediately when the respective owners 
provide the tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers permission to stay in the dwelling. 
Consequently, these could be measures that may be used to hold landowners 
accountable to keep the dwelling habitable. 
An owner could also be held liable to ensure the habitability of dwellings inhabited 
by tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers in terms of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996 (“Constitution”), as shown in the various chapters dealing with 
these categories of inhabitants. In this regard, the courts have linked habitability with 
constitutional rights such as human dignity. The link between habitability and the right 
to human dignity may indicate a constitutional standard of habitability for tenants, 
usufructuaries and occupiers in South African law. The link between habitability and 
human dignity could be used as a constitutional imperative by these categories of 
inhabitants to hold landowners liable for failure, refusal or neglect to maintain a 
dwelling in a habitable condition. Holding the landowner responsible for providing 
habitable dwellings may also be informed by the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”).16 The United Nations Committee on Economic 
 
13 Van der Walt The Law of Servitudes 483-484; Mahomed et al “Tenure Security in SA Law” 
in Land Tenure Law 2-2; Van der Merwe & De Waal “Servitudes” in LAWSA para 599; Van 
der Merwe & De Waal The Law of Things and Servitudes 216; De Waal “Servitudes” in 
Southern Cross Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa 810-813. 
14 Section 6(2)(a) of ESTA. 
15 Brunsdon’s Estate v Brunsdon’s Estate 1920 CPD 159 175-176; Wait v Estate Wait 1930 
CPD 1 4; Ex Parte Estate Borland 1961 1 SA 6 (SR) 340; Corbett “Usufruct, Usus and 
Habitatio” The Law of Succession in South Africa 2 ed (2001) 376-377; Daniels v Scribante 
2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 59-60. 
16 (Adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 993 UNTS 3. As at 18 July 
2015, the ICESCR has been ratified by 164 countries. South Africa signed the ICESCR on 4 
October 1994 and ratified it on 12 January 2015. According to art 27 of the ICESCR, it entered 
into force three months after the South African government deposited its instrument of 
ratification on 12 January 2015. 
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Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”), particularly the CESCR’s General Comment 
4,17 indicates a standard of habitability that should be provided to occupants of 
residential properties. More importantly, the CESCR’s General Comment 4 
emphasises the link that exists between adequate housing and human dignity and 
uses the requirement of habitability as a tool to promote living conditions that are 
habitable, safe, secure and dignified for inhabitants.18 Therefore, these categories of 
inhabitants may rely on the Constitution and international law as permitted by section 
39(1)(b) of the Constitution to hold the landowner liable for habitability, provided that 
such an obligation does in fact rest on the landowner as will be questioned in chapters 
3, 4 and 5 of the dissertation. 
Based on the above brief introduction, this dissertation will consider the extent to 
which these rights of certain occupants, or the imperatives driven by the Constitution 
and international law, point towards a common (or minimum) standard of habitability 
for tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers. Furthermore, the study will investigate the 
general principles of habitability and provide a comparison of the entitlement of use 
and enjoyment, security of tenure and the entitlement to make basic improvements to 
property across the three categories. The reason for this study is to determine the 
content and scope of habitability regarding each category of inhabitant. Moreover, it 
will also consider whether the obligation to ensure the standard of habitability rests on 
the landowner or the state or even the particular inhabitant. This will be especially 
important in instances where a landowner has failed to maintain and keep the dwelling 
in a habitable condition and it becomes necessary to ensure that occupants live in 
dignified and habitable dwellings. 
 
1 2 Research aims and hypotheses 
The dissertation aims to provide a comparison between tenants, usufructuaries and 
occupiers as potential inhabitants of property belonging to another. Moreover, the 
dissertation aims to determine whether a common or, more importantly, a minimum, 
standard of habitability exists for tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers in South 
African law. Crucially, it needs to be determined whether a common standard of 
 
17 CESCR’s General Comment No 4 (Sixth session, 1991) The Right to Adequate Housing 
(Article 11(1) of the ICESCR), UN Doc E/1992/23. 
18 Paras 7-8. 
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habitability for these categories of inhabitants in South African law can be derived from 
the Constitution. In this respect, it is important to consider whether the obligation to 
ensure habitability for tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers rests on the owner of the 
property, or the state, or even the respective inhabitant of the dwelling. Finally, if a 
minimum standard of habitability is not present in one (or all) of these categories of 
inhabitants, the dissertation will ultimately determine whether the absence of such a 
minimum standard of habitability is (un)constitutional. If unconstitutionality exists 
because a particular category of inhabitant’s dwelling does not comply with a minimum 
standard of habitability, it will be necessary to determine the best approach going 
forward for South African law relating to habitability in each category of inhabitant. 
The dissertation has six hypotheses as points of departure. Firstly, there seem to 
be noteworthy similarities and differences between tenants, usufructuaries and 
occupiers as inhabitants of property belonging to another. This may eventually impact 
on the standard of habitability that can be expected in the respective categories. 
Secondly, the fact that all these categories of inhabitants are entitled to the use and 
enjoyment of a dwelling belonging to the owner seems to initially imply a minimum 
standard of habitability. Thirdly, there should be a common standard of habitability 
between tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers because the standard should arguably 
be evaluated within the context of the Constitution (especially section 10, which 
provides that everyone has the right to human dignity). A link (in the context of tenants 
and occupiers for instance) presumably exists between habitability and human dignity. 
In this regard, human dignity can be used as the basis to advocate for a common 
standard of habitability. Fourthly, the obligation to ensure habitability in the context of 
tenants and usufructuaries rests on the owner. In the case of occupiers, there is 
uncertainty in respect of the balancing of rights. It is also not clear in terms of the 
obligations owed to individuals by the owner or the state concerning a basic standard 
of habitability. In the fifth place, it is assumed that the obligation to ensure habitability 
rests on the owner or the state in so far as it ensures the promotion of safe and suitable 
living conditions for tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers. Finally, a minimum 
standard of habitability seems to exist for tenants, but not overtly for usufructuaries 
and occupiers. Thus, a lack of a minimum standard of habitability applicable to all 
these types of inhabitants seems to point towards unconstitutionality as a minimum 
standard should arguably be derived from the Constitution to apply to all three 
categories of inhabitants. 




1 3 Methodology 
The research on the comparison between tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers is 
mainly based on the study and analysis of literature in this field, such as textbooks, 
legislation, case law and journal articles. To determine whether a common standard 
of habitability can be derived from the Constitution, a constitutional analysis will be 
undertaken to explain the implications of the Constitution for the notion of habitability. 
This will be done to provide a foundation for further analysis of the impact of the 
Constitution in the different categories of inhabitants dealt with in this dissertation. 
Moreover, the analysis will enable an overall assessment of whether the law imposes 
the obligation to ensure habitability on the owner or the state, or even the inhabitant in 
some (or all) instances. To research whether a minimum standard of habitability exists 
in one (or all) of these categories of inhabitants, and to ultimately make a 
pronouncement about the (un)constitutionality of such a state of affairs, it will be 
necessary to fully investigate the impact of the Constitution. This will enable the 
determination of the best approach for South African law going forward regarding the 
standard of habitability that can be expected in the context of various residential 
dwellings. It should be noted that this dissertation will focus primarily on South African 
law and the extent to which South African law recognises a minimum (or common) 
standard of habitability between a number of categories of inhabitants. The 
dissertation will also rely on international law relating to the notion of habitability. 
Reliance on international law will be done to the extent to which this source of law 
points towards a minimum (or common) standard of habitability between the 
categories of comparison. The choice for relying on international law as it pertains to 
standards of habitability for the types of inhabitants being investigated is because the 
Constitution creates a mandate that, in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, courts or 
tribunals must consider international law.19 As such, international law can be used as 
an effective guide in the interpretation of certain rights such as human dignity, security 




19 See chapter 2 part 2 4 below. 
20 See chapter 2 part 2 4 below. 
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1 4 Qualifications 
The dissertation is confined to the determination of whether a common or minimum 
standard of habitability exists for tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers in South 
African law, and on whom the obligation rests to ensure the habitability of the dwellings 
occupied by these inhabitants. Therefore, the dissertation will consider examples from 
case law limited to dwellings used for residential purposes. The dissertation will not 
attempt to discuss all the cases that deal with habitability but focuses only on case law 
that speaks directly to, or is relevant to, the notion of habitability and the obligation to 
ensure habitability. The selected case law provides a framework for the meaning of 
habitability in the particular contexts. The examples from case law also indicate on 
whom the obligation to ensure that the property is habitable rests (whether the 
occupier, an owner or the state). The chosen case law further presents the impact of 
the Constitution and international law on the standard of habitability, and how 
conflicting interests or rights should be balanced when a dwelling should be brought 
to a habitable condition (for example, in the context of occupiers). More importantly, 
the case law shows what minimum standard should be expected of a habitable 
dwelling in each context of inhabitants. 
As a start to this dissertation, chapter 2 considers the notion of habitability as given 
meaning to by the elements of habitability. This chapter further provides the meaning 
of habitability as conceptualised (generally or in particular contexts) in case law, the 
Constitution and international law in South Africa. The chapter does not look at the 
historical origins of the concept of habitability since it is assumed that habitability in 
South Africa is a constitutional issue. However, it will be necessary to first undertake 
an analysis on habitability in the common law (regulating usufructuaries and tenants) 
and statute law (regulating occupiers and tenants). Finally, it will be essential to 
investigate the impact of the Constitution and international law on a standard of 
habitability and the extent to which the Constitution and international law point towards 
a common or minimum standard of habitability. 
The dissertation includes a comparison of categories of inhabitants in chapter 3, 4 
and 5. The selected categories of inhabitants are tenants, usufructuaries and 
occupiers. The most important reason why these three categories of comparison were 
chosen is the fact that they range from those heavily protected by constitutional 
provisions (for instance, occupiers) to those only protected in terms of the common 
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law (such as ususfructus). Some tenants are subject to the common law and statute 
and fall in a middle category in respect of the protection afforded. Therefore, the 
categories were not a random selection but were carefully thought out. It is arguably 
necessary to have this type of spectrum of inhabitants to try and see whether, even at 
the common-law end of the spectrum, one can ensure a certain minimum level of 
habitability (as potentially still derived from the Constitution). Likewise, one expects a 
minimum standard of habitability in the context of occupiers where constitutional rights 
are directly at stake. However, it is not so self-evident in the context of common law 
servitude relationships. As such, the research aims to show that, at the very least, a 
standard of habitability should be ensured in the common-law construct of a usufruct. 
 
1 5 Chapter outline 
This dissertation consists of six chapters of which this chapter serves as the 
introductory one outlining the main aims, research questions, assumptions, and the 
methodology that the dissertation will follow. Chapter 2 examines a conceptual legal 
meaning of habitability. To do this, the first section of the chapter commences with an 
evaluation of the elements of habitability. The purpose of this enquiry is to find out how 
these elements provide impetus to a better understanding of the meaning to the notion 
of habitability and what may be considered a general minimum required standard of 
habitability of a dwelling. The second part of chapter 2 proceeds with an investigation 
of the impact of the Constitution on the standard of habitability. In this regard, the 
section will provide an overview of the interpretation clause; human dignity as a 
constitutional value; human dignity as a constitutional right; the right to security of 
tenure; and, the right to access to adequate housing. The third and final section of 
chapter 2 will address the extent to which international law impacts on the standard of 
habitability that can be expected of dwellings. An interesting consideration in this 
context is the impact of the ICESCR and CESCR’s General Comment 4 on the 
meaning of habitability. This section will provide an overview of the CESCR’s General 
Comment 4 relating to the right to adequate housing (article 11(1) of the ICESCR). 
Chapter 3 of the dissertation addresses habitability in the context of tenants. The 
first segment of the chapter considers the meaning of habitability in order to determine 
whether a minimum standard of habitability is required for tenants. After that, the 
chapter examines the impact of the Constitution on the standard of habitability for 
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tenants considering the right to access to adequate housing and human dignity. The 
third part of chapter 3 investigates on whom the obligation to ensure habitability rests 
– more specifically, whether such an obligation is on the landowner, the state, or the 
tenant in the landowner-tenant relationship. 
Chapter 4, in turn, proceeds to deal with the notion of habitability when it comes to 
usufructuaries. The first part of the chapter looks specifically at the meaning of 
habitability in the context of usufructuaries. In addition to that, this part of chapter 4 
determines whether the owner can be expected to give usufructuaries more 
entitlements or rights in light of the requirement of habitability. The reason for this 
enquiry is to draw conclusions about whether a minimum standard of habitability exists 
for usufructuaries that can potentially be equated with other categories, like occupiers 
and/or tenants. The second section of chapter 4 then scrutinises the impact of the 
Constitution on the standard of habitability for usufructuaries considering constitutional 
rights (or imperatives) outlined in chapter 2. The third segment of chapter 4 will explore 
on whom the obligation rests to ensure habitability, more specifically whether the 
obligation is on the owner who grants the usufruct, the state, or the occupier in the 
owner-usufructuary relationship. 
In chapter 5, the dissertation continues to investigate the concept of habitability, but 
this time in the case of occupiers. To undertake this investigation, the first part of the 
chapter discusses the meaning of habitability when dwellings are occupied by 
occupiers for purposes of ESTA. Furthermore, it questions whether there is a minimum 
standard of habitability for occupiers, specifically in terms of ESTA and cases that have 
worked towards developing the notion. The second segment of chapter 5 scrutinises 
the impact of the Constitution on the standard of habitability for occupiers. Here, the 
focus will be on the right to security of tenure (in terms of section 25(6)) and human 
dignity (in terms of section 10). It should be mentioned that the right to human dignity 
in the context of occupiers is reinforced by section 5 of ESTA. The final part of chapter 
5 explores the question of whether the landowner, the occupier, or the state must 
ensure a level of habitability for occupiers’ dwellings. 
Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation and draws conclusions from each of the 
chapters dealing with the categories of comparison. The foundational question that 
emerges in this chapter is whether there can be a minimum (or common) standard, or 
whether each category is so individual that requiring a common standard cannot be 
expected in all three contexts. The final chapter of the dissertation will aim to determine 
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whether, at the very least, a minimum standard of habitability for tenants, 
usufructuaries and occupiers in South African law can be derived from the 
Constitution. If such a minimum standard is not present in one (or all) of these 
categories of inhabitants, the chapter will attempt to ultimately make a pronouncement 
about the (un)constitutionality of such a state of affairs. Furthermore, if 
unconstitutionality exists because a particular category of inhabitant has not provided 
a minimum standard of habitability, it will be necessary to determine the best approach 
for South African law going forward. 
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CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUALISING THE LEGAL MEANING OF HABITABILITY 
2 1 Introduction 
In South Africa, neither the common law nor statutory law, provide for a uniform 
definition of habitability that applies to dwellings inhabited by tenants, usufructuaries 
and occupiers.1 However, generally speaking, the legal concept of habitability seems 
to display elaborative elements such as adequate space, protection from elements 
and other threats to the health and physical safety of occupants, and a structurally 
undamaged dwelling.2 Therefore, from a legal perspective, habitability arguably 
represents a dwelling that is physically safe and suitable to inhabit.3 In this regard, the 
sources that seem to provide some explanation of the concept of habitability in South 
African law are pronouncements of the notion in case law,4 the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“Constitution”),5 the International Covenant on 
 
1 See, for example in context, the RHA, the Deeds Registries Act 47 1937 (“DRA”), the 
Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (“PIE”), 
ESTA and the Housing Act 107 of 1997 (“HA”). 
2 Rental Housing Amendment Act 35 of 2014 (“RHAA”) once the amendment comes into 
effect; CESCR’s General Comment No 4 (Sixth session, 1991) The Right to Adequate Housing 
(Article 11(1) of the ICESCR), UN Doc E/ 1992/23 para 8. 
3 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 31-33; Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) 
para 28; City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 SA 417 (SCA) para 20; 
Alexander v Armstrong 1879 9 Buch 233 SC 234; Tee v Mcilwraith 1905 19 ECD 282 286; 
Cape Town Municipality v Paine 1923 AD 207 226; Government of the Republic of South 
Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 52; Brunsdon’s Estate v Brunsdon’s Estate 1920 
CPD 159 174. 
4 See specifically Alexander v Armstrong 1879 9 Buch 233 SC; Stewart & Co v Executors of 
Staines (1861-1863) 4 Searle 152; Bensely v Clear 1878 8 Buch 89; Tee v Mcilwraith 1905 
19 ECD 282; Salmon v Dedlow 1912 TPD 971; Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W); Barker 
v Beckett & Co Ltd 1911 TPD 151; Cape Town Municipality v Paine 1923 AD 207; Ex Parte 
De Douallier 1907 24 SC 282; Amin v Ebrahim 1926 47 NPD 1; Government of the Republic 
of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC); Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various 
Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC); City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 SA 
417 (SCA); Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea Township & 197 Main Street Johannesburg v 
City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC); Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape 
v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC); Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC); Erasmus 
v Mtenje (LCC 202/2017) [2018] ZALCC 12 (12 June 2018) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/12.html>. 
5 Section 26(1) of the Constitution; underpinned by section 152(1)(d) of the Constitution. 
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)6 and the United Nations Committee 
on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”) General Comment 4. 
Pronouncements in case law, the Constitution and the CESCR’s General Comment 4 
as sources of the law point towards a conceptual understanding of habitability. 
South African courts have made a number of judgments in which a conceptual 
understanding of habitability is reflected.7 In this regard, courts have linked habitability 
to constitutional rights to give effect to the right to a habitable dwelling.8 In other 
instances, courts have invoked the CESCR’s General Comment 4 in order to provide 
an understanding of the meaning of habitability.9 In Mpange v Sithole (“Mpange”),10 
the court referred to the right to use and enjoyment of a dwelling as implying a 
habitable dwelling that guarantees and protects occupants against threats to life or 
property.11 The court in Mpange went even further and linked habitability with access 
to adequate housing and human dignity. This link displayed that access adequate 
 
6 The ICESCR was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 16 December 
1966 and came into force on 3 January 1976. As at 18 July 2015, the ICESCR has been 
ratified by 164 countries. South Africa signed the ICESCR on 4 October 1994 and ratified it 
on 12 January 2015. According to article 27 of the ICESCR, it entered into force three months 
after the South African government deposited its instrument of ratification on 12 January 2015. 
7 See, for instance, Alexander v Armstrong 1879 9 Buch 233 SC 234; Tee v Mcilwraith 1905 
19 ECD 282 286; Ex Parte De Douallier 1907 24 SC 282 283; Cape Town Municipality v Paine 
1923 AD 207 226; Amin v Ebrahim 1926 47 NPD 1 7; Government of the Republic of South 
Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 52; City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) 
Ltd 2007 6 SA 417 (SCA) para 20; Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) para 51; Daniels v 
Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 26-32. See further SI Mohamed Landlord and Tenant – 
Rights and Obligations (2019) 42-44; SI Mohamed “Fit to Let Doesn’t Mean Habitable” (10-
04-2012) Daily News <http://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/consumer/fit-to-let-doesnt-mean-
habitable-1272672> (accessed 28-02-2018). 
8 See specially Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) paras 50-55; Daniels v Scribante 2017 
4 SA 341 (CC) paras 12, 31-34; Erasmus v Mtenje (LCC 202/2017) [2018] ZALCC 12 (12 
June 2018) SAFLII http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/12.html para 34. See further 
Mohamed Landlord and Tenant – Rights and Obligations 43-44; Mohamed “Fit to Let Doesn’t 
Mean Habitable” (10-04-2012) Daily News. 
9 See particularly Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) para 51; City of Johannesburg v Rand 
Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 SA 417 (SCA) para 20. See further Mohamed Landlord and Tenant 
– Rights and Obligations 43-44; Mohamed “Fit to Let Doesn’t Mean Habitable” (10-04-2012) 
Daily News. 
10 Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W). 
11 Para 28. 
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housing in terms of section 26(1) of the Constitution includes habitability,12 and 
habitability, in turn, implies living in dignified conditions.13 Similarly, the court in Ex 
Parte De Doualier (“De Doualier”)14 mentioned that the premises of usufructuaries 
should be placed in a habitable state of repair.15 In Daniels v Scribante (“Daniels”),16 
the court, in turn, found that “reside on and use of” a farm dwelling implies habitability 
that guarantees occupiers’ secure tenure.17 The court in Daniels went on to link 
habitability with security of tenure and human dignity.18 This link implied that secure 
tenure means making basic improvements that preserve a dwelling in a habitable 
condition and the living conditions should accord with human dignity.19 
Despite these leaps taken by the courts, it appears that a conceptualised legal 
meaning of habitability that will lead to clarity and certainty for claimants wishing to 
argue for a minimum standard of habitability has not been pronounced yet. Moreover, 
a universal meaning of “habitability” across different contexts of occupancy has not 
yet crystallised. This chapter aims to conceptualise a possible legal meaning of 
habitability in order to canvass a minimum standard of habitability in three categories 
of rights of residential occupancy in South African law, namely tenants, usufructuaries 
and occupiers. The questions that come to mind are: does habitability mean to reside 
on, and/or the use and enjoyment of property? Moreover, does habitability imply a 
certain level of security of tenure? Furthermore, can we assume that habitability 
includes the right to make improvements? These questions will be approached from a 
constitutional perspective, but also considering the prescriptions in the ICESCR and 
the CESCR’s General Comment 4 as shown below. Arguably, the fact that all these 
categories of inhabitants are entitled to the use and enjoyment of a dwelling belonging 
to another implies a minimum standard of habitability. Whether the standard is similar 
for tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers will, in turn, be investigated in chapters 3, 4, 
and 5 of the dissertation. It is worth mentioning early on already that the investigation 
 
12 Para 51, discussing CESCR’s General Comment No 4 (Sixth session, 1991) The Right to 
Adequate Housing (Article 11(1) of the ICESCR), UN Doc E/ 1992/23 para 8. 
13 Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) paras 51-55. 
14 Ex Parte De Douallier 1907 24 SC 282. 
15 283. 
16 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC). 
17 Para 32. 
18 Paras 2 and 31-34. 
19 Paras 26-32. 
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into whether there should be a common standard of habitability looks at whether the 
standard is (or should be) the same across all categories of inhabitants. The enquiry 
into a minimum standard assesses whether all the categories should have a baseline, 
although the standard in each category may be different. 
With this in mind, the first section of this chapter starts by evaluating the elements 
of habitability. The purpose of this evaluation is to find out how these elements provide 
greater clarity on the meaning of the notion and what may be considered a general or 
minimum required standard of habitability. 
The second section of the chapter commences with an investigation of the impact 
of the Constitution on the standard of habitability. It will provide an overview the 
interpretation clause; of human dignity as a constitutional value; human dignity as a 
constitutional right; the right to security of tenure; and the right to access to adequate 
housing. As such, it is assumed that an investigation of the impact of the Constitution 
on the standard of habitability will show a link between habitability and the right to 
human dignity, security of tenure and access to adequate housing as enshrined in the 
Constitution. Moreover, such a link may imply a minimum standard of habitability 
between these categories of inhabitants. 
The final section of this chapter will address the extent to which international law 
impact on the standard of habitability. An interesting consideration in the context of 
habitability is the impact of the ICESCR and the CESCR’s General Comment 4 on the 
meaning of habitability. This section will provide an overview of article 11(1) of the 
ICESCR on the right to adequate housing and CESCR’s General Comment 4 issued 
in relation to article 11(1) of the ICESCR.20 An investigation of the impact of the 
ICESCR and the CESCR’s General Comment 4 on the standard of habitability will 








20 CESCR’s General Comment No 4 (Sixth session, 1991) The Right to Adequate Housing 
(Article 11(1) of the ICESCR), UN Doc E/ 1992/23 para 8(d). 
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2 2 Elements of habitability 
2 2 1 Introduction 
This section seeks to determine whether there are certain key elements of what makes 
a dwelling habitable. In other words, it will ask: What does it mean to live in a habitable 
dwelling; and are there important constituents that make up a “habitable dwelling”? 
The CESCR’s General Comment 4 sets out the meaning of habitability in relation to 
the right to adequate housing.21 Although South Africa is a party to the ICESCR, and 
should therefore subscribe to this conceptual understanding of habitability, a cursory 
analysis shows that a definition of habitability as it may be uniformly applicable to 
tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers is not provided for in legislation or common law 
in South Africa.22 Therefore, it is necessary to define the concept from what can 
arguably be said to constitute elements of habitability.23 These elements include, inter 
alia, adequate space, protection from the elements and other threats to health, and 
physical safety of the occupant or a structurally sound building.24 It is important to 
consider whether these elements can aid in a conceptual understanding of habitability, 
especially in so far as it potentially points towards a minimum standard of habitability 
in general, or in a specific category of inhabitant. Therefore, the section aims to 
elaborate on the elements of habitability. 
 
2 2 2 Adequate space 
Adequate space essentially has to do with a dwelling that is suitable to the extent that 
it has sufficient room (or the area must be equipped) to do the basic things that one 
needs to do in the dwelling where he or she lives.25 This would mean that a space 
 
21 Para 8. 
22 See, for instance, the RHA, DRA, PIE, ESTA and HA. However, for a definition of habitability 
relating to tenants, see specifically the RHAA. This definition will only be applicable once the 
RHAA finally comes into effect. 
23 K Bapela & P Stoop “Unpacking the Rental Housing Amendment Act 35 of 2014” (2016) De 
Rebus 19. 
24 CESCR’s General Comment No 4 (Sixth session, 1991) The Right to Adequate Housing 
(Article 11(1) of the ICESCR), UN Doc E/1992/23 para 8 read together with section 1 of RHAA 
(once it comes into operation). 
25 M Picard, S Russell, K Sutton, T Komino & S Matsuo The Sphere Handbook: Humanitarian 
Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response 4 ed (2018) 254-255. 
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becomes adequate if it provides its inhabitants with a sufficient area to perform daily 
household activities such as cooking and eating, sleeping, bathing, washing, dressing, 
and storing food or water safely and securely.26 The dwelling must ensure that the 
space is separated or partitioned with either brick walls, hardboards or curtains for the 
inhabitant and his family to live in privacy and dignity.27 A space that does not enable 
an inhabitant to achieve basic human amenities is arguably inadequate and therefore 
not suitable and safe to live in. Hence, if habitability entails that the “space must be 
adequate”, the notion assumes that there is enough room to live in safety, security, 
privacy and dignity. 
 
2 2 3 Protection from the elements and other threats to health 
To be protected against “the elements” means that an inhabitant of a dwelling must be 
protected from cold, damp, heat, rain, or wind.28 Protection against the elements has 
to do with the physical structure of the dwelling. The structure should be able to warrant 
against weather conditions. An inhabitant must also enjoy protection from other threats 
to health. This means that an inhabitant must not inhabit a dwelling that poses serious 
harm or danger to his or her health. For example, the ceiling of a dwelling should be 
repaired or replaced if the ceiling is dilapidated and contains asbestos that might pose 
a danger to one’s health. It is thus obligatory for landowners who provide housing for 
others to warrant that inhabitants shall not be exposed to unnecessary risk to life or 
property as a result of the above-mentioned elements.29 This underscores the fact that 
housing is a fundamental right of citizens in which they are guaranteed to be protected 
from the elements and other threats to health in their homes.30 Hohmann argues that 
a safe and secure house protects people from the elements and provides refuge from 
external factors. She further asserts that a house gives people a foundation from which 
 
26 254-255; T Rapelang An Evaluation of the Right to “Access to Adequate Housing” in Joe 
Morolong Local Municipality, South Africa LLM thesis, University of the Free State (2013) 97. 
27 Picard et al The Sphere Handbook 255. 
28 See generally CESCR’s General Comment No 4 (Sixth session, 1991) The Right to 
Adequate Housing (Article 11(1) of the ICESCR), UN Doc E/1992/23 para 8(d). 
29 Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) para 28; Amin v Ebrahim 1926 NPD 1 7. 
30 Section 26 of the Constitution; NL Newmark & PJ Thompson Self, Space & Shelter: An 
Introduction to Housing (1977) 11. 
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they can build a livelihood.31 Landman, in turn, states that a dwelling is more than a 
mere shelter or physical structure; it should at the very least protect its inhabitants 
from the elements and threats to health.32 Accordingly, habitability not only requires 
adequate space as defined above but it further entails dwellings that should protect 
against the elements and threats to health. 
 
2 2 4 Physical safety of the occupant 
Physical safety relates to the physical condition of the dwelling. A dwelling is physically 
safe if the security of the occupant is guaranteed. This would mean that the occupant 
must be protected against violence, theft, exposure to weapons and harsh 
environmental factors.33 In this regard, it may be appropriate, for instance, to install 
alarm systems, burglar bars, and erect a fence or wall.34 Moreover, the windows and 
doors should not be broken. At this juncture, it is pertinent to point out that “protection 
from the elements and other threats to health” and the “physical safety of occupants” 
may seem to constitute the same thing because both relate to physical safety of the 
inhabitant. However, to be physically safe in a dwelling means to be protected from 
conduct occasioned by people and harsh environmental factors intruding or potentially 
intruding on the dwelling, and to be protected against the elements and other threats 
to health means to be shielded from excessive weather conditions and a state of 
disrepair of the structure that might affect one’s health. It should be noted that there 
may be an overlap between protection from the elements and physical safety. As such, 
there should be a principled distinction between the two elements. 
A dwelling is understood not just to be a shelter giving physical protection or safety 
but it is “a zone of personal intimacy and family security”.35 As the United Nations 
Housing Rights Programme notes: 
 
31 J Hohmann The Right to Housing: Law, Concepts, Possibilities (2012) 4. 
32 K Landman Stronghold, Shelter or Shack: Reconsidering the Nature of Sustainable Housing 
in South Africa (2005) unpublished paper delivered at the Fourth Conference on Sustainable 
Built Environments (SBE2005): Enabling Frameworks for Sustainability at Pretoria, 22-
24/06/2005 (copy on file with author). 
33 See Tee v McIlwraith 1905 19 ECD 282 286; Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) para 28. 
34 P Stoop “The Law of Lease” (2014) Annual Survey of South African Law 811. 
35 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 20051 SA 217 (CC) para 17. See also 
Newmark & Thompson Self, Space & Shelter 8-9; Rapelang An Evaluation of the Right to 
“Access to Adequate Housing” 1. 




“[t]o live in a place, and to have established one’s own personal habitat with peace, security 
and dignity, should be considered neither a luxury, a privilege nor purely the good fortune 
of those who can afford a decent home ...”36 
 
Thus to have a habitable home is essential because a home satisfies many human 
needs like security and safety.37 In support of this idea, Newmark and Thompson state 
that a house is a shell of family security and safety for its occupants. It shields them 
from the outside world and hence makes them feel safe and their possessions 
safeguarded.38 Correspondingly, Hartman points out that a house has a special 
character in that it forms a central setting of one’s personal and family life thus 
supporting the fact that people need to enjoy physical safety in their houses.39 In light 
of the above, it seems clear that safety and security are intrinsically linked to having a 
habitable home. It arguably, therefore, constitutes an essential element of what is 
considered a habitable space. 
 
2 2 5 A structurally sound building 
A dwelling is structurally sound if it is adequately built and its condition is fit and 
suitable for human habitation. A building is arguably habitable if it does not display 
evidence of defects, damage, deterioration or distress that might impair its structural 
function or its present habitation and use.40 In this regard, the words “a structurally 
sound building” do not mean the building is adequate. Instead, the words “a structurally 
 
36 United Nations Housing Rights Programme, Report No 1, “Housing Rights Legislation: 
Review of International and National Legal Instruments” (2002) 1. See also Port Elizabeth 
Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 17; C Hartman “The Case for a 
Right to Housing” (1998) 9 Housing Policy Debate 223 227-228. 
37 Rapelang An Evaluation of the Right to “Access to Adequate Housing” 1. 
38 Newmark & Thompson Self, Space & Shelter 10. 
39 Hartman (1998) Housing Policy Debate 223 230. See also Rapelang An Evaluation of the 
Right to “Access to Adequate Housing” 1. 
40 NK Becker, D Ireland, N Kennedy, R Nathwani, B Ross & W Teron “Professional Engineers 
Ontario Structural Condition Assessments of Existing Buildings and Designated Structures 
Guideline” (18-11-2016) <www.peo.on.ca/index.php/ci_id/31399/la_id/1.htm> (accessed 01-
10-2020). 
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sound building” should be construed to mean a structurally undamaged building.41 In 
other words, there should arguably be no structural damage to a building to render it 
habitable and for the element of habitability to be complied with. This is important 
because a structurally undamaged building is ordinarily suitable and safe to inhabit. 
The most common structural defects that are often encountered include roofs that 
are insecurely fitted to walls, which results in leaking; doors that do not correctly fit on 
door frames; and cracked walls or foundations.42 This brings to mind the National 
Home Builders Registration Council (“NHBRC”), which was established in terms of the 
Housing Consumer Protection Measures Act 95 of 1998 (“HCPMA”).43 The objects of 
the NHBRC are, inter alia, to keep a record of home builders, oversee the construction 
of residential premises to make sure that proper building standards are maintained, 
and to provide a guarantee of services for serious structural defects.44 
Furthermore, the General Regulations Regarding Housing Consumer Protection 
Measures (“GRRHCPM”)45 elaborates on the technical requirements for strength, 
stability and serviceability. The technical requirements for strength and stability include 
that a home and any structural element or component must be planned and built to 
provide strength and stability for the lifetime of the structure. The planning and building 
of the dwelling must be in accordance with accepted standards of good practice. 
During the planning and building phase, foundations of the dwelling must be planned 
and erected to transmit loads from super-structures to soil horizons safely and without 
 
41 Becker et al “Professional Engineers Ontario Structural Condition Assessments of Existing 
Buildings and Designated Structures Guideline” (18-11-2016) PEO. 
42 Rapelang An Evaluation of the Right to “Access to Adequate Housing” 5; S Khoza Socio-
Economic Rights in South Africa: A Resource Book (2007) 262. See also Construction Industry 
Development Board “Construction Quality in South Africa: A Client Perspective a Discussion 
Document” (29-06-2011) <www.cidb.org.za> (10-10-2018). 
43 Sections 1 and 2 of HCPMA. See also Construction Industry Development Board 
“Construction Quality in South Africa: A Client Perspective a Discussion Document” (29-06-
2011) CIDB <www.cidb.org.za> (10-10-2018). 
44 Section 3 of HCPMA. See also Construction Industry Development Board “Construction 
Quality in South Africa: A Client Perspective a Discussion Document” (29-06-2011) CIDB 
<www.cidb.org.za> (10-10-2018). 
45 General Regulations Regarding Housing Consumer Protection Measures GNR 1406 in GG 
20658 of 1 December 1999. 
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causing excessive movement or distress in the elements which they support.46 The 
foundations of the dwelling must be planned and erected to resist differential 
displacement and to prevent the passage of moisture to the interior of the dwelling. 
The floors and stairs of the dwelling must be planned and erected to safely carry their 
own dead loads in addition to any live loads, which they are likely to be subjected to, 
without undue deformation and distress.47 The walls of the dwelling must be planned 
and built to safely withstand any load to which they are likely to be subjected to, without 
impairing weather tightness and without undue deformation and distress. The roof of 
the dwelling and its components must be planned and made to safely resist any forces 
to which they are likely to be subjected to, and without the roof structure becoming 
detached from its respective supporting structure.48 
The technical requirements for serviceability, in turn, include that any home and any 
structural element or component must be durable.49 The home must also resist water 
penetration and prevent condensation which may adversely affect the habitability of 
the dwelling.50 The home must further be able to withstand any loads to which it may 
likely be subjected to, without undue deflection and distortion or cracking over the 
lifetime of the structure. In addition, walls must be planned and built to resist the 
penetration of water into the interior of the dwelling and roofs must be planned and 
made to resist rain penetration to avoid the accumulation of rainwater.51 Accordingly, 
habitability not only requires adequate space, the protection against the elements and 
other threats to health, and physical safety of occupants as defined above, but it also 
encompasses the fact that dwellings should be structurally sound and undamaged. 
 
 
46 General Regulations Regarding Housing Consumer Protection Measures GNR 1406 in GG 
20658 of 1 December 1999. 
47 General Regulations Regarding Housing Consumer Protection Measures GNR 1406 in GG 
20658 of 1 December 1999. 
48 General Regulations Regarding Housing Consumer Protection Measures GNR 1406 in GG 
20658 of 1 December 1999. 
49 General Regulations Regarding Housing Consumer Protection Measures GNR 1406 in GG 
20658 of 1 December 1999. 
50 General Regulations Regarding Housing Consumer Protection Measures GNR 1406 in GG 
20658 of 1 December 1999. 
51 General Regulations Regarding Housing Consumer Protection Measures GNR 1406 in GG 
20658 of 1 December 1999. 
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2 2 6 Concluding remarks 
A conceptual legal understanding of habitability as elaborated by the above-discussed 
elements of habitability shows that a dwelling will arguably exhibit habitability if it meets 
the minimum standard of adequate space, ensures protection against excessive 
environmental factors, provides security from conduct that can be potentially caused 
by individuals or harsh external factors, and is generally a dwelling that has no 
structural defects. The focus now turns to an evaluation of constitutional provisions 
such as human dignity, security of tenure, and access to adequate housing. The aim 
of the section below is to investigate the implications of the Constitution on the 
standard of habitability. Considering the aim of chapter 2 specifically and the 
dissertation as a whole, the significance of this is to investigate what habitability means 
and to assess whether the link between habitability and constitutional rights points 
towards a minimum or common standard of habitability in general or in the specific 
category of inhabitant. 
 
2 3 Impact of the Constitution on the standard of habitability 
2 3 1 Introduction 
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land; therefore any conduct or law 
inconsistent with it is unconstitutional, and all constitutional obligations imposed by the 
Constitution must be fulfilled diligently and without delay.52 This means that the Bill of 
Rights has supremacy over any conduct or law and that the Bill of Rights binds the 
state and its organs, on the one hand, and private landowners (in certain 
circumstances) on the other, to the extent to which the rights are applicable and taking 
into consideration the nature and obligation imposed by the rights.53 However, the 
Constitution may not directly protect tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers and may 
also not explicitly require their dwellings to specifically be habitable. 
The Constitution does nonetheless support the requirement of habitability by 
providing that the state should promote a safe and healthy environment for all.54 This 
 
52 Section 2, read with section 237 of the Constitution. 
53 Section 8 of the Constitution. 
54 See section 152(1)(d) of the Constitution. See also G Muller “Proposing a Way to Develop 
the Substantive Content of the Right of Access to Adequate Housing: An Alternative to the 
Reasonableness Review Model” (2015) 30 Southern African Public Law 71 90. 
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provision of the Constitution on its own may be insufficient to impose an obligation on 
the state to promote habitability, unless it is read with other provisions like section 26 
of the Constitution.55 The Constitution also entrenches rights or values in the Bill of 
Rights ensuring an undeniable promise for social justice and the improvement in the 
quality of life for all people of South Africa.56 This is envisioned by the preamble of the 
Constitution, which states that the Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic and 
aims to “heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic 
values . . . [and] . . . improve the quality of life of all citizens”.57 With that said, South 
African courts have certainly made considerable strides towards reflecting on (quite 
explicitly) a standard of habitability with specific reference to the Constitution. As a 
result, courts have linked habitability with constitutional rights to give effect to the right 
to a habitable dwelling since habitability as a stand-alone concept or right is not 
justiciable. In this regard, the rights contained in chapter 2 of the Constitution have a 
direct impact on habitability. These rights include the right to human dignity,58 security 
of tenure,59 and access to adequate housing.60 
 
55 Compare P de Vos, W Freedman, D Brand, C Gevers, K Govender, P Lenaghan, D Mailula, 
N Ntlama, S Sibanda & L Stone “Socio-Economic Rights” in P de Vos & W Freedman (eds) 
South African Constitutional Law in Context (2014) 670, discussing Joseph v City of 
Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 55 (CC). In this case, the court used section 152 of the Constitution 
and other rights to impose an obligation on the state to protect and advance socio-economic 
rights. 
56 The preamble of the Constitution; section 7(1) of the Constitution. 
57 The preamble of the Constitution (own emphasis added). 
58 Section 10 of the Constitution. This section provides that every person has inherent human 
dignity, and very importantly, the right to have their human dignity respected and protected. 
59 Section 25(6) of the Constitution. This section stipulates that a person or community whose 
tenure of land became legally insecure due to past racially discriminatory laws or practices is 
entitled, to the extent provided for in an Act of Parliament, to either tenure which is legally 
secure or to comparable redress. 
60 Section 26 of the Constitution. This section affords every person the right to have access to 
adequate housing. The section also states that the state must take reasonable legislative and 
other measures, within its available resources, to ensure the progressive realisation of the 
right to access to adequate housing. The section further specifies that no person may be 
evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without a court order made after 
taking into account all legally relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary 
evictions. 
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Thus, when considering the state of dwellings, specifically whether they comply with 
a specific standard of habitability in the constitutional era, it needs to be determined 
what that standard should be. In this regard, a question that crops up is whether and 
to what extent that standard is informed by these constitutional rights to human dignity, 
security of tenure and access to adequate housing. To answer this question, it is 
important to first assess what these constitutional provisions mean and whether the 
link between habitability and these constitutional provisions may inform a minimum (or 
common) standard of habitability. Therefore, the purpose of this section is to unpack 
and elaborate on these fundamental rights to investigate the impact of the Constitution 
on the standard of habitability. The dissertation will now deal with section 39 of the 
Constitution, which provides how the rights in chapter 2 of the Constitution may be 
interpreted. This discussion is done to show that when interpreting legislation 
(regulating tenants and occupiers) or the common law (regulating tenants and 
usufructuaries) in light of the Bill of Rights, such legislation or the common law should 
be interpreted progressively in a way that gives effect to human dignity, equality and 
freedom.61 
 
2 3 2 Interpretation under section 39 of the Constitution 
The Constitution demands that when interpreting the rights in the Bill of Rights the 
values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom should be promoted.62 According to Liebenberg, this serves as 
confirmation of the mandate the Constitution creates or contains, in the case of section 
39, imposed on courts or tribunals to discharge their obligation in promoting the 
foundational values in the interpretation of rights.63 The Constitution also signals a 
must follow and not to be ignored value-based interpretation approach of the Bill of 
 
61 Section 39(1)(a) of the Constitution. See further Eskom Holdings Ltd v National Union of 
Mineworkers 2012 2 SA 197 (SCA) para 28; Minister of Safety & Security v Sekhoto 2011 5 
SA 367 (SCA) para 15; Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd; In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO 2001 1 SA 545 
(CC) paras 21-26. 
62 Section 39 (1)(a) of the Constitution. 
63 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 97-98. 
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Rights.64 As Ngcobo J put it in Matatiele Municipality v President of the Republic of 
South Africa (“Matatiele Municipality”),65 “[c]onstitutional provisions must be construed 
purposively and in the light of the Constitution as a whole”.66 
The Bill of Rights must also be interpreted and understood according to context. 
This may include a textual interpretation or understanding, in which chapter 2 of the 
Constitution and the Constitution as a whole are considered. On the other hand, rights 
must be interpreted and understood in their social and historical context.67 When 
looking at the social and historical context, the court must take into account the 
difficulties associated with the enjoyment of the right in question or the vulnerability of 
the individual persons.68 Chaskalson P, in Soobramoney v Minister of Health, 
KwaZulu-Natal (“Soobramoney”),69 described a more comprehensive context in which 
these rights in the Bill of Rights should be interpreted in the following manner: 
 
“[w]e live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth. Millions of people are 
living in deplorable conditions and in great poverty. There is a high level of unemployment, 
inadequate social security, and many do not have access to clean water or to adequate 
health services. These conditions already existed when the Constitution was adopted and 
a commitment to address them, and to transform our society into one in which there will be 
human dignity, freedom and equality, lies at the heart of our new constitutional order. For 
as long as these conditions continue to exist that aspiration will have a hollow ring.”70 
 
Therefore, when interpreting the Bill of Rights one must recognise the present 
circumstances of tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers coupled with the Constitution’s 
 
64 IM Rautenbach “Interpretation” in Y Mokgoro & P Tlakula (eds) Bill of Rights Compendium 
(SI: 35 2015) 1A-22 (own emphasis). 
65 Matatiele Municipality v President of the Republic of South Africa 2006 5 SA 47 (CC). 
66 Para 36 (own emphasis). 
67 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) paras 22 and 
25. See also IM Rautenbach “Introduction to the Bill of Rights” in Y Mokgoro & P Tlakula (eds) 
Bill of Rights Compendium (SI: 35 2015) 1A-22; Khoza Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 
33. 
68 Khoza Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 33. 
69 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 1 SA 765 (CC). 
70 Para 8. See further Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 
(CC) para 25; Rates Action Group v City of Cape Town 2004 5 SA 545 (C) para 99; Liebenberg 
Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 100; E Cameron 
Justice: A Personal Account (2014) 256; De Vos et al “Socio-Economic Rights” in South 
African Constitutional Law in Context 666. 
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goal towards a society based on democratic values such as human dignity.71 Thus, if 
a purposive interpretative approach is followed, it advances a spirit of transformation.72 
The Constitution further demands that when interpreting legislation (for instance in 
the context of regulating tenants or occupiers) and developing the common law (as 
with the regulation of usufructuaries) the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights 
should be promoted.73 This is a compulsory interpretative mandate in terms of which 
all legislation, the common law and customary law should be interpreted through the 
prism of the Bill of Rights.74 This is because our new constitutional order stems from 
an evolving history in which a switch was made from a society of division, injustice and 
exclusion of democratic processes into the inclusion of democratic processes and 
respect for human dignity, equality and freedom for every citizen when the Bill of Rights 
is interpreted.75 In the case of Frazer v ABSA Bank Ltd (“Frazer”)76 it was confirmed 
 
71 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offenses v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) 
Ltd: In re: Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) para 21. See 
further City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W) para 51; DM Davis 
& K Klare “Transformative Constitutionalism and the Common and Customary Law” (2010) 26 
South African Journal on Human Rights 403 404; P de Vos “Grootboom, the Right of Access 
to Housing and Substantive Equality as Contextual Fairness” (2001) 17 South African Journal 
on Human Rights 258 268; S Liebenberg “South Africa: Adjudicating Social Rights under a 
Transformative Constitution” in M Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging 
Trends in International and Comparative Law (2008) 75 78. 
72 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offenses v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) 
Ltd: In re: Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) para 21. 
73 Section 39(2) of the Constitution. 
74 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offenses v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) 
Ltd: In re: Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) para 21. See 
further Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex Parte President of 
the Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 49; Ahmed v Minister of Home Affairs 
2017 2 SA 417 (WCC) para 17; Carmichele v Minister of Safety & Security 2001 4 SA 938 
(CC) paras 33 and 39; First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner 
for the South African Revenue Services; First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank 
v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 para 31; Jordaan v City of Tshwane Metropolitan 
Municipality; City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v New Ventures Consulting & Services 
(Pty) Limited; Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Livanos 2017 6 SA 287 (CC) para 44; 
City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Link Africa (Pty) Ltd 2015 6 SA 440 (CC) para 
115. 
75 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offenses v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) 
Ltd: In re: Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) para 21. 
76 Frazer v ABSA Bank Ltd 2007 3 SA 484 (CC). 
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that when interpreting legislation or the common law, the Constitution demands the 
promotion of the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.77 This is activated when 
a provision of the legislation (or the common law) under consideration affects 
constitutional rights.78 
 
2 3 2 1 Concluding remarks 
It may be argued that where constitutional rights of tenants, usufructuaries and 
occupiers are impacted by a provision in legislation (or the common law) the court may 
adopt an interpretation of legislation (or the common law) that is in line with the 
Constitution.79 This may, however, be done if the interpretation can reasonably be 
ascribed to the provision in the legislation (or the common law) that regulates these 
type of inhabitants.80 In this regard, courts may not avoid interpretations of 
unconstitutionality. However, the courts may interpret the legislation (or the common 
law) regulating tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers in light of the Bill of Rights.81 
This may ensure that the legislation (or the common law) regulating these categories 
 
77 Para 47. 
78 See Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC) paras 88-90; Frazer v ABSA Bank 
Ltd 2007 3 SA 484 (CC) para 47; DE van Loggerenberg “Excerpts from the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996” in DE van Loggerenberg & E Bertelsmann (eds) Erasmus: 
Superior Court Practice 2 ed Vol 1 (OS: 6 2015) A1-23A; B Maswazi “The Doctrine of 
Precedent and the Value of Section 39(2) of the Constitution” (2017) De Rebus 28 29. 
79 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offenses v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) 
Ltd: In re: Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) para 23; 
University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic v Minister of Justice & Correctional Services; 
Association of Debt Recovery Agents NPC v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic; 
Mavava Trading 279 (Pty) Ltd v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic 2016 6 SA 596 
(CC) para 135. 
80 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offenses v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) 
Ltd: In re: Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) para 23; 
University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic v Minister of Justice & Correctional Services; 
Association of Debt Recovery Agents NPC v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic; 
Mavava Trading 279 (Pty) Ltd v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic 2016 6 SA 596 
(CC) para 135. 
81 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) 
Ltd; In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) paras 21-26; 
Minister of Safety & Security v Sekhoto 2011 5 SA 367 (SCA) para 15; Eskom Holdings Ltd v 
National Union of Mineworkers 2012 2 SA 197 (SCA) para 28. 
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of inhabitants is construed in a manner that promotes the underlying values of that 
legislation (or the common law).82 As a result, the interpretation of the legislation (or 
the common law) governing tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers may not be unduly 
strained.83 Thus, a court engaged in an exercise where constitutional rights are 
affected may prefer an interpretation that gives tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers 
full protection of their constitutional rights.84 This may ensure that tenants, 
usufructuaries and occupiers enjoy exactly what the particular constitutional right 
guarantees them.85 In this regard, the court may embrace an interpretation of 
legislation (or the common law) that promotes constitutional rights and values such as 
human dignity, equality and freedom.86 This may be done even if the provision of the 
legislation (or the common law) relating to tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers is 
clear and unambiguous.87 The following part of this section will explore human dignity 
as a constitutional value after which the rights to human dignity, security of tenure, and 
access to adequate housing will be unpacked. 
 
2 3 3 Human dignity as a constitutional value (sections 1, 7(1), 36(1) and 39(1)(a)) 
The Constitution expressly declares that the Republic of South Africa is one, 
sovereign, democratic state founded on the values of human dignity, equality and 
freedom.88 The Constitution also declares that the Bill of Rights is the cornerstone of 
democracy in South Africa; since it entrenches the rights of all people in our country 
 
82 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) 
Ltd; In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) paras 21-26; 
referred to in Minister of Safety & Security v Sekhoto 2011 5 SA 367 (SCA) para 15; Eskom 
Holdings Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers 2012 2 SA 197 (SCA) para 28. 
83 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) 
Ltd; In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) para 24. 
84 Ahmed v Minister of Home Affairs 2017 2 SA 417 (WCC) para 17; Department of Land 
Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 SA 199 (CC) para 53. 
85 Ahmed v Minister of Home Affairs 2017 2 SA 417 (WCC) para 17; Department of Land 
Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 SA 199 (CC) para 53. 
86 Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 SA 199 (CC) 
para 53. 
87 Para 53; Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) 
para 90. 
88 Section 1(a) of the Constitution. 
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and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.89 
Furthermore, the Constitution makes it clear that the rights in the Bill of Rights may be 
limited only in terms of a law of general application to the extent that the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on the values of 
human dignity, equality and freedom.90 When a court, therefore, interprets the Bill of 
Rights it must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based 
on human dignity, equality and freedom.91 Although all of these foundational values 
are important, the focus of this dissertation is on human dignity as a constitutional 
value.92 
Goolam points out that between these three values, human dignity is expressly 
mentioned first in sections 1, 7, 36 and 39 of the Constitution.93 The significance of 
human dignity appearing before equality and freedom, he submits, is because in 
essence human rights are aimed at protecting the human dignity of people.94 Similarly, 
Ackerman agrees with Goolam and takes the idea on human dignity further by stating 
that “human dignity is not merely a protected and entrenched right, but that the concept 
of human dignity is definitional to what it means to be human”.95 In this regard, it is 
important to note that human dignity is a constitutional value and a constitutional right. 
In the case of Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs (“Dawood”),96 O’Regan J 
meticulously explained and distinguished human dignity as a value, as opposed to a 
right, in the following way: 
 
“The value of dignity in our Constitutional framework cannot therefore be doubted. The 
Constitution asserts dignity to contradict our past in which human dignity for black South 
Africans was routinely and cruelly denied. It asserts it too to inform the future, to invest in 
 
89 Section 7(1). 
90 Section 36(1). 
91 Section 39(1)(a). 
92 It should be mentioned that the endeavour to establish a minimum or common standard of 
habitability may also implicate the value of equality and the right to equal benefit and 
enjoyment of the law. 
93 NMI Goolam “Human Dignity – Our Supreme Constitutional Value” (2001) 4 Potchefstroom 
Electronic Law Journal 43 43. 
94 43 and 44. See also NMI Goolam “The Interim Constitution, the Working Drafts and South 
Africa’s new Constitution – Some Observations” (1997) 12 South African Public Law 186 186. 
95 LWH Ackerman “The Legal Nature of the South African Constitutional Revolution” 2004 
New Zealand Law Review 633 647. 
96 Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC). 
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our democracy respect for the intrinsic worth of all human beings. Human dignity therefore 
informs constitutional adjudication and interpretation at a range of levels. It is a value that 
informs the interpretation of many, possibly all, other rights. This Court has already 
acknowledged the importance of the constitutional value of dignity in interpreting rights 
such as the right to equality, the right not to be punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading 
way, and the right to life. Human dignity is also a constitutional value that is of central 
significance in the limitations analysis. Section 10, however, makes it plain that dignity is 
not only a value fundamental to our Constitution, it is a justiciable and enforceable right that 
must be respected and protected. In many cases, however, where the value of human 
dignity is offended, the primary constitutional breach occasioned may be of a more specific 
right such as the right to bodily integrity, the right to equality or the right not to be subjected 
to slavery, servitude or forced labour.”97 
 
It is clear from the above paragraph that there is a close link between the value of 
human dignity and other constitutional rights. Thus, human dignity in this regard plays 
an important role in the interpretation of rights and its significance cannot be over-
emphasised.98 For example, in Grootboom, the court interpreted the right to housing 
by stressing the importance of the value of human dignity. In this respect, the court 
 
97 Para 35. See further A Barak Human Dignity: The Constitutional Value and the 
Constitutional Right (2015) 266; De Vos et al “Socio-Economic Rights” in South African 
Constitutional Law in Context 459; MR Staffen & M Arshakyan “The Legal Development of the 
Notion of Human Dignity in the Constitutional Jurisprudence” (2016) 12 Revista Brasileira de 
Direito 108 120-121; Nelson Mandela Foundation Trust v Afriforum NPC (EQ02/2018) [2019] 
ZAEQC 2 (21 August 2019) para 28. 
98 See, for example, Section 39 of the Constitution. See further S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 
391 (CC) paras 144 and 328; Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) para 
35; Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention (“NICRO”) 2005 3 SA 
280 (CC) para 21; Ferreira v Levin NO; Vryenhoek v Powell NO 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) paras 
47-49; President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) para 41; Prinsloo 
v Van der Linde 1997 3 SA 1012 (CC) paras 31-33; Harksen v Lane NO 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) 
paras 46 and 50-53, 91-92; National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 
1999 1 SA 6 (CC) paras 17-32 and 120-129; National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v 
Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 SA 1 (CC) paras 41-42 and 48; Bhe v Khayelitsha Magistrate 
2005 1 SA 580 (CC) para 48; Barak Human Dignity 266; R Steinmann “Law and Human 
Dignity at Odds over Assisted Suicide” (2015) De Rebus 24 25; Goolam (2001) Potchefstroom 
Electronic Law Journal 43 50; M Reyneke “The Right to Human Dignity and Restorative 
Justice in Schools” (2011) 14 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 129 130; S Liebenberg 
“The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting Socio-Economic Rights” (2000) 21 South African 
Journal of Human Rights 1 6-7; N Haysom “Dignity” in MH Cheadle, DM Davis & NRL Haysom 
(eds) South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 2 ed (I: 18 2015) 5-1 and 5-4. 
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mentioned that the foundational values of human dignity, freedom and equality are 
denied to people who do not have access to food, clothing or adequate housing.99 This 
means that the value of human dignity informs the standard of life to which someone 
is entitled to live.100 Therefore, the use of the value of human dignity in the 
interpretation of rights, particularly socio-economic rights, may ensure that people live 
in conditions that enable them to develop their potentials in order to flourish as human 
beings.101 The recognition of human dignity as a value in the interpretation of rights 
also affirms that human dignity is a cornerstone of the rights in chapter 2 of the 
Constitution.102 However, the value of human dignity is not a distinct and enforceable 
right on its own.103 Amongst other values, human dignity informs and gives substance 
to the rights contained in chapter 2 of the Constitution since it is foundational.104 
 
99 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 23. See 
also Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 
6 SA 505 (CC) para 44; De Vos et al “Socio-Economic Rights” in South African Constitutional 
Law in Context 459. 
100 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 28. See also 
De Vos et al “Socio-Economic Rights” in South African Constitutional Law in Context 459. 
101 Liebenberg (2000) South African Journal of Human Rights 13. See also De Vos et al “Socio-
Economic Rights” in South African Constitutional Law in Context 459-460. 
102 Sections 1(a) and 39(1)(a) of the Constitution. See further A Chaskalson “Human Dignity 
as a Foundational Value of our Constitutional Order” (2000) 16 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 193 204; Reyneke (2011) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 130; H Botha 
“Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stellenbosch Law Review 171 197; Currie 
& De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 253; MH Cheadle, DM Davis & NRL Haysom South 
African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2002) 130; Haysom “Dignity” in South African 
Constitutional Law 5-1 and 5-6; S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 328. 
103 Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention (“NICRO”) 2005 3 SA 280 
(CC) para 21. See also Barak Human Dignity 266; Rautenbach “Introduction to the Bill of 
Rights” in Bill of Rights Compendium 1A-22. 
104 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 328. See further Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 
3 SA 1012 (CC) para 32, which provides that dignity is at the heart of individual rights; 
President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) para 92; Dawood v Minister 
of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) para 35; Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for 
Crime Prevention (NICRO) 2005 3 SA 280 (CC) para 21; Barak Human Dignity 266; I Currie 
& J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 253; Cheadle, Davis & Haysom South 
African Constitutional Law 125-127; Rautenbach “Introduction to the Bill of Rights” in Bill of 
Rights Compendium 1A-22; Haysom “Dignity” in South African Constitutional Law 5-1; R 
Steinmann “The Core Meaning of Human Dignity” (2016) 19 Potchefstroom Electronic Law 
Journal 1 8; C McCrudden “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) 
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Devenish correctly submits that human dignity as a value constitutes a moral basis for 
the existence and operation of other fundamental rights.105 According to the 
Constitutional Court, human dignity as a constitutional value informs and gives 
substance to all constitutional rights as evident from a close reading of section 1 of the 
Constitution, and the manner in which the Constitution is structured, specifically the 
Bill of Rights.106 
 
2 3 3 1 Concluding remarks 
It is clear that the value of human dignity is significant as it informs how the Bill of 
Rights may be adjudicated and interpreted under a transformative Constitution.107 
Human dignity as a value would impact on the analysis of whether a dwelling is 
habitable when legislation (regulating tenants and occupiers) and the common law 
(regulating tenants and usufructuaries) is interpreted in line with the Constitution and 
based on constitutional values such as human dignity, equality and freedom.108 The 
dissertation now turns to discuss human dignity as a constitutional right and other 
 
19 European Journal of International Law 656 680; Reyneke (2011) Potchefstroom Electronic 
Law Journal 130; O Schachter “Human Dignity as a Normative Concept” (1983) 77 American 
Journal of International Law 848 848-854. 
105 GE Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) 81. For a similar 
view see also Barak Human Dignity 266; Cheadle, Davis & Haysom South African 
Constitutional Law 125-127; Haysom “Dignity” in South African Constitutional Law 5-3. 
106 Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention (NICRO) 2005 3 SA 280 
(CC) para 21. 
107 Haysom “Dignity” in South African Constitutional Law 5-1; Barak Human Dignity 266-267. 
The concept of “transformative constitutionalism” has been described by Klare as “[a] long-
term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement committed … to 
transforming a country’s political and social institutions and power relationships in a 
democratic, participatory and egalitarian direction.” In the context of this dissertation, 
“transformative constitutionalism” would mean that courts as ultimate guardians of the 
Constitution should interpret legislation and the common law to promote constitutional values. 
Such an interpretation will ensure that constitutional rights are applied in a manner that 
improves the quality of life of tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers. See generally KE Klare 
“Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 146 150; SM Mbenenge “Transformative Constitutionalism: A Judicial 
Perspective from the Eastern Cape” (2018) 32 Speculus Juris 1 2. 
108 See chapter 2 part 2 3 2 above. 
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fundamental rights such as security of tenure and access to adequate housing, all of 
which potentially impact on a meaning of habitability in various contexts of occupancy. 
 
2 3 4 Human dignity as a constitutional right (section 10) 
Section 10 of the Constitution states that “[e]veryone has inherent dignity and the right 
to have their dignity respected and protected”.109 Human dignity is an inherent 
characteristic, which all people possess in the same measure.110 In our constitutional 
dispensation, human dignity has been recognised as one of the most important rights 
in the Constitution.111 Section 10 of the Constitution embodies three basic 
requirements.112 The first is the requirement that holds that everyone has inherent 
dignity.113 In this context, the inherent dignity of all people in section 10 is an 
affirmation that the respect for human dignity is a true reflection of the attribute of life 
 
109 Section 10 of the Constitution. 
110 Steinmann (2015) De Rebus 25. See further Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 3 SA 1012 
(CC) paras 32-33, where the court mentioned that human beings are inherently equal in 
dignity; as well as S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 329, where the court found that 
the Constitution affirms the equal worth of all South Africans. Likewise, in Minister of Home 
Affairs v Fourie 2006 1 SA 524 (CC) para 50, the court reiterated that all persons have the 
same inherent worth and dignity as human beings. See further President of the Republic of 
South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) para 41; National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality 
v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 SA 1 (CC) para 42; Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for 
Economic Development, Eastern Cape 2015 6 SA 125 (CC) para 43. 
111 Staffen & Arshakyan (2016) Revista Brasileira de Direito 108 120; Reyneke (2011) 129 
131; Goolam (2001) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 43 43; Haysom “Dignity” in South 
African Constitutional Law 5-1; S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) paras 144 and 328; 
Ferreira v Levin NO; Vryenhoek v Powell NO 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) para 47. 
112 Steinmann (2016) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 6; Steinmann (2015) De Rebus 
25; LR Barroso “Here, There and Everywhere: Human Dignity in Contemporary Law and the 
Transitional Discourse” (2012) 35 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 
331 360; N Rao “Three Concepts of Human Dignity in Constitutional Law” (2011) 86 Notre 
Dame Law Review 183 187-189; Botha (2009) Stellenbosch Law Review 189-190; 
McCrudden (2008) European Journal of International Law 679; Schachter (1983) American 
Journal of International Law 848 849-854. 
113 Steinmann (2015) De Rebus 25; Steinmann (2016) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 
6; McCrudden (2008) European Journal of International Law 656 679. 
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in its entirety and not some advantage granted to people by the state.114 Inherent 
dignity speaks to the sense of self-worth a person has as an individual and as a 
member of the society. It encompasses a personal understanding that each and every 
person is worthy of acknowledgement as a human being and should be treated 
humanely.115 Therefore, conduct or conditions that may result in a person being seen 
as less human is unacceptable in terms of section 10 of the Constitution.116 
The second requirement in section 10 relates to the idea that everyone is entitled 
to have their human dignity respected. This further includes the entitlement to receive 
treatment that is consistent with human dignity from other people.117 Goolam suggests 
that for true respect of human dignity as required by section 10 of the Constitution to 
have more practical value or impact, the meaning of “tolerance” as reflected in the UN 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (“UNESCO”) 1995 Declaration on the 
Principles of Tolerance should be applied in our constitutional dispensation.118 Goolam 
further submits that our courts should, in this new constitutional dispensation, invoke 
the meaning of “tolerance” as reflected in article 1 of Declaration on the Principles of 
Tolerance (“DPT”).119 This is because “tolerance” as defined in the DPT is consistent 
with respect for human rights and its application in our constitutional dispensation will 
mean the rejection of social injustice or weakening of one's rights. Practicing tolerance 
would mean that one is entitled to have his or her rights respected and protected.120 
This may ensure that every person lives in a habitable dwelling. 
The third requirement of human dignity is that the state or private individuals (in 
special circumstances where the private person is required by legislation and other 
 
114 Chaskalson (2000) South African Journal on Human Rights 193 196; Goolam (2001) 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 43 46; Steinmann (2016) Potchefstroom Electronic Law 
Journal 1 5 and 9-17. 
115 De Vos et al “Socio-Economic Rights” in South African Constitutional Law in Context 457; 
Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC) para 27; Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v 
Minister of Justice & Constitutional Development 2014 2 SA 168 (CC) para 52. 
116 De Vos et al “Socio-Economic Rights” in South African Constitutional Law in Context 457; 
Haysom “Dignity” in South African Constitutional Law 5-10 and 5-12. 
117 Steinmann (2015) De Rebus 25; Steinmann (2016) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 
1 6; McCrudden (2008) European Journal of International Law 656 679. 
118 See generally Goolam (2001) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 48. 
119 Goolam (2001) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 48-19. 
120 UNESCO 1995 Declaration on the Principles of Tolerance. 
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measures to provide housing for another)121 are under the obligation to provide 
minimum living conditions for its inhabitants in terms of socio-economic rights.122 
These requirements illustrate the importance of human dignity and that it should be 
accorded to everyone irrespective of race or gender. Although these requirements 
have not been specifically identified in case law in that manner, a closer look at S v 
Makwanyane (“Makwanyane”)123 shows that judges do apply these requirements 
when adjudicating matters concerning the Bill of Rights.124 This is clear from the 
holding of the court in Makwanyane that the recognition of human dignity as a 
constitutional right asserts the inherent worth of human beings, and implies that human 
beings are entitled to be treated as worthy of respect and concern.125 
The right to human dignity sometimes overlaps or conflicts with other fundamental 
rights. For example, parents have an interest in how their children should be raised. If 
their child misbehaves, they usually give that child a hiding. The hiding may seem 
reasonable to the parents as an unruly child may be chastised in terms of religion or 
their belief. However, the child might find such hiding as unreasonable and inhumane. 
Moreover, the inflicting of pain may be seen as an infringement of his right in terms of 
section 10 (human dignity), section 12 (freedom and of security of the person) and 
 
121 See, for example, Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 48-49; Erasmus v Mtenje 
(LCC 202/2017) [2018] ZALCC 12 (12 June 2018) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/12.html> para 32. 
122 Steinmann (2015) De Rebus 25; Steinmann (2016) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 
6; McCrudden (2008) European Journal of International Law 656 679; IM Rautenbach 
“Vonnisbespreking: Sosiale Regte en Private Pligte – Huisvesting op Plase Daniels v 
Scribante 2017 8 BCLR 949 (KH)” (2017) 14 Litnet Akademies 959 959; IM Rautenbach 
“Overview of Constitutional Court Judgments on the Bill of Rights – 2017” (2018) Tydskrif vir 
die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 367 372-373. 
123 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC). 
124 Steinmann (2016) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 6-8; Steinmann (2015) De Rebus 
25. 
125 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 328. See further Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 
3 SA 1012 (CC) para 32; President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) 
para 92; Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 252; Staffen & Arshakyan (2016) 
Revista Brasileira de Direito 108 120; Steinmann (2015) De Rebus 25; Goolam (2001) 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 43 45; Reyneke (2011) 129 131-132; Liebenberg 
(2000) South African Journal of Human Rights 1 6-7; A Raath “Human Personhood and Social 
Benevolence – Reformational Reflections on the Right to Human Dignity” (2007) 72 Koers: 
Bulletin for Christian Scholarship 159 159-191. 
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section 28 (children’s rights). If this is accepted, the human dignity and religious beliefs 
of the parents might be affected. This is because the parents would be told how to 
raise their child and could be seen as weak in the eyes of the public if they do not 
discipline their child where he has done wrong.126 Where such tension of rights or 
overlap or conflict ensues, the right to human dignity has been used as an aid that 
reinforces the overlapping or conflicting rights.127 The right to human dignity can also 
be in conflict with other fundamental rights such as the right to life. In such instances, 
the value of human dignity is essentially used in a limitations analysis in terms of 
section 36 of the Constitution.128 In our new constitutional dispensation, the right to 
human dignity has been used as a device to create rights that were not specifically 
provided for in legislation or the common law,129 as evidenced in the recent case of 
Daniels.130 Consequently, section 10 of the Constitution may be used to give effect to 
rights that were not recognised in terms of the common law or explicitly stated in 
legislation. In the next few paragraphs this section continues to discuss the purpose 
of human dignity, conduct prohibited, and the persons protected and bound by section 
10. The discussion will elaborate on human dignity in order to facilitate an appropriate 
legal understanding of habitability. 
The purpose of section 10 of the Constitution is to guarantee everyone respect and 
protection for their human dignity.131 This means that everyone should be regarded as 
bearers of human rights and not as objects to be treated inhumanly by others.132 This 
 
126 Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC) para 15. See 
other examples in Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC) para 27; Botha (2009) 
Stellenbosch Law Review 182; Barak Human Dignity 272. 
127 Steinmann (2015) De Rebus 25; Barak Human Dignity 157; McCrudden (2008) European 
Journal of International Law 656 680; Cheadle, Davis & Haysom South African Constitutional 
Law 123; Rautenbach “Introduction to the Bill of Rights” in Bill of Rights Compendium 1A-
1301A-131; Haysom “Dignity” in South African Constitutional Law 5-1. 
128 Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) para 35; Steinmann (2015) De 
Rebus 25; Barak Human Dignity 157. 
129 Steinmann (2015) De Rebus 25. 
130 See Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 27-34. 
131 Rautenbach “Introduction to the Bill of Rights” in Bill of Rights Compendium 1A-130; 
Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) para 35; Bhe v Khayelitsha Magistrate 
2005 1 SA 580 (CC) para 48. 
132 A Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) 83; Rautenbach 
“Introduction to the Bill of Rights” in Bill of Rights Compendium 1A-130; Liebenberg (2000) 
South African Journal of Human Rights 1 6-7; Reyneke (2011) Potchefstroom Electronic Law 
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brings in the conduct that section 10 of the Constitution primarily guards against. 
Section 10 prohibits conduct that treats persons in a cruel, inhuman, humiliating, or 
degrading manner.133 In other words, the infringement of human dignity refers to 
conduct or ideas that directly offend or degrade human dignity and the worth of 
people.134 It is therefore important to pause and point out that the conduct identified 
here is not an exhaustive list since the courts have not exhaustively tested human 
dignity against all potential conduct. There are several cases which have, in the past, 
dealt with the protection of the right to human dignity. These cases indicate what 
conduct the right to human dignity guards against and in what circumstances such 
conduct will be prohibited. This discussion may be valuable when considering how 
human dignity can be used to prevent certain conduct in the context of an owner or 
landlord denying tenants, usufructuaries and/or occupiers a certain standard of 
habitability. In this regard, human dignity relates to both conduct and living conditions. 
In Makwanyane, the court held that at the very core of the right to human dignity 
lies the fact that everyone is entitled to claim protection against conduct that is cruel, 
inhuman and degrading.135 In National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v Minister 
of Justice (“Minister of Justice”)136 the court, in turn, found that the common law crime 
of sodomy constituted an infringement of the right to equality and human dignity.137 
This is because gay men were simply arrested, prosecuted and convicted when they 
 
Journal 131; Advance Mining Hydraulics v Botes 2000 1 SA 815 (T) 823; Government of the 
Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 71; S v Dodo 2001 3 SA 382 
(CC) para 38; Bhe v Khayelitsha Magistrate 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) para 187. 
133 D Davis, H Cheadle & N Haysom Fundamental Rights in the Constitution: Commentary 
and Cases (1997) 73; Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 254; Devenish A 
Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights 84; Rautenbach “Introduction to the Bill of 
Rights” in Bill of Rights Compendium 1A-130 - 1A-133; Haysom “Dignity” in South African 
Constitutional Law 5-10 and 5-12; Reyneke (2011) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 129 
133; Advance Mining Hydraulics v Botes 2000 1 SA 815 (T) 823. 
134 Steinmann (2016) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 16. See also Schachter (1983) 
American Journal of International Law 851 852; Rautenbach “Introduction to the Bill of Rights” 
in Bill of Rights Compendium 1A-130, 1A-134. 
135 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 111. See also Currie & De Waal The Bill of 
Rights Handbook 254. 
136 National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC). 
137 Para 28. See also De Vos et al “Socio-Economic Rights” in South African Constitutional 
Law in Context 459. 
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engaged in sexual conduct that was ordinarily part of human experience. According to 
the court, such a punishment degraded and devalued gay men and impaired their 
human dignity in terms of section 10.138 In another case of S v Williams (“Williams”),139 
the court pointed out that the reason for the protection against cruel, inhuman or 
degrading conduct was the acknowledgement of how the community views decency 
in line with human dignity.140 The protection afforded by section 10 of the Constitution 
was taken further in other cases as well. For instance, in Stanfield v Minister of 
Correctional Services (“Stanfield”),141 the court found that section 10 protects against 
conduct that denies a terminally-ill prisoner to die in peace with his family.142 In Robert 
James Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice & Correctional Services (“Stransham-
Ford”),143 the court, in turn, found that allowing a terminally-ill patient to suffer in an 
undignified way without assisted suicide amounts to an infringement of human dignity 
under section 10.144 The protection that everyone enjoys in terms of section 10 also 
relates to conduct in which living conditions are deplorable or degrading as illustrated 
in Mpange and Daniels.145 Therefore, it is clear that human dignity may not be limited 
to conduct that infringes one’s personality; respect for human dignity may also require 
that one lives in conditions that befit a standard of human dignity.146 
Before one may argue that their human dignity has been infringed by either the 
conduct of another or the conditions in which they live, it is important to determine 
whether such a person is in fact a bearer of the right to human dignity, or falls within 
the category of persons who are protected by section 10 of the Constitution. In terms 
of section 10, every person (whether natural or juristic, such as a company) has a right 
 
138 National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC) para 
28. See also De Vos et al “Socio-Economic Rights” in South African Constitutional Law in 
Context 459. 
139 S v Williams 1995 3 SA 632 (CC). 
140 Para 35. See also Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 254. 
141 Stanfield v Minister of Correctional Services 2004 4 SA 43 (C). 
142 Para 129. See also Steinmann (2016) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 16. 
143 Robert James Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice & Correctional Services 2015 4 SA 50 
(GNP). 
144 Para 12. 
145 See Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 31; Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 
(W) paras 53-55. 
146 Liebenberg (2000) South African Journal of Human Rights 9. See also De Vos et al “Socio-
Economic Rights” in South African Constitutional Law in Context 460. 
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to have their human dignity respected and protected.147 This dissertation will however 
only focus on human dignity exercised or enjoyed by a natural person. This is because 
the dissertation deals with categories of inhabitants that live in property belonging to 
a private person. 
In contrast to the beneficiaries of the right as mentioned above, the persons that 
are bound by section 10 of the Constitution include the state and all its organs.148 This 
is because the state and all its organs have an obligation in terms of the Constitution 
to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.149 Arguably, this 
obligation may include a duty to ensure habitability of dwellings inhabited by the 
categories of comparison. In Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 
(“Carmichele”),150 the Constitutional Court confirmed that the state is obliged by the 
Constitution and international law to protect the human dignity of people.151 In this 
regard, the obligation of the state or its organs is to protect the human dignity of 
persons against impairment by other persons or state arms. This obligation is fulfilled 
when the state protects the dignity of persons against the conduct of other persons by 
putting laws in place which prohibit undignified conduct and provide for or make 
 
147 Section 10 of the Constitution. See also Barak Human Dignity 272; Rautenbach 
“Introduction to the Bill of Rights” in Bill of Rights Compendium 1A-130; H Cheadle 
“Application” in MH Cheadle, DM Davis & NRL Haysom (eds) South African Constitutional 
Law: The Bill of Rights 2 ed (I: 18 2015) 3-23 – 3-26. 
148 Section 8(1) of the Constitution. See further Devenish A Commentary on the South African 
Bill of Rights 91; Davis, Cheadle & Haysom Fundamental Rights in the Constitution 70-71; 
Rautenbach “Introduction to the Bill of Rights” in Bill of Rights Compendium 1A-130, 1A-134; 
Haysom “Dignity” in South African Constitutional Law 5-14. 
149 Section 7(2) of the Constitution. See further Steinmann (2015) De Rebus 25; Steinmann 
(2016) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 9 and 23; Rautenbach “Introduction to the Bill of 
Rights” in Bill of Rights Compendium 1A-130; Van Loggerenberg “Excerpts from the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996” in Erasmus: Superior Court Practice A1-2; 
D Davis “Rights” in H Cheadle, D Davis & N Haysom (eds) South African Constitutional Law: 
The Bill of Rights 2 ed (I: 18 2015) 2-4 – 2-9 and 5-14; Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social 
Development 2017 3 SA 335 (CC) paras 40-41, where the court underlined that the state has 
an obligation to protect and fulfil the right in Chapter 2 of the Constitution; Advance Mining 
Hydraulics v Botes 2000 1 SA 815 (T) 823. 
150 Carmichele v Minister of Safety & Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC). 
151 Paras 44 and 62. See also Steinmann (2016) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 9. 
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remedies available in the case of infringement.152 As Ackermann and Goldstone JJ 
put it in Carmichele “there is a duty imposed on the state and all of its organs not to 
perform any act that infringes [fundamental] rights. In some circumstances, there 
would also be a positive component which obliges the state and its organs to provide 
appropriate protection to everyone through laws and structures designed to afford 
such protection [against possible infringement].”153 The same argument on the 
obligations of the state in terms of the Constitution was made in Glenister v President 
of the Republic of South Africa (“Glenister”),154 where the court emphasised that 
section 7(2) of the Constitution imposes special obligations on the state. For that 
reason, the court concluded that the requirement that the state “must respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights” entails that the state must create 
efficient mechanisms through which infringement of the Bill of Rights is curbed.155 
However, human dignity may also apply between private individuals in certain 
instances. This is because a provision of the Bill of Rights may bind either natural or 
juristic persons.156 More importantly, section 10 reinforced by section 8(2) of the 
Constitution, may imply that certain persons are duty-bound to uphold human dignity 
and not to impair it. This may include the responsibility that every person should treat 
other human beings in a dignified and humane manner.157 Consequently, in the 
circumstances where human dignity is claimed against the state, its organs, or private 
persons in certain instances, the interpretation of any law, its application and 
 
152 Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights 91; Davis, Cheadle & Haysom 
Fundamental Rights in the Constitution 70-71; Rautenbach “Introduction to the Bill of Rights” 
in Bill of Rights Compendium 1A-134. 
153 Carmichele v Minister of Safety & Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 44. See similarly Rail 
Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2005 2 SA 721 (CC) para 71. 
154 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC). 
155 Para 177. See also My Vote Counts NPC v President of the Republic of South Africa 2017 
6 SA 501 (WCC) para 35. 
156 Section 8(1)-(2) of the Constitution. See further Devenish A Commentary on the South 
African Bill of Rights 91; Rautenbach “Introduction to the Bill of Rights” in Bill of Rights 
Compendium 1A-130, 1A-134; Van Loggerenberg “Excerpts from the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996” in Erasmus: Superior Court Practice A1-2. 
157 Goolam (2001) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 43 46; Rautenbach “Introduction to 
the Bill of Rights” in Bill of Rights Compendium 1A-134. 
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development must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights in terms 
of section 39(2) of the Constitution.158 
 
2 3 4 1 Concluding remarks 
Against this background, it can be concluded that human dignity is an inherent 
characteristic of human beings which recognises the intrinsic worth of a human being. 
The protection given by section 10 of the Constitution is aimed at preventing conduct 
and living conditions that degrade the inherent dignity of humans. The implication of 
section 10 of the Constitution on the standard of habitability is that everyone has 
inherent human dignity and by implication, they may be entitled to live somewhere in 
dignity. Moreover, human dignity may require another to receive equal treatment and 
concern from others and not be regarded as an instrument to fulfil their objective. 
Furthermore, as will be argued in chapters 3, 4 and 5 below, section 10 (in conjunction 
with section 8(1) to (2) of the Constitution) may require the state or private individuals 
to provide inhabitants with minimum habitable living conditions in terms of socio-
economic rights. This provides the platform for looking at another constitutional right 
potentially impacting on habitability, namely the right to security of tenure, which is 
discussed below. 
 
2 3 5 Security of tenure (section 25(6)) 
Section 25(6) of the Constitution provides for secure tenure. It reads: 
 
“[a] person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, 
either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress.”159 
 
Section 25(6) of the Constitution clearly seeks to ensure that persons or communities 
who lost security of tenure or even those who never had secure tenure as a 
consequence of apartheid discriminatory laws or practices are enabled by way of an 
Act of Parliament to have security of tenure restored to them. Nevertheless, if there is 
no possibility that the lost security of tenure can be restored to such a person or 
 
158 Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights 91. 
159 Section 25(6) of the Constitution. 
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community, they are eligible for comparable redress.160 It is noteworthy to point out 
that section 25(6) of the Constitution emphasises “legally secure” tenure for a person 
or community. According to Pienaar, the reference to “legally secure” tenure includes 
(a) the content, definition and delineation of the form of tenure, and (b) how to enforce 
the form of tenure.161 She submits that “legally secure” in the context of the latter two 
points, speaks to the legal meaning of the kind of tenure that one enjoys within a 
property law context. Pienaar further points out that “legally secure” in relation to how 
to enforce the form of tenure focuses on the protection the tenure affords individuals 
or communities in instances of unlawful invasion or eviction.162 
The core of section 25(6) is to ensure that a person possesses a certain level of 
security where they stay. In this regard, there cannot be true security of tenure devoid 
of access to adequate housing. This is because security of tenure is a key element of 
access to adequate housing. Moreover, security of tenure and access to adequate 
housing are closely linked to habitability in the following terms: if the house is not 
habitable, the dweller is denied access to adequate housing that would have enabled 
the dweller to hold a degree of security of tenure. As a result, the dweller may vacate 
the house because it is not habitable, which in effect impacts on the right to security 
of tenure of the dweller if he or she is rendered homeless.163 It is a vicious cycle really, 
and all the elements (namely habitability, secure tenure and access to adequate 
housing) potentially impact on each other. The question of whether occupiers have 
secure tenure seems to be wider than the question of whether they live in habitable 
property. This discussion further raises questions about the purpose of section 25(6) 
of the Constitution, specifically in terms of the conduct that the provision aims to protect 
against, who the bearers are of the right and who is bound to fulfil the right in terms of 
the provision. These are dealt with briefly below. Against the backdrop of the above 
discussion, it is important to note that, the purpose of section 25(6) of the Constitution 
 
160 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 165. See also Pienaar Land Reform 390; 
Khoza Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 204; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various 
Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 19. 
161 Pienaar Land Reform 390. 
162 390. 
163 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 33-34. 
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is to provide and guarantee persons with secure land tenure which had become legally 
insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices.164 
In general, section 25(6) provides a person or community legal protection against 
any form of unlawful interference, harassment or other threats related to eviction.165 
This is commendable since evictions need to be monitored by the courts.166 In PE 
Municipality, the court recognised that property rights, the right to access to adequate 
housing and the right not to be arbitrarily evicted from one’s home, are interrelated. 
Thus, the stronger the right to property, the greater the prospect of a secure home for 
inhabitants.167 Section 25(6) of the Constitution further protects individuals or 
communities who had property rights violated as a result of apartheid practices or 
laws, bearing in mind section 8(1) to (2) of the Constitution.168 The purpose of section 
8(1) to (2) of the Constitution is to ensure that the rights enshrined in the Constitution 
are enforceable against the state or private persons.169 Therefore, the protection 
guaranteed by section 25(6) of the Constitution is to the extent provided for in an Act 
of Parliament.170 Parliament must thus enact the legislation referred to in section 25(6) 
of the Constitution.171 For purposes of this dissertation, ESTA is an important example 
of legislation that was enacted by Parliament that specifically aims to secure tenure 
and give effect to section 25(6) of the Constitution.172 ESTA provides the state with 
 
164 Pienaar Land Reform 390; Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 560; Rautenbach 
(2018) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 372. 
165 Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 559-561; Pienaar Land Reform 390; 
CESCR’s General Comment No 4 (Sixth session, 1991) The Right to Adequate Housing 
(Article 11(1) of the ICESCR), UN Doc E/ 1992/23 para 8(a); Rapelang An Evaluation of the 
Right to “Access to Adequate Housing” 19. 
166 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 32. 
167 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 19. See also 
Khoza Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 237. 
168 Section 25(6), read together with section 8(2) of the Constitution. See also Pienaar Land 
Reform 390; Khoza Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 26; Cheadle “Application” in South 
African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 3-23. 
169 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 157. 
170 Section 25(6) of the Constitution. See also Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 
13. 
171 Section 25(9) of the Constitution. See also Pienaar Land Reform 390; Pienaar & Brickhill 
“Land” in CLOSA 48-25. 
172 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 13; Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights 
Handbook 561; Rautenbach (2018) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 372. 
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measures to facilitate long-term security of land tenure. It regulates the conditions of 
residence on certain land. Moreover, it regulates the conditions on, and circumstances 
under which, the right of persons to reside on land may be terminated. The 
circumstances under which persons, whose right of residence had been terminated, 
may be evicted from land, is also set out in ESTA.173 It will thus be necessary to 
determine the extent to which section 25(6) points towards a minimum standard of 
habitability for occupiers. This statement should not be construed to mean that section 
25(6) is not applicable in the context of tenants and usufructuaries. 
The obligation imposed by section 25(6) is both positive and negative in nature.174 
The Constitution provides that where a right in the Bill of Rights is at stake, the state 
must “respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights”.175 The 
Constitution further states that a right in the Bill of Rights “applies to all law, and binds 
the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary and all organs of state”.176 More 
specifically in relation to section 25(6), the Constitution stipulates that “[t]he state must 
take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to 
foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis”.177 
It is clear that in terms of section 25(6) of the Constitution a positive obligation rests 
on the state to ensure that tenure is restored to persons whose tenure has been lost 
 
173 See the purpose of ESTA. See also Pienaar & Brickhill “Land” in CLOSA 48-28 – 48-29; 
Khoza Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 211. 
174 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 49. 
175 See section 7(2) of the Constitution. See further A Nolan “Daniels v Scribante: South Africa 
Pushes the Boundaries for Horizontality and Social Rights” (2017) International Journal on 
Constitutional Law Blog 1/3 2/3; Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essay 
NO (CCT 29/10) [2011] ZACC 13 (11 April 2011) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2011/13.html> para 45; Van Loggerenberg “Excerpts 
from the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996” in Erasmus: Superior Court 
Practice A1-2; Davis “Rights” in South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 2-4 – 2-9; 
Khoza Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 35-37; Advance Mining Hydraulics v Botes 2000 
1 SA 815 (T) 823. 
176 Section 8(1) of the Constitution. See further Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 
157; Nolan (2017) International Journal on Constitutional Law Blog 1/3 2/3; Rautenbach 
“Introduction to the Bill of Rights” in Bill of Rights Compendium 1A-193; Van Loggerenberg 
“Excerpts from the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996” in Erasmus: Superior 
Court Practice A1-2; Cheadle “Application” in South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of 
Rights 3-15 – 3-16. 
177 Section 25(5) of the Constitution. 
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due to racially discriminatory laws or practices.178 The state also has a negative 
obligation to refrain from doing something that may limit another person’s access to 
and enjoyment of secure tenure.179 Nevertheless, a reading of the words “legislative 
and other measure” in the constitutional provision could arguably be a source of also 
holding private owners liable to ensure that other persons gain access to and enjoy 
secure tenure.180 The state has already taken reasonable legislative measures by 
enacting ESTA.181 In this respect, section 25(6) of the Constitution enjoins landowners 
through ESTA to provide occupiers with dwellings to use as accommodation.182 As a 
private owner voluntarily provides housing to occupiers on its land, the owner may 
arguably bear a primary positive obligation to provide housing with secure tenure.183 
This is because the owner may be enjoined by the Constitution through ESTA to make 
his or her land available to the occupier to use as accommodation. The landowner 
may also bear a negative obligation not to improperly interfere with the occupier’s right 
to security of tenure.184 
 
178 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 167. 
179 De Vos et al “Socio-Economic Rights” in South African Constitutional Law in Context 671-
674. 
180 S Liebenberg “The Application of Socio-Economic Rights to Private Law” (2008) Tydskrif 
vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 464 468; S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication 
under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 328-329; S Liebenberg “Socio-Economic Rights 
Beyond the Public-Private Law Divide” in M Langford, B Cousins, J Dugard & T Madlingozi 
(eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: Symbols or Substance? (2014) 63 70-71; J 
Klaaren “An Institutional Interpretation of Socio-Economic Rights and Judicial Remedies after 
TAC” in H Botha, AJ van der Walt and J van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a 
Transformative Constitution (2003) 105 105-115; J Klaaren “A Remedial Interpretation of the 
Treatment Action Campaign Decision” (2003) 19 South African Journal on Human Rights 455 
460-461. 
181 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) para 3. 
182 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 49. 
183 Para 49. 
184 Para 49. See further In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) para 78; Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v 
Essay NO (CCT 29/10) [2011] ZACC 13 (11 April 2011) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2011/13.html> para 58; Jaftha v Schoeman Van 
Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) paras 33-34; Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet 
Ltd t/a Metrorail 2005 2 SA 359 (CC) paras 68-71; Minister of Health v Treatment Action 
Campaign (2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 46; Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
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The landowners’ liability may also lie in the fact that the application of constitutional 
rights is not only limited to the relationship between the state and natural persons. The 
rights in the Constitution may also apply between natural persons and private 
landowners. This is clear from and reinforced by section 8(2) of the Constitution which 
states that a right in the Bill of Rights may bind a natural or juristic person “if, and to 
the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature 
of any duty imposed by the right.”185 However, it is apparent that some of the rights in 
the Constitution may potentially be applicable and enforceable against the state.186 
This is because section 8(1) of the Constitution expressly pronounces that the rights 
contained in the Constitution bind the state and its respective organs.187 
Furthermore, section 8(2) of the Constitution provides for the fact that the Bill of 
Rights in the Constitution may bind natural or juristic persons depending on whether 
the right applies to the particular person, and having regard to the nature of the right 
and the obligation imposed by the rights.188 This means that it may be expected in 
some circumstances, where the private landowner is required by legislative and other 
policy or judicial measures to make its property available for use as accommodation, 
to provide a habitable dwelling to its inhabitants.189 In light of the above discussion on 
the obligation imposed by section 25(6), a private landowner may be obliged to provide 
habitable dwellings to its occupant depending on a number of considerations. First, 
whether the owner was enjoined by legislation and other policy or judicial measures 
to provide housing for use as accommodation. Second, the nature of the right and the 
obligation imposed by the right. Finally, whether the landowner improperly interfered 
with the occupant’s rights. In the respective chapters that follow, the dissertation will 
focus on the obligation imposed by the Constitution in the context of section 25(6) 
where private individuals are bound. 
 
 
Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 34; Van Eeden v Minister of Safety & Security 2003 1 SA 
389 (SCA) para 13; S v Baloyi 2000 2 SA 425 (CC) para 11. 
185 Section 8(2) of the Constitution. See also Nolan (2017) International Journal on 
Constitutional Law Blog 1/3 2/3; Van Loggerenberg “Excerpts from the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996” in Erasmus: Superior Court Practice A1-2. 
186 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 157. 
187 Para 157. 
188 Para 157. 
189 Para 49. 
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2 3 5 1 Concluding remarks 
In light of the discussion of the right to security of tenure, it is clear that there may be 
an integral link between security of tenure and habitability specifically in the context of 
the right to access to adequate housing and human dignity. Although occupiers (to the 
extent provided in legislation) are at all stages of their occupancy obviously subject to 
section 25(6) of the Constitution as opposed to tenants (subject to a lease agreement) 
and usufructuaries (subject to a usufruct grant), all of these occupants arguably may 
not be excluded from protection in terms of the right contained in section 25(6) of the 
Constitution. Furthermore, it needs to be assessed whether the link between security 
of tenure and habitability may be used as a minimum standard of habitability for 
tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers in South African law because they enjoy 
protection in terms of the Constitution. In addition to the above-mentioned rights and 
their impact on the standard of habitability that various inhabitants may expect in light 
of the Constitution, the right to access to adequate housing that is essential to the right 
to human dignity, will be discussed next. 
 
2 3 6 Access to adequate housing (section 26) 
Section 26 makes provision for the right to have access to adequate housing. It 
provides as follows: 
 
“(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right. 
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an 
order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may 
permit arbitrary evictions.”190 
 
The right enshrined in section 26(1) of the Constitution is a right to access to adequate 
housing. The Constitutional Court has interpreted the right as meaning more than a 
physical structure.191 Access to adequate housing further requires available land, 
 
190 Section 26(1), (2) and (3) of the Constitution. 
191 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 35. See 
further City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W) para 49; Rapelang 
An Evaluation of the Right to “Access to Adequate Housing” 22; S Rosa The Means and the 
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appropriate services such as water, removal of sewages and money to finance every 
necessity including that of building the dwelling itself. Accordingly, land, services and 
a dwelling encapsulate what would ordinarily be access to adequate housing.192 This 
immediately reveals a link between habitability and the right to access to adequate 
housing. Housing gives rise to tenure and requires services like daily removal of 
sewage and refuse for the house to be in an acceptable condition. All of these are 
correlated with habitability.193 Here also, it should be mentioned that the question of 
whether one has access to adequate housing as defined here seems to be wider than 
the question of whether the categories of comparison live in habitable dwellings. 
Van Bueren shows that “adequate” in section 26(1) of the Constitution means that 
the dwelling has to be habitable.194 This may mean that there can be no access to 
adequate housing in a dwelling that is not habitable. In this regard, Van Bueren 
indicates that for housing to be “adequate" it must be habitable and provides its 
inhabitants with adequate space, protection from the elements, and other threats to 
health and physical safety.195 Rapelang mentions in this regard that the right to access 
to adequate housing guarantees everyone a safe, healthy and secure place to live in 
peace and human dignity.196 As mentioned earlier, this is also underpinned by section 
152(1)(d) of the Constitution, which provides for the promotion of safe and healthy 
environments. 
 
Ends of Justice: The Interaction Between Socio-Economic Rights and Administrative Justice 
in a South African Democratic Developmental State LLD dissertation, Stellenbosch University 
(2017) 129; Muller (2015) Southern African Public Law 71 72; L Chenwi “The Right to Have 
Access to Adequate Housing” (2007) 8 Economic and Social Rights Review in South Africa 
21 22; Khoza Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 34. 
192 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 35. See 
further Muller (2015) Southern African Public Law 71 72; Chenwi (2007) Economic and Social 
Rights Review in South Africa 22; Rapelang An Evaluation of the Right to “Access to Adequate 
Housing” 22; Rosa The Means and the Ends of Justice 129; Khoza Socio-Economic Rights in 
South Africa 34; G van Bueren “Housing” in MH Cheadle, DM Davis & NRL Haysom (eds) 
South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 2 ed (I: 18 2015) 21-6 – 21-7. 
193 M Craven The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A 
Perspective on its Development PhD thesis, University of Nottingham (1992) 380. 
194 Van Bueren “Housing” in South African Constitutional Law 21-8. 
195 Van Bueren “Housing” in South African Constitutional Law 21-8, citing CESCR’s General 
Comment No 4 (Sixth session, 1991) The Right to Adequate Housing (Article 11(1) of the 
ICESCR), UN Doc E/ 1992/23 para 8(d). 
196 Rapelang An Evaluation of the Right to “Access to Adequate Housing” 21. 
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In Grootboom, the court observed that “[t]he Constitution will be worth infinitely less 
than its paper if … action concerned with housing is determined without regard to the 
fundamental constitutional value of human dignity”.197 This correctly flows from the 
premise that the rights in the Bill of Rights are interrelated with human dignity and are 
all equally important.198 Similarly, the court in Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 
(“Jaftha”) mentioned that human dignity is inherently linked with socio-economic 
rights.199 Apart from that, it is an essential pivot of a society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom to have rights integrally linked to one another in order to give 
effect to each other. Therefore, it is imperative to evaluate action on the right to access 
to housing with the inherent dignity of human beings.200 This is because housing is 
important for human dignity.201 
The purpose of section 26 of the Constitution is to promote and guarantee everyone 
access to adequate housing and provide people with rights protecting their homes.202 
Khoza states that the aim of section 26(1) of the Constitution is to give people access 
to housing, basic needs and services, which are crucial for human beings to lead a 
dignified life.203 In terms of section 26, everyone (including children) is a beneficiary of 
the right to access to adequate housing.204 In Khosa v Minister of Social Development; 
 
197 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 83. See 
also Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea Township & 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 10. 
198 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) paras 23 and 
83. See also Khoza Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 27. 
199 Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) para 24. 
200 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 83. See 
also Khoza Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 20; Van Bueren “Housing” in South African 
Constitutional Law 21-3. 
201 Khoza Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 21; Chenwi (2007) Economic and Social 
Rights Review in South Africa 21; Rapelang An Evaluation of the Right to “Access to Adequate 
Housing” 8; Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 
44; Malan v City of Cape Town 2014 6 SA 315 (CC) para 127. 
202 S Liebenberg “Housing” in D Davis, H Cheadle & N Haysom (eds) Fundamental Rights in 
the Constitution: Commentary and Cases (1997) 334. 
203 Khoza Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 20. 
204 Section 26 of the Constitution. See further Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 34; Cheadle “Application” in South African Constitutional 
Law: The Bill of Rights 3-23 – 3-26; Rautenbach “Introduction to the Bill of Rights” in Bill of 
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Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development (“Khosa”),205 the court mentioned that the 
right in section 26 of the Constitution is for the benefit of both citizens and non-
citizens.206 Section 26 of the Constitution, like any other fundamental right, imposes a 
mixture of obligations either on the state or on a private landowner or individual.207 
According to Chenwi, the right to access to adequate housing is one of the most 
important rights enshrined in the Constitution for the enjoyment of all other rights.208 
She further notes that housing is essential for human dignity and physical and mental 
health and also for socio-economic development. She concludes by pointing out the 
importance of the right to access to adequate housing in terms of the Constitution, 
especially section 7(2), which makes it mandatory for the state or its organs to respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil the right to access to adequate housing by taking 
reasonable legislative measures that realise this right as stipulated in section 26(1) to 
(2) of the Constitution.209 The relevant legislative measures enacted to realise this 
right for purposes of this dissertation include a) the Housing Act 107 of 1997 (“HA”); 
 
Rights Compendium 1A-206; Van Bueren “Housing” in South African Constitutional Law 21-
6; Khoza Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 26 and 237. 
205 Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 
6 SA 505 (CC). 
206 Paras 46-47. See also Larbi-Odam v Member of the Executive Council for Education 
(North-West Province) 1998 1 SA 745 (CC) paras 19-20, where Mokgoro J pointed out that 
non-citizens are a vulnerable group in general and thus have little political muscle. 
Accordingly, excluding them from claiming socio-economic rights is discriminatory; Khoza 
Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 42. 
207 A Nolan “Holding Non-State Actors to Account for Constitutional Economic and Social 
Rights Violations: Experiences and Lessons from South Africa and Ireland” (2014) 12 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 61 76; Khoza Socio-Economic Rights in South 
Africa 20; Cheadle “Application” in South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 3-1; 
Liebenberg “South Africa: Adjudicating Social Rights under a Transformative Constitution” in 
Social Rights Jurisprudence 78; S Ellmann “A Constitutional Confluence: American ‘State 
Action’ Law and the Application of South Africa’s Socio-Economic Rights Guarantees to 
Private Actors” in P Andrews & S Ellmann (eds) The Post-Apartheid Constitutions: 
Perspectives on South Africa’s Basic Law (2001) 444 444. 
208 Chenwi (2007) Economic and Social Rights Review in South Africa 1. 
209 21. See also Rapelang An Evaluation of the Right to “Access to Adequate Housing” 8; 
Hohmann The Right to Housing 96; JC Mubangizi The Protection of Human Rights in South 
Africa: A Legal and Practical Guide 2 ed (2013) 145. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
51 
b) the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 (“RHA”) or the Rental Housing Amendment Act 
35 of 2014 (once it is signed into law) (“RHAA”); and c) ESTA.210 
Section 26 of the Constitution binds both the state and private persons.211 Although 
section 26 does not explicitly stipulate the obligations imposed on the state or private 
persons, a negative obligation does exist upon the state and all other private entities 
to refrain from preventing or impairing the right to access to adequate housing.212 
Concerning the state, it must further endeavour to protect individuals from violations 
of this right caused by other persons.213 Liebenberg submits that section 26 of the 
Constitution has the potential to bind private individuals if they do not refrain from 
interfering with another’s right to access to adequate housing.214 In Grootboom, the 
 
210 Mubangizi The Protection of Human Rights in South Africa 145-146. 
211 Section 26(1)-(2) of the Constitution. See further Liebenberg “Housing” in Fundamental 
Rights in the Constitution 353 and 349; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication under 
a Transformative Constitution 82, 317-335; S Liebenberg “The Interpretation of Socio-
Economic Rights” in S Woolman, T Roux, J Klaaren, A Stein, M Chaskalson & M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed Vol 2 (RS: 6 2014) 33-6; Rautenbach “Introduction to 
the Bill of Rights” in Bill of Rights Compendium 1A-207; Van Loggerenberg “Excerpts from the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996” in Erasmus: Superior Court Practice A1-2; 
Davis “Rights” in South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 2-4 – 2-9; D Horsten 
“The Role Played by the South African Human Rights Commissions, Economic and Social 
Rights Report in Good Governance in South Africa” (2006) 9 Potchefstroom Electronic Law 
Journal 177 177; Khoza Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 20 and 35-37; Government of 
the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) paras 34 and 38; Advance 
Mining Hydraulics v Botes 2000 1 SA 815 (T) 823. 
212 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 34. See 
further Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) para 50; Minister of Health v Treatment Action 
Campaign (2) 2002 5 SA 703 (CC) para 46; Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 
SA 140 (CC) para 34; Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2005 2 SA 
721 (CC) para 69; City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 SA 417 (SCA) 
paras 37-38; In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, 1996 
4 SA 744 (CC) para 78; Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 568; Khoza Socio-
Economic Rights in South Africa 20 and 24; Liebenberg “The Interpretation of Socio-Economic 
Rights” in CLOSA 33-17; G van Bueren “Housing” in MH Cheadle, DM Davis & NRL Haysom 
(eds) South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 2 ed (I: 18 2015) 21-2 and 21-6. 
213 Khoza Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 20. 
214 Liebenberg “Housing” in Fundamental Rights in the Constitution 353. See also Rautenbach 
“Introduction to the Bill of Rights” in Bill of Rights Compendium 1A-207; Currie & De Waal The 
Bill of Rights Handbook 568-584; Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 
2001 1 SA 46 (CC) paras 34 and 38. 
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court held that a right to access to adequate housing suggests that it is not only the 
state that has the obligation to provide accommodation for people; private landowners 
should be enabled by legislative and other measures to house others.215 This means 
that a private owner may, in certain instances as required by legislative and other 
measures, bear a positive obligation to provide housing for certain categories of 
inhabitants such as tenants, usufructuaries or occupiers. As it may be appropriate to 
impose an obligation on the private landowner to provide constitutional rights in terms 
of legislative and other measures in certain circumstances, it may imply that a 
landowner can also have the positive obligation to ensure habitability because he or 
she has that obligation under the right to access to adequate housing. 
The conduct that section 26(3) of the Constitution guards against is conduct that 
evicts people from their homes, or demolishes their homes without a court order.216 In 
Grootboom, the court described the eviction of people without a court order as 
premature and inhumane with the effect of leaving people without their homes and 
their possessions destroyed.217 This indicates that our Constitution has a special 
regard for peoples’ homes since a home is viewed as more than a shelter protecting 
people from natural disasters or other threats, but also a place where people should 
enjoy personal and family security.218 Sachs J in PE Municipality recognised that 
eviction from a home or demolition thereof is “a shock for any family, the more so for 
one that has established itself on a site that has become its familiar habitat”.219 With 
this in mind, section 26 of the Constitution stands to show that conduct that prevents 
people from residing in their houses in peace, security and human dignity is contrary 
to the Constitution.220 Additionally, unhealthy living conditions, lack of tenure, 
inadequate housing and lack of access to adequate basic services like water or 
 
215 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 35. 
216 Section 26(3) of the Constitution. See further Liebenberg “Housing” in Fundamental Rights 
in the Constitution 349; Rautenbach “Introduction to the Bill of Rights” in Bill of Rights 
Compendium 1A-209; Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 586-587; Khoza Socio-
Economic Rights in South Africa 240; Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) para 10. 
217 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 10. See 
also Van Bueren “Housing” in South African Constitutional Law 21-2. 
218 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 17. 
219 Para 17. 
220 CESCR’s General Comment No 4 (Sixth session, 1991) The Right to Adequate Housing 
(Article 11(1) of the ICESCR), UN Doc E/ 1992/23 para 7. 
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sanitation violates the right to access to adequate housing.221 However, an eviction or 
demolition of a home is permissible after obtaining a court order where the court had 
considered all the relevant circumstances of the people concerned.222 Liebenberg 
points out that the relevant circumstances the court must take into account before it 
grants an order for eviction or demolition includes taking into account the personal 
circumstances of those denied a place to reside.223 Moreover, the right to adequate 
housing also prevents conduct by legislation authorising arbitrary evictions.224 This 
means that the state is precluded from enacting legislation in which arbitrary evictions 
are permitted.225 
 
2 3 6 1 Concluding remarks 
It is clear from the above discussion that section 26 was included in the Constitution 
in order for people to gain access to adequate housing. As indicated above, the right 
is very wide and it grants the holder thereof, at the very least, protection of existing 
housing that meets a particular standard. However, for an inhabitant to really have that 
access to housing that is adequate, the dwelling must be habitable. The impact of 
section 26 of the Constitution on the standard of habitability is that, at the very least, 
adequate housing has to be habitable in order to provide inhabitants with an 
opportunity to enjoy other fundamental rights such as human dignity and security of 
tenure. Interestingly, this standard is the same minimum standard of habitability as 
reflected in the CESCR’s General Comment 4, which sets out the meaning of 
habitability in relation to the right to adequate housing dealt with below.226 The courts 
 
221 Rapelang An Evaluation of the Right to “Access to Adequate Housing” 3. 
222 Section 26(3) of the Constitution. See also Liebenberg “Housing” in Fundamental Rights in 
the Constitution 349; Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 586-587; Van Bueren 
“Housing” in South African Constitutional Law 21-12. 
223 Liebenberg “Housing” in Fundamental Rights in the Constitution 350. See further Van 
Bueren “Housing” in South African Constitutional Law 21-12. 
224 Section 26(3) of the Constitution. See also Liebenberg “Housing” in Fundamental Rights in 
the Constitution 349; Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 589; Van Bueren 
“Housing” in South African Constitutional Law 21-12. 
225 Section 26(3) of the Constitution. See also Liebenberg “Housing” in Fundamental Rights in 
the Constitution 349; Van Bueren “Housing” in South African Constitutional Law 21-12. 
226 CESCR’s General Comment No 4 (Sixth session, 1991) The Right to Adequate Housing 
(Article 11(1) of the ICESCR), UN Doc E/1992/23 paras 7-8(d). 
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have generally invoked this standard in fleshing out the obligations imposed by section 
26 of the Constitution.227 This is commendable because it gives inhabitants the 
necessary protection and provides guidance towards what would be expected of the 
right to a habitable house. 
From the above analysis, it may be concluded that there is a link between 
habitability and section 26 of the Constitution. This link comes as a result of habitability 
being an element of access to adequate housing as contained in section 26. The link 
may point towards a minimum standard of habitability for tenants, usufructuaries and 
occupiers. In dealing with sections 26, 25(6) and 10 of the Constitution, the courts 
have also invoked the prescriptions of the ICESCR and the CESCR’s General 
Comment 4 (for instance in the context of tenants and occupiers where constitutional 
rights have been at stake). This is because a court interpreting the Bill of Rights must 
interpret such rights with particular reference to international law.228 Moreover, when 
a court interprets any legislation, the court must interpret that legislation in a manner 
that is compatible with international law.229 The CESCR tasked with interpreting the 
ICESCR has noted the meaning of habitability in the CESCR’s General Comment 4. 
The purpose of the next section is to investigate the impact of international law on the 
standard of habitability to provide a conceptual legal meaning of habitability and 
canvass what a minimum standard of habitability would be in general or in particular 







227 See, for example, Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) para 51; Government of the 
Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) paras 26-33; City of Johannesburg 
v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 SA 417 (SCA) para 20; Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen 
v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) para 24. 
228 Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution. This section stipulates that a court interpreting the Bill 
of Rights must consider international law. 
229 Section 233 of the Constitution, which require courts when interpreting any legislation to 
prefer an interpretation that is reasonable and consistent with international law above any 
interpretation that is inconsistent with international law. 
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2 4 Impact of international law on the standard of habitability 
2 4 1 Introduction 
As already mentioned, the Constitution attaches great value to international law and 
makes it obligatory for a court interpreting the Bill of Rights to consider international 
law.230 This signals that guidance may be sought from international law that has dealt 
with similar matters at hand before a court of law.231 Since international law serves to 
guide the court in interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court must consider such law. 
However, a court is not bound to follow or to apply international law.232 As Chaskalson 
P aptly explained in Makwanyane: 
 
“[P]ublic international law would include non-binding as well as binding law. They may both 
be used under the section as tools of interpretation. International agreements and 
customary international law accordingly provide a framework within which [the Bill of Rights] 
can be evaluated and understood, and for that purpose, decisions of tribunals dealing with 
comparable instruments, such as the United Nations Committee on Human Rights, the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
the European Commission on Human Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights, 
and, in appropriate cases, reports of specialised agencies such as the International Labour 
 
230 See Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution; Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 26; Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 
140 (CC) para 23; Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) 
para 201; Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 570; Liebenberg Socio-
Economic Rights Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 101; Devenish A 
Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights 622; Rautenbach “Introduction to the Bill of 
Rights” in Bill of Rights Compendium 1A-25; A O’Shea “International Law and the Bill of 
Rights” in Y Mokgoro & P Tlakula (eds) Bill of Rights Compendium (SI: 35 2015) 7A-6; D Davis 
“Interpretation of the Bill of Rights” in MH Cheadle, DM Davis & NRL Haysom (eds) South 
African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 2 ed (I: 18 2015) 33-2; J Dugard International 
Law: A South African Perspective 4 ed (2011) 347-348; BV Slade International Law in the 
Interpretation of Sections 25 and 26 of the Constitution LLM thesis, Stellenbosch University 
(2010) 5 and 13-37. 
231 Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) para 23. 
232 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 103; 
Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights 622; Rautenbach “Introduction to 
the Bill of Rights” in Bill of Rights Compendium 1A-25; O’Shea “International Law and the Bill 
of Rights” in Bill of Rights Compendium 7A-6; De Vos et al “Socio-Economic Rights” in South 
African Constitutional Law in Context 675; BV Slade International Law in the Interpretation of 
Sections 25 and 26 of the Constitution LLM thesis, Stellenbosch University (2010) 5 and 13-
37. 
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Organisation, may provide guidance as to the correct interpretation of particular provisions 
of [the Bill of Rights].”233 
 
Thus, international law that is applicable to a particular situation can be a useful guide 
that can provide a better interpretation and a desired result in line with our Constitution. 
However, the weight to be attached to international law will differ depending on 
whether it directly applies to, and binds South Africa.234 International law applies and 
binds South Africa in terms of sections 231 and 233 of the Constitution.235 Section 
231, on the one hand, creates a dualist system that South Africa should follow 
regarding international law.236 Section 231 further requires that before ratified237 
international law becomes law in South Africa, it must be enacted into law by national 
legislation.238 However, a self-executing provision239 of international law is regarded 
as law in South Africa, unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of 
Parliament.240 Section 233 of the Constitution, on the other hand, enjoins a court to 
prefer any reasonable interpretation of legislation that is consistent with international 
law.241 There are a host of sources relating to international law found in international 
 
233 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 35. See also Government of the Republic of 
South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 26; Liebenberg “The Interpretation of 
Socio-Economic Rights” in CLOSA 33-10 – 33-11; Davis “Interpretation of the Bill of Rights” 
in South African Constitutional Law 33-2. 
234 Sections 231-235 of the Constitution; cited in Government of the Republic of South Africa 
v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 26; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication 
under a Transformative Constitution 102-103; Liebenberg “The Interpretation of Socio-
Economic Rights” in CLOSA 33-11. 
235 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 103. 
236 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 103. 
237 Ratification mean the duty to discharge obligations in good faith. See generally Article 2 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 done at Vienna on 23 May 1969. Entered 
into force on 27 January 1980. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol 1155, p 331. 
238 Section 231(4) of the Constitution; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication under 
a Transformative Constitution 103. 
239 A self-executing provision mean a provision of international law that can be directly applied 
in municipal law without being incorporated into legislation. See generally J Dugard 
International Law: A South African Perspective 4 ed (2011) 68; Liebenberg Socio-Economic 
Rights Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 103. 
240 Section 231(4) of the Constitution; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication under 
a Transformative Constitution 103. 
241 See section 233 of the Constitution in detail. 
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treaties, declarations and conventions.242 However, for purposes of this section, the 
ICESCR and CESCR’s General Comment 4243 is an example of the relevant 
international law, which may be an important starting point in understanding the impact 
of international law on the concept and standard of habitability. In this regard, the 
section below sets out the relevant article of the ICESCR and then deals with the 
CESCR’s General Comment 4 on article 11(1) of the ICESCR, which is soft law that 
sets out the right to adequate housing in relation to habitability. 
 
2 4 2 Prescriptions of the ICESCR 
The ICESCR provides the most progressive international standard protecting housing 
rights.244 The ICESCR provides that: 
 
“[t]he [s]tates [p]arties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and 
housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The [s]tates [p]arties will 
take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the 
essential importance of international cooperation based on free consent.”245 
 
It further states that: 
 
“[e]ach [s]tate [p]arty to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to 
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”246 
 
242 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 105-
117; Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights 622-623; P Dhliwayo Tenure 
Security in Relation to Farmland LLM thesis, Stellenbosch University (2012) 31-35. 
243 CESCR’s General Comment No 4 (Sixth session, 1991) The Right to Adequate Housing 
(Article 11(1) of the ICESCR), UN Doc E/ 1992/23. 
244 B Thiele “The Human Rights to Adequate Housing: A Tool for Promoting and Protecting 
Individual and Community Health” (2002) 92 American Journal of Public Health 712 713. 
245 Article 11(1) of the ICESCR. See also Muller (2015) Southern African Public Law 71 80; S 
Maass “Rental Housing as Adequate Housing” (2011) 3 Stellenbosch Law Review 759 770; S 
Maass “Rental Housing as Adequate Housing” in S Liebenberg & G Quinot (eds) Law and 
Poverty: Perspectives from South Africa and Beyond (2012) 328. 
246 Article 2(1) of the ICESCR. 




South Africa is a state party to the ICESCR and is therefore obliged to recognise the 
right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for themselves and their families.247 
Consequently, tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers may be protected by the 
ICESCR.248 The obligations to be fulfilled by South Africa as a state party to the 
ICESCR are monitored by the CESCR.249 Therefore, it is of significance to look at the 
CESCR’s General Comment 4 and its impact on the standard of habitability. In fleshing 
out the impact of this international law on the standard of habitability, the CESCR’s 
meaning of habitability in the CESCR’s General Comment 4 is of particular 
importance.250 In the CESCR’s General Comment 4, the CESCR’s view on the right 
to housing is neither narrow nor restrictive, as this is a right to inhabit a secure, 
peaceful and dignified house, which should be considered to be more than the four 
walls and roof of a house.251 This is strengthened by the link between the right to 
adequate housing and human dignity.252 In this regard, the inherent human dignity of 
persons informs an interpretation of housing that is “adequate” and is ensured to 
 
247 Article 11(1) of the ICESCR; CESCR’s General Comment No 4 (Sixth session, 1991) The 
Right to Adequate Housing (Article 11(1) of the ICESCR), UN Doc E/ 1992/23 para 1; 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 27. 
248 CESCR’s General Comment No 4 (Sixth session, 1991) The Right to Adequate Housing 
(Article 11(1) of the ICESCR), UN Doc E/ 1992/23 para 6, which states that the right to 
adequate housing applies to everyone; Muller (2015) Southern African Public Law 71 81, 
states that the right to adequate housing should not be interpreted in a manner that excludes 
any person from enjoying its protection. 
249 Thiele (2002) American Journal of Public Health 713; Muller (2015) Southern African Public 
Law 71 81; Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 
29; Khoza Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 238; M Langford & JA King “Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Past, Present and Future” in M Langford (ed) Social 
Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (2008) 477 
479, 676. 
250 CESCR’s General Comment No 4 (Sixth session, 1991) The Right to Adequate Housing 
(Article 11(1) of the ICESCR), UN Doc E/ 1992/23 para 7. 
251 Para 7. 
252 Para 7; Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) para 51. For the link between housing and 
dignity, see Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 
83; Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) para 24; Occupiers of 51 
Olivia Road Berea Township & 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 2008 
3 SA 208 (CC) para 10. 
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everyone (including tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers).253 As such, the CESCR 
has acknowledged the importance of adequacy concerning the right to housing. This 
is because adequacy underscores numerous factors that can be used to determine 
what constitutes adequate housing for the purposes of the CESCR’s General 
Comment 4.254 
In relation to habitability, the CESCR has noted that: 
 
“Adequate housing must be habitable, in terms of providing the inhabitants with adequate 
space and protecting them from cold, damp, heat, rain, wind or other threats to health, 
structural hazards, and disease vectors. The physical safety of occupants must be 
guaranteed as well. The Committee encourages [s]tates parties to comprehensively apply 
the Health Principles of Housing prepared by WHO which view housing as the 
environmental factor most frequently associated with conditions for disease in 
epidemiological analyses; i.e. inadequate and deficient housing and living conditions are 
invariably associated with higher mortality and morbidity rates”.255 
 
There is clearly an important link that exists between habitability and adequate 
housing, in the sense that a habitable dwelling should be somewhere to live in security, 
peace and dignity.256 Moreover, habitability is linked to other human rights such as 
human dignity.257 The impact of the CESCR’s General Comment 4 on the standard of 
habitability is that housing should comply with habitability requirements including 
health and safety standards.258 These standards require that adequate housing may 
be recognised as habitable if it provides shelter from cold, damp, heat, rain, wind or 
other threats to health, structural hazards, and disease vectors.259 By this, it means 
 
253 CESCR’s General Comment No 4 (Sixth session, 1991) The Right to Adequate Housing 
(Article 11(1) of the ICESCR), UN Doc E/ 1992/23 para 7. 
254 Para 8. See also Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) para 24; 
Muller (2015) Southern African Public Law 71 82; Maass (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 
759 771; Maass “Rental Housing as Adequate Housing” in Law and Poverty 329. 
255 CESCR’s General Comment No 4 (Sixth session, 1991) The Right to Adequate Housing 
(Article 11(1) of the ICESCR), UN Doc E/ 1992/23 para 8(d). 
256 Paras 7-8(d). 
257 Paras 7-8. See also Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) para 51. 
258 Thiele (2002) American Journal of Public Health 712. 
259 713; Khoza Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 239. 
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that there cannot be adequate housing without habitability, safety and security, which 
includes the dignified living conditions of inhabitants.260 
The impact of the ICESCR is that state parties to the ICESCR are under the 
obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the minimum standard of habitability by adopting 
legislative standards and regulations.261 For instance, the state should ensure that 
every old and new house being built in the public sector corresponds with a minimum 
standard of habitability.262 Craven discourages overregulation because it may 
negatively affect the right to housing. However, he advocates for strict regulation in 
terms of legislation in the private sector where construction firms are involved in 
building houses for a profit. He points out furthermore that where local communities or 
individuals are building houses for themselves, regulation must not be strict since it 
may discourage people to build their own homes.263 Hohmann also correctly 
advocates for less strict regulation in instances where communities or individuals in 
informal settlements build their own houses. However, where one builds a house to 
rent out or accommodate another in terms of legislation, there should be regulation to 
ensure that dwellings are safe and suitable to live in. 
Furthermore, CESCR’s General Comment 4 invokes the World Health 
Organisation’s (“WHO”) health principles of housing, which must be rigidly applied by 
all state parties. These principles view (uninhabitable) housing as an environmental 
factor connected with unsafe, unsanitary and inadequate housing.264 The health 
 
260 CESCR’s General Comment No 4 (Sixth session, 1991) The Right to Adequate Housing 
(Article 11(1) of the ICESCR), UN Doc E/ 1992/23 paras 7-8(d). See also Thiele (2002) 
American Journal of Public Health 712 713. 
261 Articles 11(1) and 2(1) of the ICESCR, read together with CESCR’s General Comment No 
4 (Sixth session, 1991) The Right to Adequate Housing (Article 11(1) of the ICESCR), UN Doc 
E/1992/23 paras 7-8(d). See further Thiele (2002) American Journal of Public Health 712 713; 
M Strauss A Right to the City for South Africa’s Urban Poor LLD dissertation, Stellenbosch 
University (2017) 142; Craven The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: A Perspective on its Development 380. 
262 Craven The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective 
on its Development 380. 
263 Craven The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective 
on its Development 380; Craven The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 142-143; Hohmann The Right to Housing 25. 
264 CESCR’s General Comment No 4 (Sixth session, 1991) The Right to Adequate Housing 
(Article 11(1) of the ICESCR), UN Doc E/ 1992/23 paras 7-8(d). See also Strauss A Right to 
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principles regulating the link between housing and habitability include the protection 
from communicable diseases; protection from injuries, poisonings and chronic 
diseases; reducing psychological and social stresses to a minimum; improving the 
environment; making informed use of housing; and protecting populations at risk.265 
The first two principles are of particular relevance to habitability. The first principle 
provides that adequate housing that is habitable may be ensured by way of safe water 
supply, sanitary disposal of excreta; disposal of solid waste, drainage of surface water, 
personal and domestic hygiene and structural safeguards from disease vectors.266 
The second principle states that structural safety such as ventilation and light should 
be ensured. Moreover, the structure of the house should provide physical safety to the 
inhabitants by not exposing them to dangerous conditions or structural hazards.267 In 
light of the above, it may be said that adequate housing is not just a roof over one’s 
head. Adequate housing must be habitable with secure tenure and adhering to the 
standard of human dignity. Thus, when one or more of the attributes of habitability is 
not present, it can be said that housing is inadequate because it is uninhabitable.268 
These principles are being taken into account by court in the category of tenants and 
recently in respect of occupiers. In the context of usufructuaries, the principles have 
not yet been explicitly stated as a need has not arisen to invoke such principles in that 
particular context. However, that does not mean that they do not apply to 
usufructuaries as will be argued in chapter 4. Although it is a very high standard, it 
should arguably be expected in all categories of comparison, presumably if all these 
types of inhabitants rely on the Constitution and have regard to international law as 
required by the Constitution. 
 
 
the City for South Africa’s Urban Poor 142; Thiele (2002) American Journal of Public Health 
712 713; Hohmann The Right to Housing 25. 
265 World Health Organization “Health Principles of Housing, Geneva Switzerland” (1989) 
WHO <http://www.who.int/iris/handle/10665/39847> (12-10-2018). See also Thiele (2002) 
American Journal of Public Health 712 713. 
266 World Health Organization “Health Principles of Housing, Geneva Switzerland” (1989) 
WHO. See also Thiele (2002) American Journal of Public Health 712 713. 
267 World Health Organization “Health Principles of Housing, Geneva Switzerland” (1989) 
WHO. See also Thiele (2002) American Journal of Public Health 712 713. 
268 South African Human Rights Commission 3rd Economic and Social Rights Report 1999-
2000 (2001) 250 and 252. 
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2 5 Conclusion 
Considering the importance of the habitability of dwellings in the twenty-first century, 
as a point of departure this chapter conceptualises the legal meaning of habitability by 
focusing on the elements of habitability, the impact of the Constitution on the standard 
of habitability and the importance of international law on the standard of habitability in 
South African law. The chapter concludes that a conceptual legal meaning of 
habitability may not be viewed in isolation from other fundamental human rights, 
amongst others, human dignity, security of tenure, and access to adequate housing. 
This is because the meaning of habitability may carry more weight and practical effect 
if it is linked with human rights as discussed above. The CESCR’s General Comment 
4 in this regard also emphasises the importance of linking habitability with other human 
rights in order to achieve better housing standard. 
In terms of the constitutional rights that may provide impetus to understanding 
habitability, it should be noted that the question of having access to adequate housing 
and security of tenure as defined in this chapter seems to be wider than the question 
of whether the dwellings inhabited by tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers are 
habitable. Although the right to access to adequate housing, the right to security of 
tenure and the right to human dignity may be used in some (or all) the categories to 
make an argument that a dwelling that is not habitable will not comply with the standard 
in terms of each of these constitutional rights, these constitutional provisions arguably 
do not overtly state when a dwelling is habitable. In different circumstances also these 
constitutional rights would not provide what constitutes a “habitable dwelling” for the 
purposes of residential property. However, when habitability is linked with these 
constitutional rights such as human dignity, security of tenure and access to adequate 
housing, it may arguably point towards a stronger constitutional standard of habitability 
for tenancy, ususfructus and occupiers. 
The general aim of this chapter was to conceptualise the legal meaning of 
habitability and canvass what may be a minimum standard of habitability in general, 
or for tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers in South African law, more specifically. 
The chapter gives an outline of the general principles associated with the legal concept 
of habitability by pinpointing what may be a minimum standard of habitability. It further 
investigates the impact of the Constitution and the extent to which the prescriptions of 
the ICESCR and CESCR’s General Comment 4 impacts on the standard of 
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habitability. A conceptual understanding of habitability has laid the foundation to 
investigate whether the meaning of habitability and/or the standard of habitability is 
similar for tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers in chapters 3, 4, and 5 of the 
dissertation. These issues are examined in the respective chapters that follow. 
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CHAPTER 3: HABITABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF TENANTS 
3 1 Introduction 
The Rental Housing Amendment Act 35 of 2014 (“RHAA”) will introduce a change to 
the South African residential tenancy law.1 Of particular relevance to this chapter, the 
change as suggested by the RHAA lies in the meaning of habitability in the context of 
tenants, and the obligation that ordinarily rests on the landowner to place and maintain 
the property in a condition reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was leased.2 
Before the RHAA was introduced, landowners3 are obliged under the common law to 
provide tenants with a dwelling4 that is in a condition reasonably fit for the purpose for 
which it was leased.5 The obligation of the landowner in that regard will be changed to 
habitability in terms of the RHAA.6 Hence, habitability in the context of tenants should 
be considered against the background of the move from the common law regulating 
the position towards more protection for tenants in terms of a standard of habitability 
as envisioned in the RHAA. Against this background, this chapter seeks to investigate 
how the notion of habitability is and should be viewed in the context of tenants 
occupying dwellings belonging to landowners. It remains to be seen what the individual 
standard is in this regard, and whether a minimum standard can be derived in terms 
 
1 G Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale and Lease 4 ed (2014) 385; S Viljoen The Law of Landlord and 
Tenant (2016) 200-201; SI Mohamed Landlord and Tenant – Rights and Obligations (2019) 
45; Mohamed “Safeguards for Tenants ‘Habitability will Replace Fit for the Purpose’ 
Obligation” (12-11-2014) Daily News. 
2 Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale and Lease 385; Viljoen The Law of Landlord and Tenant 200-201; 
Mohamed Landlord and Tenant 45; Mohamed “Safeguards for Tenants ‘Habitability will 
Replace Fit for the Purpose’ Obligation” (12-11-2014) Daily News. 
3 For the purpose of gender neutrality as required in the RHAA, this dissertation will henceforth 
use the term “landowner” rather than “landlord” or “landlady”. See generally Van der Merwe & 
Pienaar (2014) Annual Survey of South African Law 844; Mohamed “Safeguards for Tenants 
‘Habitability will Replace Fit for the Purpose’ Obligation” (12-11-2014) Daily News. 
4 Section 1 of the RHA provides that a “dwelling, includes any house, hostel room, hut, shack, 
flat, apartment, room, outbuilding, garage or similar structure which is leased, as well as any 
storeroom, outbuilding, garage or demarcated parking space which is leased as part of the 
lease”. See also Mohamed Landlord and Tenant 18; SI Mohamed Tenant and Landlord in 
South Africa: A Guide to the Rights, Duties and Responsibilities of Tenant and Landlord of 
Residential Dwellings (2004) 9; SI Mohamed Tenant and Landlord in South Africa 2 ed (2010) 
16; KM Kern “Letting and Hiring” in CJ Nagel (ed) Commercial Law 4 ed (2011) 242-243. 
5 See part 3 4 1 below. 
6 See part 3 4 3 below. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
65 
of the Constitution for this category of inhabitant. Finally, it needs to be determined 
whether an obligation rests on the tenant, the owner or the state when it comes to 
ensuring that the dwelling is in a habitable state. 
The first segment of this chapter will consider the meaning of habitability in the 
context of tenants to find out what individual standard of habitability exists for tenants. 
The assumption is that tenants enjoy the right to the use and enjoyment of a dwelling 
belonging to the landowner, which implies a particular standard of habitability. 
Thereafter, the second section of this chapter will examine the impact of the 
Constitution on the standard of habitability for tenants in light of the rights to access to 
adequate housing and human dignity as outlined in chapter 2. The assumption is that 
an examination of the impact of the Constitution on the standard of habitability for 
tenants will show a link between habitability and the right to access to adequate 
housing and human dignity as enshrined in the Constitution. It will be argued that such 
a link will imply a minimum standard of habitability for tenants. 
The final part of this chapter will investigate on whom the obligation rests to ensure 
habitability. More specifically, it will question whether such an obligation rests on a 
private landowner in the case where property is let privately, or on the tenant, or on 
the state. In this regard, it is assumed that the obligation to ensure habitability in the 
context of tenants rests on the landowner in so far as such an obligation ensures the 
promotion of safe and suitable living conditions for tenants. 
 
3 2 Meaning of habitability in the context of tenants 
3 2 1 Common-law position of “fit for the purpose for which the dwelling was rented” 
The meaning of habitability in the context of tenants is essentially based on the 
common-law requirement that the dwelling to be rented must be in a condition that is 
reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was leased.7 The case of Hunter v Cumnor 
 
7 See, for example, Viljoen v Cleaver 1945 NPD 332 334; Poynton v Cran 1910 AD 205 214 
and 221; Marais v Cloete 1945 EDL 238 242-243; Bahadur v Phillipson 1956 4 SA 638 (FC) 
641; Harlin Properties (Pty) Ltd v Los Angeles Hotel (Pty) Ltd 1962 3 SA 143 (A) 150; Proud 
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Lanchem Inter (Pty) Ltd 1991 3 SA 738 (A) 748; Pete’s Warehousing 
& Sales CC v Bowsink Investments CC 2000 3 SA 833 (E) 839; Stewart & Co v Executors of 
Staines (1861-1863) 4 Searle 152 159-160; Nannucci v Wilson & Co (1894) 11 SC 240 244-
245; Tee v McIlwraith 1905 19 ECD 282 286; Jacobson v Bloch 1906 TS 350 352; Frenkel & 
Co v Rand Mines Produce Supply Co 1909 TS 129 131; Salmon v Dedlow 1912 TPD 971 
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Investments (“Hunter”)8 provides authority in this regard. In this case, the court 
confirmed that the underlying common law principle of a lease was that the landowner 
was under the duty to repair defects in the property to be leased. Moreover, the 
landowner had to place and maintain the dwelling in a condition fit for the purpose for 
which it was leased.9 This common-law fit for the purpose principle was confirmed in 
a number of other cases.10 However, habitability was ignored despite it being an 
 
978; Bosomworth v Labistour (1914) 35 NPD 79 84; Bowen v Daverin 1914 AD 632 650; 
Smook v Dreyer 1918 OPD 1 3-4; African Theatres Trust Ltd v Estate Mccubbin (1919) 40 
NPD 277 279; Henning v Le Roux 1921 CPD 587 590; Cape Town Municipality v Paine 1923 
AD 207 218; Amin v Ebrahim 1926 47 NPD 1 7; Holborn House Ltd v Katz & Lourie Ltd 1941 
TPD 10 12; Viljoen v Cleaver 1945 NPD 332 334 and 336; Sarkin v Koren (2) 1949 3 SA 545 
(C) 551-552; Sarkin v Koren (3) 1950 1 SA 495 (C) 499-500; Hunter v Cumnor Investments 
1952 1 SA 735 (C) 740; Heerman’s Supermarket (Pty) Ltd v Mona Road Investments (Pty) 
Ltd 1975 4 SA 391 (D) 393; Fourie No en `n Ander v Potgietersrusse Stansraad 1987 2 SA 
921 (A) 931; Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) para 28; Gateway Properties (Pty) Ltd v 
Bright Idea Projects 249 CC 2014 3 All SA 577 (KZP) paras 22 and 24. 
8 Hunter v Cumnor Investments 1952 1 SA 735 (C). 
9 740. See Mohamed Landlord and Tenant 42-43. 
10 See, for example, Stewart & Co v Executors of Staines (1861-1863) 4 Searle 152 159-160; 
Nannucci v Wilson & Co (1894) 11 SC 240 244-245; North Western Hotel Ltd v Rolfes Nebel 
& Co 1902 TS 324 333; Tee v McIlwraith 1905 19 ECD 282 286; Jacobson v Bloch 1906 TS 
350 352; Assignees Kaiser Brothers v Continental Caoutchouc Company (1906) 23 SC 736 
739; Frenkel & Co v Rand Mines Produce Supply Co 1909 TS 129 131; Poynton v Cran 1910 
AD 205 214; Murman v Minchin (1905-1910) 10 HCG 313 323-326; Salmon v Dedlow 1912 
TPD 971 978; Bowen v Daverin 1914 AD 632 650; Bosomworth v Labistour (1914) 35 NPD 
79 84; Smook v Dreyer 1918 OPD 1 3-4; Henning v Le Roux 1921 CPD 587 590; Cape Town 
Municipality v Paine 1923 AD 207 218; Amin v Ebrahim 1926 47 NPD 1 7; Shapiro v Yutar 
1930 CPD 92 100; Holborn House Ltd v Katz & Lourie Ltd 1941 TPD 10 12; Viljoen v Cleaver 
1945 NPD 332 334; Marais v Cloete 1945 EDL 238 242-243; Bowman v Stanford 1950 2 SA 
210 (D) 214; Bahadur v Phillipson 1956 4 SA 638 (FC) 641; Harlin Properties (Pty) Ltd v Los 
Angeles Hotel (Pty) Ltd 1962 3 SA 143 (A) 150; The Treasure Chest v Tambuti Enterprises 
1957 2 SA 738 (A) 744 and 752; Heerman’s Supermarket (Pty) Ltd v Mona Road Investments 
(Pty) Ltd 1975 4 SA 391 (D) 393; Fourie NO en ‘n Ander v Potgietersrusse Stansraad 1987 2 
SA 921 (A) 931; Harlin Properties (Pty) Ltd v Los Angeles Hotel (Pty) Ltd 1962 3 SA 143 (A) 
150; Proud Investments (Pty) Ltd v Lanchem Inter (Pty) Ltd 1991 3 SA 738 (A) 748; Pete’s 
Warehousing & Sales CC v Bowsink Investments CC 2000 3 SA 833 (E) 839; African Theatres 
Trust Ltd v Estate Mccubbin (1919) 40 NPD 277 279; Sarkin v Koren (2) 1949 3 SA 545 (C) 
551-552; Sarkin v Koren (3) 1950 1 SA 495 (C) 499-500; Fourie v Hansen 2001 2 SA 823 (W) 
838; Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) para 28; Gateway Properties (Pty) Ltd v Bright Idea 
Projects 249 CC 2014 3 All SA 577 (KZP) paras 22 and 24. 
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important requirement for letting and hiring.11 For instance, a tenant has a just cause 
to cancel the lease where the dwelling is uninhabitable.12 Nonetheless, there are a few 
cases that envisaged the fit for the purpose requirement to include habitability by 
specifically referring to the notion. These cases are dealt with below. 
Alexander v Armstrong (“Armstrong”)13 is one of the oldest cases that confirm the 
existence of habitability in the common-law fit for the purpose requirement. In this 
case, De Villiers CJ noted that a landowner was obliged to hand over the dwelling to 
be let to the tenant in a safe and habitable condition, and in a fit and proper state of 
repair.14 This holding in Armstrong confirms that habitability forms part of the common-
law requirement that the dwelling to be leased should be fit for the purpose for which 
it was leased. In the case of Cape Town Municipality v Paine (“Paine”),15 Innes CJ 
also held that the common law places an obligation on the landowner to deliver and 
maintain the property to be leased in a condition that is reasonably fit for the purpose 
for which it was let.16 Consequently, the court held that a failure on the part of the 
landowner to reasonably repair the dwelling to make it habitable gives a tenant 
sufficient reason to cancel the lease agreement.17 Thus, the holding in Paine endorses 
the importance of habitability to the common-law position of fit for the purpose for 
which the property was rented. Barker v Beckett & Co Ltd (“Barker”)18 is yet another 
case where the court reiterated that at common law the landowner is required to place 
and maintain the property in a proper and habitable state. Thus, if a court found that 
the property was uninhabitable, the tenant was permitted to cancel the lease.19 The 
holding in Barker also confirms that habitability is part of the common-law fit for the 
purpose principle. 
 
11 See Mohamed Landlord and Tenant 43; Mohamed “Fit to Let Doesn’t Mean Habitable” (10-
04-2012) Daily News. 
12 Cape Town Municipality v Paine 1923 AD 207 218 and 226; Mohamed Landlord and Tenant 
43; Mohamed “Fit to Let Doesn’t Mean Habitable” (10-04-2012) Daily News. 
13 Alexander v Armstrong 1879 9 Buch 233 SC. 
14 234. See also Mohamed Landlord and Tenant 43. 
15 Cape Town Municipality v Paine 1923 AD 207. 
16 218, citing Poynton v Cran 1910 AD 205 221. 
17 Cape Town Municipality v Paine 1923 AD 207 226. See also Mohamed Landlord and Tenant 
43. 
18 Barker v Beckett & Co Ltd 1911 TPD 151. 
19 157, citing Alexander v Armstrong 1879 9 Buch 233 SC 234. 
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In Stewart & Co v Executors of Staines (“Stewart”),20 Hodges CJ similarly 
mentioned that the duty upon the landowner is to maintain and keep the thing leased 
in a proper and habitable state of repair. This is to allow the tenant to occupy the 
dwelling in a reasonably fit condition.21 Hodges CJ in Stewart clearly shows that 
habitability is relevant to (and in fact informs) the common-law fit for the purpose 
principle. De Villiers CJ in Bensley v Clear (“Bensley”)22 similarly found that the 
obligation of the landowner was to place and keep the property let in a proper and 
habitable state of repair so that the property can be reasonably fit for the purpose for 
which it was let.23 The case of Bensley makes it even clearer that habitability is 
essential to the fit for the purpose requirement. In the case of Tee v Mcilwraith 
(“Tee”),24 Kotze JP likewise ruled that when the landowner leases property he must 
deliver and maintain the property to be let to the tenant in a proper and habitable state 
of repair so that the property can be reasonably fit for human occupation.25 The court 
in Tee seems to support the idea that habitability forms part of the common-law 
requirement that the property to be let must be in a condition reasonably fit for the 
purpose for which it was leased. 
In the case of Amin v Ebrahim (“Amin”),26 Tatham J also pointed out that a 
landowner was obliged to hand over to the tenant and maintain the property to be let 
in a proper and habitable condition for the property to be used in a reasonably fit 
condition.27 The Amin case reinforces the fact that habitability is part of our common-
law fit for the purpose principle. Mpange v Sithole (“Mpange”),28 is another case where 
exactly this point is made. Here, the court found that the landowner must deliver and 
maintain the property let in a condition that is reasonably fit for the purpose for which 
it was let. This includes providing the tenants with adequate space, protection from the 
 
20 Stewart & Co v Executors of Staines (1861-1863) 4 Searle 152. 
21 159. 
22 Bensely v Clear 1878 8 Buch 89. 
23 90. 
24 Tee v Mcilwraith 1905 19 ECD 282. 
25 286. 
26 Amin v Ebrahim 1926 47 NPD 1. 
27 7, citing Stewart & Co v Executors of Staines (1861-1863) 4 Searle 152 159; Tee v 
Mcilwraith 1905 19 ECD 282 286; Salmon v Dedlow 1912 TPD 971 978; Cape Town 
Municipality v Paine 1923 AD 207 218. 
28 Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W). 
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elements, threats to health, safety, human dignity and the premises being free from 
defects.29 This means that the common-law fit for the purpose requirement is not 
fulfilled when the landowner has failed to hand over and maintain the dwelling 
premises in a proper and habitable condition.30 
The cases of Armstrong, Paine, Barker, Stewart, Bensley, Tee, Amin and Mpange 
indicate that the courts already had the language of habitability in terms of the common 
law, but this was not expressly stated before and only developed in these few cases.31 
Thus, when the courts referred to habitable in the context of the common-law fit for the 
purpose requirement they suggested that the fit for the purpose requirement in fact 
includes habitability.32 Nevertheless, the common-law requirement of fit for the 
purpose for which the dwelling was let/leased does not have a corresponding and/or 
similar meaning to habitability. In this regard, Mahomed correctly notes that fit to let 
does not mean the property is habitable.33 Thus, a habitable dwelling is considered as 
such when it adheres to an individual standard including elements such as adequate 
space, protection from weather conditions, threats to health, safety, and a building that 
is free from defects.34 This provides tenants with better protection because it prevents 
tenants from accepting occupation of dwellings which are in a state of disrepair. As 
clearly indicated by the case of Mpange, the courts already applied the elements of 
habitability, but in terms of the common-law requirement of fit for the purpose. 
 
 
29 Paras 28-32 and 51-55, citing Poynton v Cran 1910 AD 205 214; Hunter v Cumnor 
Investments 1952 1 SA 735 (C) 740A; Harlin Properties (Pty) Ltd v Los Angeles Hotel (Pty) 
Ltd 1962 3 SA 143 (A) 150H; Cape Town Municipality v Paine 1923 AD 207 218; Amin v 
Ebrahim 1926 NPD 1 7; Tee v McIlwraith 1905 (19) ECD 282 286; CESCR’s General 
Comment No 4 (Sixth session, 1991) The Right to Adequate Housing (Article 11(1) of the 
ICESCR), UN Doc E/ 1992/23 para 8. 
30 Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) para 32; G Bradfield & K Lehmann Principles of the 
Law of Sale & Lease 3 ed (2013) 114; G D’Amato The Duties and Rights of Tenants and 
Landlords under Swiss and South African Law – A Comparative Analysis LLM dissertation, 
University of Cape Town (2015) 13; Mohamed Landlord and Tenant 44. 
31 Mohamed Landlord and Tenant 43-44; Mohamed “Fit to Let Doesn’t Mean Habitable” (10-
04-2012) Daily News. 
32 See especially Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) para 28. 
33 Mohamed Landlord and Tenant 43; Mohamed “Fit to Let Doesn’t Mean Habitable” (10-04-
2012) Daily News. 
34 See Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) paras 28-32 and 51. 
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3 2 1 1 Concluding remarks 
It is clear from the cases mentioned above that courts seem to endorse habitability in 
terms of the common law similar to the definition of habitability as envisaged by the 
RHAA. This is despite the fact that the cases were decided before the RHAA was 
introduced. Therefore, these cases decided under the common law, in any event, 
endorse the definition of habitability as provided in terms of the RHAA, and the 
elements of habitability were already applied by the court even though the RHAA is 
not applicable yet. Now that this subsection has established the meaning of habitability 
in terms of the common-law fit for the purpose requirement, the next subsection 
indicates the impact of legislation on the existing common law as it relates to the 
meaning of habitability. 
 
3 2 2 The impact of the Rental Housing Act 
The RHA envisages habitability to mean residential premises that can offer acceptable 
living conditions and are maintained properly.35 This means that the residential 
property to be let should be fit and suitable for human occupation. Therefore, premises 
which are unhygienic, unsafe and exposes tenants to unnecessary risk to life or 
property will not be considered fit or suitable for human habitation.36 The RHA does 
not change the existing common-law requirement that the dwelling must be fit for the 
purpose for which it was rented.37 Rather, the RHA confirms the common-law position 
that the landowner must ensure that a dwelling is in a condition that is reasonably fit 
for human habitation at the commencement of the lease, and such a landowner should 
maintain the dwelling in the same condition.38 
 
35 Section 13(4) of the RHA. See further Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale & 
Lease 114; D’Amato The Duties and Rights of Tenants and Landlords under Swiss and South 
African Law 13; SI Mohamed Rights and Obligations of Landlord and Tenant: A Study in Light 
of the Shari‘ah (Islamic Law) and the South African Rental Housing Act MA thesis, University 
of Durban-Westville (2002) 147. 
36 See Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) paras 28-33; Tee v Mcilwraith 1905 19 ECD 282 
286; Amin v Ebrahim 1926 47 NPD 1 7; Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale & 
Lease 144; Mohamed Tenant and Landlord in South Africa 32; D’Amato The Duties and Rights 
of Tenants and Landlords under Swiss and South African Law 13. 
37 Mohamed Tenant and Landlord in South Africa 16. 
38 See Regulation 6(1)(b)(i) of the Unfair Practice Regulations to the Rental Housing Act 50 of 
1999 GN 340 in GG 30863 of 14-03-2008 issued by the Department of Housing. See further 
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The importation and modification of the common-law fit for the purpose requirement 
into the RHA is an improvement because it protects the rights of tenants even more. 
Moreover, the RHA provides the courts with the authority to hold landowners liable for 
the failure to let residential property that is acceptable for living conditions.39 However, 
this applies unless the tenant signed a lease agreement relieving the landowner of his 
common-law fit for purpose obligation.40 Nevertheless, the RHA still falls short of the 
elements of habitability as outlined by the courts in cases like Armstrong, Paine, 
Barker, Stewart, Bensley, Tee, Amin and Mpange mentioned above. To sum up, the 
RHA confirms the common-law fit for the purpose requirement and envisions 
habitability to mean property that is fit and acceptable for living conditions. As it stands 
now, the meaning of habitability in the context of tenants is in terms of the common-
law fit for the purpose requirement, which is essentially confirmed in the RHA. 
However, Parliament has intervened to improve the living conditions of tenants even 
further in terms of the RHAA. More specifically, the RHAA incorporates very pertinently 
the definition of habitability in the context of tenants. As such, the following subsection 
discusses the impact of the RHAA on the existing common law. 
 
 
Regulation 7(1)(b)(i) of the Gauteng Unfair Practice Regulations, promulgated under and in 
terms of the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 GN 4004 in GG 30863 of 04-07-2001, as amended 
by GN 1472 of 04-06-2002; Regulation 4(1)(a)(i) of the Western Cape Unfair Practice 
Regulations, made in terms of the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 GN 5822 in GG 20726 of 
01-02-2002; Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale & Lease 114; D’Amato The 
Duties and Rights of Tenants and Landlords under Swiss and South African Law 13. 
39 Section 13(4)(c) of the RHA. See further Regulation 6(1)(b)(i), read together with Regulation 
13(1)(a)-(g) of the Unfair Practice Regulations to the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 GN 340 
in GG 30863 of 14-03-2008 issued by the Department of Housing; Regulation 7(1)(b)(i), read 
together with Regulation 14(1)(a)-(g) of the Gauteng Unfair Practice Regulations, promulgated 
under and in terms of the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 GN 4004 in GG 30863 of 04-07-
2001, as amended by GN 1472 of 04-06-2002; Regulation 4(1)(a)(i), read together with 
Regulation 9(1)(a)-(g )of the Western Cape Unfair Practice Regulations, made in terms of the 
Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 GN 5822 in GG 20726 of 01-02-2002; Bradfield & Lehmann 
Principles of the Law of Sale & Lease 144; D’Amato The Duties and Rights of Tenants and 
Landlords under Swiss and South African Law 13. 
40 Mohamed “Safeguards for Tenants ‘Habitability will Replace Fit for the Purpose’ Obligation” 
(12-11-2014) Daily News. 
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3 2 3 The impact of the Rental Housing Amendment Act 
As already mentioned, in terms of the common law and the RHA, the landowner must 
let a dwelling that is in a condition that is reasonably fit for human habitation. This 
common-law fit for the purpose warranty, which was incorporated into the RHA, will 
soon to be amended by the RHAA.41 In terms of this RHAA, the requirement of fit for 
the purpose will be replaced with habitability.42 Therefore, the RHAA is a valuable 
contribution to the understanding of habitability in relation to tenants. Not only does 
the RHAA provide for the word “habitability”, but it goes further and defines habitability 
in the context of tenants as: 
 
“a dwelling that is safe and suitable for living in and includes adequate space, protection 
from elements and other threats to health, physical safety of the tenant, the tenant’s 
household and visitors, and a structurally sound building”.43 
 
A close analysis of the definition of habitability in terms of the RHAA reveals that the 
meaning of habitability in the context of tenants contains some similar elements of the 
CESCR’s General Comment 4 as mentioned in chapter two. The meaning of 
habitability in the RHAA focuses on the right to reside in a dwelling and the use and 
enjoyment of such dwelling. It also emphasises the safety and suitability of the 
structure for residential purposes and further requires an individual standard in the 
form of elements such as adequacy, security, physical safety and a building that is 
free from defect or damage. Van der Merwe and Pienaar properly point out that the 
definition of habitability in the RHAA builds on the principle that rental housing should 
be usable and suitable.44 Thus the insertion of a definition of habitability in the RHAA 
 
41 See section 4B(11) of the RHAA. See also Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale and Lease 385; Viljoen 
The Law of Landlord and Tenant 200; Mohamed Landlord and Tenant 45. 
42 See sections 1 and 4B(11) of the RHAA read together. See further Viljoen The Law of 
Landlord and Tenant 200; Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale and Lease 385; Bapela & Stoop (2016) 
De Rebus 18-20; Mohamed Landlord and Tenant 45; Mohamed “Safeguards for Tenants 
‘Habitability will Replace Fit for the Purpose’ Obligation” (12-11-2014) Daily News. 
43 Section 1 of the RHAA. See further Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale and Lease 385; Bapela & 
Stoop (2016) De Rebus 19; Viljoen The Law of Landlord and Tenant 200; Van der Merwe & 
Pienaar (2014) Annual Survey of South African Law 844; Stoop (2014) Annual Survey of South 
African Law 811; Mohamed Landlord and Tenant 45; Mohamed “Safeguards for Tenants 
‘Habitability will Replace Fit for the Purpose’ Obligation” (12-11-2014) Daily News. 
44 Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2014) Annual Survey of South African Law 844. 
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is a vast improvement in protecting the rights of tenants, and it provides the courts with 
more authority regarding what constitutes a habitable dwelling.45 
The impact of the RHAA on the existing common law is that it explicitly adds the 
definition of habitability. The RHAA makes habitability a compulsory statutory 
requirement, which was not an express requirement in terms of the common law and 
courts had to essentially read it into the requirement of fit for the purpose of rental 
housing. Thus, the statutory requirement of habitability for dwellings that are leased to 
individuals for residential purposes will now be applied consistently in all cases by the 
courts or tribunals. This also means that habitability will no longer be ignored as it was 
in some instances in terms of the common law. Furthermore, the RHAA makes it 
compulsory for the landowner to guarantee that the dwelling or property is safe and 
suitable to inhabit, including a warranty of all the elements of habitability. 
 
3 2 4 Concluding remarks 
The above section aimed to consider the meaning of habitability in the context of 
tenants, and it is clear that a standard of habitability exists for tenants in terms of the 
common law-position that has crystallised in a number of cases mentioned in this 
section. Moreover, this standard as established basically as an extension of the 
common-law fit for the purpose requirement seems to provide a baseline that would 
make it possible for a tenant to hold a landowner liable unless that tenant has 
specifically agreed in the lease agreement to waive the right. This standard seems to 
be reinforced by the RHA, which endorses the standard of habitability that can be 
expected when property is rented for residential purposes. The impending RHAA is 
even more direct in its protection of tenants and its assurance that tenants are able to 
occupy habitable dwellings. The common law and the legislation in this regard 
arguably point towards a possible standard of habitability in the context of tenants. The 
consideration of the meaning of habitability in the context of tenants has paved the 
way for the analysis of the impact of the Constitution on the standard of habitability for 
tenants, because it will be important to determine whether the Constitution provides 
even further reinforcement of tenants’ right to demand habitable dwellings. This is 
examined in the next section. 
 
45 Viljoen The Law of Landlord and Tenant 200; Mohamed “Safeguards for Tenants 
‘Habitability will Replace Fit for the Purpose’ Obligation” (12-11-2014) Daily News. 
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3 3 Impact of the Constitution on the standard of habitability for tenants 
Section 26 of the Constitution reinforces a standard of habitability for tenants. This 
section provides for the right to have access to adequate housing.46 However, 
habitability may also be linked with other constitutional rights such as the right to 
human dignity, depending on whether the uninhabitable living condition implicates 
such fundamental rights.47 Interestingly, in Mpange, Satchwell J linked habitability with 
the right to access to adequate housing.48 The implication of this link signals that the 
conduct of the state or that of a landowner should not be the reason that tenants do 
not enjoy aspects of the right to access to adequate housing.49 
The constitutional obligation in respect of granting tenants access to adequate 
housing is fulfilled when they are provided with adequately habitable housing50 that 
ensures at the very least, a minimum standard of habitability with specific reference to 
adequate space, protection from weather, promotion of health, and physical safety. In 
my view, section 26(1) of the Constitution and the CESCR’s General Comment 4 as 
quoted in chapter 2 above properly sanctions a minimum standard, which the state or 
private landowners need to meet in the context of tenancy. The Constitution underpins 
the minimum standard by stating that local government must promote a safe and 
healthy environment.51 Similarly, the CESCR’s General Comment 4 emphasises the 
need for the provision of effective domestic legal remedies to deal with habitability as 
a characteristic of the right to adequate housing.52 The remedies include tenants filing 
complaints against illegal conduct undertaken or supported by landowners in the 
public or private sector in terms of rent charged. Moreover, the remedies entail tenants 
 
46 Section 26(1) of the Constitution. 
47 See, for example, Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) paras 50-58. 
48 See Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) paras 50-51. 
49 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) paras 34-35; 
Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 2012 3 SA 531 (CC) paras 21 and 32; P de 
Vos “The Right to Housing” in D Brand & C Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South 
Africa (2005) 85 92; P de Vos “The Essential Components of the Human Right to Adequate 
Housing – A South African Perspective” in D Brand & S Russell (eds) Exploring the Core 
Content of Socio-Economic Rights: South African and International Perspectives (2002) 23 
23-33. 
50 Malan v City of Cape Town 2014 6 SA 315 (CC) para 58. 
51 Section 152(1)(d) of the Constitution. 
52 Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) para 52. 
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reporting any lack of the maintenance of premises by landowners. Furthermore, 
tenants lodging complaints to courts or tribunals against landowners regarding 
unhealthy or inadequate housing conditions is also a remedy.53 
The court in Mpange – a case dealing specifically with tenants – also emphasised 
that human dignity is fundamentally linked with habitability. In this regard, the court 
pointed out that: 
 
“[a]s an abstract value, common to the core values of our Constitution, dignity informs the 
content of all the concrete rights and plays a role in the balancing process necessary to 
bring different rights and values into harmony. It too, however, must find its place in the 
constitutional order. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the application of the social and 
economic rights entrenched in the Constitution”.54 
 
The conditions of the dwelling in Mpange were alleged to be illegal, unsafe, 
unhygienic, and the building was generally in a state of decay and disrepair. The 
building was unsuitable for human habitation.55 The landowner had leased the 
premises to provide residential housing for 133 tenants. The tenants alleged that the 
premises were unfit for residential accommodation for themselves and their children. 
The court observed that since the landowner intended to provide the tenants with 
residential housing, the landowner should have also considered the human dignity of 
the tenants. In this regard, the landowner could have ensured that municipal 
connections were made available to tenants who had paid for water and electricity 
while the municipality was providing the required services. Moreover, as daily living 
 
53 CESCR’s General Comment No 4 (Sixth session, 1991) The Right to Adequate Housing 
(Article 11(1) of the ICESCR), UN Doc E/ 1992/23 para 17(c)-(e). 
54 Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) para 53. See also Mohamed Landlord and Tenant 44; 
A Chaskalson “Human Dignity as a Foundational Value of our Constitutional Order” (2000) 16 
South African Journal on Human Rights 193 196; I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights 
Handbook 6 ed (2013) 251; NMI Goolam “Human Dignity – Our Supreme Constitutional Value” 
(2001) 4 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 43 52. 
55 Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) paras 7 and 29. See further W du Plessis, JM Pienaar 
& N Olivier “Land Matters: 2007 (2)” (2007) 22 South African Public Law 548 571; CG van der 
Merwe & JM Pienaar “The Law of Property (including Real Security)” (2007) Annual Survey of 
South African Law 978; A Friedman & K Hofmeyr “Constitutional Law” (2007) 4 Juta’s 
Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.8; SI Mohamed “Unravelling Rent Contracts” (12-08-
2008) Daily News <www.ocr.org.za/property_law/Unravelling rent contracts.pdf> (accessed 
05-02-2018). 
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resulted into the production of garbage, it was the landowner’s responsibility to provide 
the tenants with sufficient refuse bins and to ensure the refuse is collected by the 
municipality at all times.56 
As a result of the above, the court properly concluded that conditions that are illegal, 
unhygienic, unsafe and unsuitable for human habitation create circumstances that fall 
short of protecting the human dignity of tenants.57 Generally, the recognition of human 
dignity as one of the founding values of the Constitution confirms the importance of 
human dignity as a facet of the use or occupation of dwellings.58 As Zondo J in Malan 
v City of Cape Town (“Malan”)59 succinctly asserted, “[h]aving a home is very important 
to the dignity of any person”.60 This is because a home is necessary to provide dignity 
to a person. Consequently, a tenant’s human dignity may be affected in instances 
where: (a) the landowner fails to provide tenants with access to electricity supply, 
water and toilet facilities; (b) the landowner fails to attend to issues like a leaking roof, 
broken windows, faulty electric wiring and plumbing; or (c) in cases where the 
landowner fails to attend to the regular removal of refuse, which creates dirty 
conditions that cannot be considered adequate.61 Therefore, linking habitability and 
 
56 Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) paras 5 and 31. See further Du Plessis, Pienaar & 
Olivier (2007) South African Public Law 548 571; Friedman & Hofmeyr (2007) Juta’s Quarterly 
Review of South African Law 2.8; Mohamed “Unravelling Rent Contracts” (12-08-2008) Daily 
News. 
57 Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) para 54. See further T Naudé “The Law of Lease” 
(2007) Annual Survey of South African Law 873; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2007) Annual 
Survey of South African Law 978; Friedman & Hofmeyr (2007) Juta’s Quarterly Review of 
South African Law 2.8; SI Mohamed The Tenant-Landlord in South Africa 2 ed (2010) 56; 
Mohamed “Unravelling Rent Contracts” (12-08-2008) Daily News. 
58 Chaskalson (2000) South African Journal on Human Rights 193 196 and 204; JM Reyneke 
“Dignity: The Missing Building Block in South African Schools?” (2010) 35 Journal for Juridical 
Science 71 77; Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 250; Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 
SA 578 (W) para 55. 
59 Malan v City of Cape Town 2014 6 SA 315 (CC). 
60 Para 127. See also City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W) 
para 49, where the court said that housing forms an indispensable part of ensuring human 
dignity; R Steinmann “The Core Meaning of Human Dignity” (2016) 19 Potchefstroom 
Electronic Law Journal 1 23. 
61 See Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) para 54; City of Cape Town v Rudolph 2004 5 
SA 39 (C) 77. 
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human dignity brings about a stronger constitutional minimum standard of habitability 
for tenants. 
 
3 3 1 Concluding remarks 
The impact of the Constitution on the standard of habitability for tenants is a positive 
one in that it ensures the protection and promotion of the rights of tenants in requiring 
safe and healthy home environments.62 This is an innovative new dimension of 
habitability in the context of tenants as indicated in the above discussion. The links are 
so clear, yet these links have not clearly been made in the context of tenancy. The 
impact of the Constitution on the standard of habitability is clearly necessitated by 
section 26(1) of the Constitution and underpinned by section 152(1)(d) of the 
Constitution.63 It is clear that habitability forms part of the content of the right to access 
to adequate housing – but is not exhaustive of its content as there are elements 
beyond habitability that also form the content of the right. Proximity to work and 
facilities, would for instance form part of the content of the right and this goes beyond 
habitability. Therefore, access to adequate housing means that a dwelling must be 
habitable so that it promotes a safe and healthy living environment for tenants.64 
Although Satchwell J in Mpange neglected to point this out in clear terms, it is evident 
from an analysis of the case that the outcome of the judgment was intended to support 
the postulation that access to “adequate” housing includes habitability as an element 
of its content.65 Therefore, it is clear that a minimum standard exists because it can be 
derived from the Constitution. The next step in the analysis includes an investigation 
into whether the owner has such an obligation, or whether the state bears the duty to 




62 Section 152(1)(d) of the Constitution. 
63 See chapter 2 part 2 3 1 above. 
64 G van Bueren “Housing” in MH Cheadle, DM Davis & NRL Haysom (eds) South African 
Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 2 ed (I: 18 2015) 21-8, discussing CESCR’s General 
Comment No 4 (Sixth session, 1991) The Right to Adequate Housing (Article 11(1) of the 
ICESCR), UN Doc E/ 1992/23 para 8(d). 
65 See Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) para 51. 
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3 4 On whom does the obligation rest to ensure habitability in the context of 
tenants? 
3 4 1 Common-law obligation of “fit for the purpose for which the dwelling was rented” 
The question into whether the obligation to ensure habitability of the leased premises 
rests on the owner or the state is particularly important where a landowner has failed 
to maintain and keep the dwelling in a safe and habitable condition during the term of 
the lease agreement. Theoretically, when the owner lets the property to the tenant, he 
promises to give the tenant the entitlements of full use and enjoyment of the property 
for a limited duration of time.66 Arguably, as the property is an investment for the 
landowner, it can be seen as advantageous for the landowner to ensure that the 
property is not a health hazard or unfit for human habitation.67 
The obligation to ensure habitability for tenants is essentially based on the common-
law obligation to ensure that the premises is fit for the purpose for which it was 
leased.68 In this regard, the common law imposes the obligation on a landowner to 
place and maintain the dwelling in a condition reasonably fit for the purpose.69 This 
 
66 Mohamed Landlord and Tenant 39-40; Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale and Lease 342-352; 
Viljoen The Law of Landlord and Tenant 139; Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of the Law of 
Sale & Lease 138; Cooper Landlord and Tenant 38. See further Gateway Properties (Pty) Ltd 
v Bright Idea Projects 249 CC 2014 3 All SA 577 (KZP) para 24; Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 
578 (W) para 28; Boyd v Stuttaford & Co 1910 AD 101 116; Poynton v Cran 1910 AD 205 
221; Bozzone v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1975 4 SA 579 (A) 585. 
67 Mohamed (2006) LexisNexis Butterworths Property Law Digest 3-6; Mohamed Tenant and 
Landlord in South Africa 32; Mohamed Rights and Obligations of Landlord and Tenant 166. 
68 Mohamed Landlord and Tenant 42; Mohamed “Safeguards for Tenants ‘Habitability will 
Replace Fit for the Purpose’ Obligation” (12-11-2014) Daily News. 
69 Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) para 28. See further Stewart & Co v Executors of 
Staines (1861-1863) 4 Searle 152 159-160; Nannucci v Wilson & Co (1894) 11 SC 240 244-
245; North Western Hotel Ltd v Rolfes Nebel & Co 1902 TS 324 333; Tee v McIlwraith 1905 
19 ECD 282 286; Jacobson v Bloch 1906 TS 350 352; Assignees Kaiser Brothers v 
Continental Caoutchouc Company (1906) 23 SC 736 739; Frenkel & Co v Rand Mines 
Produce Supply Co 1909 TS 129 131; Poynton v Cran 1910 AD 205 214; Murman v Minchin 
(1905-1910) 10 HCG 313 323-326; Salmon v Dedlow 1912 TPD 971 978; Bosomworth v 
Labistour (1914) 35 NPD 79 84; Bowen v Daverin 1914 AD 632 650; Smook v Dreyer 1918 
OPD 1 3-4; African Theatres Trust Ltd v Estate Mccubbin (1919) 40 NPD 277 279; Henning v 
Le Roux 1921 CPD 587 590; Cape Town Municipality v Paine 1923 AD 207 218; Amin v 
Ebrahim 1926 47 NPD 1 7; Shapiro v Yutar 1930 CPD 92 100; Holborn House Ltd v Katz & 
Lourie Ltd 1941 TPD 10 12; Viljoen v Cleaver 1945 NPD 332 334; Marais v Cloete 1945 EDL 
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means that the residential dwelling let should be fit for human habitation.70 It is clear 
from the literature that regarding internal and external maintenance of the dwelling the 
landowner is responsible.71 However, the landowner may be absolved of his common-
law obligation to maintain the dwelling if it is stipulated by the parties in the lease 
agreement.72 However, under the current constitutional dispensation, the landowner 
cannot opt-out of a constitutional obligation relating to constitutional rights.73 In terms 
 
238 242-243; Sarkin v Koren (2) 1949 3 SA 545 (C) 551-552; Sarkin v Koren (3) 1950 1 SA 
495 (C) 499-500; Bowman v Stanford 1950 2 SA 210 (D) 214; Hunter v Cumnor Investments 
1952 1 SA 735 (C) 740; Bahadur v Phillipson 1956 4 SA 638 (FC) 641; Harlin Properties (Pty) 
Ltd v Los Angeles Hotel (Pty) Ltd 1962 3 SA 143 (A) 150; The Treasure Chest v Tambuti 
Enterprises 1957 2 SA 738 (A) 744 and 752; Heerman’s Supermarket (Pty) Ltd v Mona Road 
Investments (Pty) Ltd 1975 4 SA 391 (D) 393; Fourie No en `n Ander v Potgietersrusse 
Stansraad 1987 2 SA 921 (A) 931; Proud Investments (Pty) Ltd v Lanchem Inter (Pty) Ltd 
1991 3 SA 738 (A) 748; Pete’s Warehousing & Sales CC v Bowsink Investments CC 2000 3 
SA 833 (E) 839; Fourie v Hansen 2001 2 SA 823 (W) 838; Gateway Properties (Pty) Ltd v 
Bright Idea Projects 249 CC 2014 3 All SA 577 (KZP) paras 22 and 24. 
70 Section 13(4) of the RHA. See also Regulation 6(1)(b)(i) of the Unfair Practice Regulations 
to the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 GN 340 in GG 30863 of 14-03-2008 issued by the 
Department of Housing; Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale & Lease 144. 
71 Regulation 6(1)(f)-(k) of the Unfair Practice Regulations to the Rental Housing Act 50 of 
1999 GN 340 in GG 30863 of 14-03-2008 issued by the Department of Housing. See further 
Mohamed Landlord and Tenant 84-85; Mohamed Tenant and Landlord in South Africa 32; SI 
Mohamed “Remedies for Failures by Landlords” (28-05-2013) Daily News 
<http://www.iol.co.za/ .../remedies-for-failures-by-landlords-1522778> (accessed 05-02-
2018). 
72 Mohamed Landlord and Tenant 84; Mohamed Tenant and Landlord in South Africa 32; 
Mohamed “Remedies for Failures by Landlords” (28-05-2013) Daily News; D’Amato The 
Duties and Rights of Tenants and Landlords under Swiss and South African Law 14; Bradfield 
& Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale & Lease 144-145; Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale and 
Lease 386-387; Wille Landlord and Tenant in South Africa (1910) 269; Wille Landlord and 
Tenant in South Africa 147-150; Cooper Landlord and Tenant 112; Viljoen The Law of 
Landlord and Tenant 207; Jacobson v Bloch 1906 TS 350 352-353. See further Poynton v 
Cran 1910 AD 205 221, where the court said that the obligation to maintain the property can 
be changed by an expressed or implied provision in the lease. However, the onus is on the 
landowner to prove the nature of the agreement. The same point was made in Cape Town 
Municipality v Paine 1923 AD 207 218; Sarkin v Koren (2) 1949 3 SA 545 (C) 552; Sarkin v 
Koren (3) 1950 1 SA 495 (C) 449. 
73 See section 8(2), read in conjunction with section 39(2) of the Constitution. See also Mpange 
v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) paras 49-50 and 71-74; S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: 
Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 319. 
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of the common-law obligation of maintenance, advisably the parties should ensure 
that the terms and conditions of the lease contract set out their undertaking as to the 
maintenance of the dwelling unambiguously. Thus if the undertaking is unclear, such 
an omission to stipulate clearly has normally driven the courts to strictly interpret the 
terms and conditions of the lease agreement in favour of the tenant.74 As such, the 
landowner retains his obligation to maintain the dwelling in a condition reasonably fit 
for the purpose.75 
It is fair to point out that the landowner’s obligation to maintain the existing structure 
of the dwelling in a condition reasonably fit for the purpose does not include situations 
where the tenants, or his or her household and visitors, negligently or intentionally 
caused the dwelling to become uninhabitable.76 Therefore, the obligation of the 
 
74 Poynton v Cran 1910 AD 205 215; Shapiro v Yutar 1930 CPD 92 101; Bhyat v Commissioner 
for Immigration 1932 AD 125 129; Holborn House Ltd v Katz & Lourie 1941 TPD 10 12-13; 
Adams v O’Leary 1945 NPD 147 150; Sarkin v Koren (2) 1949 3 SA 545 (C) 551-552; Sarkin 
v Koren (3) 1950 1 SA 495 (C) 449; Bowman v Stanford 1950 2 SA 210 (D) 214; Pete’s 
Warehousing & Sales CC v Bowsink Investments CC 2000 3 SA 833 (E) 839; Canada 
Steamship Lines Ltd v The King (1952) 1 All ER 305 (PC) 310; Government of the Republic 
of South Africa v Fibre Spinners & Weavers (Pty) Ltd 1978 2 SA 794 (A) 803-804; Durban's 
Water Wonderland (Pty) Limited v Botha 1999 1 SA 982 (SCA) 989; Swinburne v Newbee 
Investments (Pty) Ltd 2010 5 SA 296 (KZD) 306-331; South African Railways & Harbours v 
Lyle Shipping Co Limited 1958 3 SA 416 (A) 419; First National Bank of SA Limited v 
Rosenblum 2001 4 SA 189 (SCA) para 6; Van der Westhuizen v Arnold 2002 6 SA 453 (SCA) 
para 40; Drifters Adventure Tours CC v Hircock 2007 2 SA 83 (SCA) paras 9-16. 
75 Poynton v Cran 1910 AD 205 214, 221 and 224; Cape Town Municipality v Paine 1923 AD 
207 218; Shapiro v Yutar 1930 CPD 92 101; Sarkin v Koren (2) 1949 3 SA 545 (C) 551-552; 
Pete’s Warehousing & Sales CC v Bowsink Investments CC 2000 3 SA 833 (E) 839. See 
further Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale and Lease 387; Viljoen The Law of Landlord and Tenant 
207; Wille Landlord and Tenant in South Africa (1910) 269; Wille Landlord and Tenant in South 
Africa 149-150; Mohamed Landlord and Tenant 85. 
76 Frenkel v Ohlsson's Cape Breweries Ltd 1909 TS 957 963-965 and 975; Hayes v Mcnally 
1910 TS 326 330-333; Groenewald v Duvenhage 1915 OPD 25 29-30; Von Holdt v Bruwer 
1918 CPD 163 167; Eensaam Syndicate v Moore 1920 AD 457 458; Bresky v Vivier 1928 
CPD 202 204-205; Getz v Pahlavi 1943 WLD 142 145; Brand v Kotze 1948 3 SA 769 (C) 770-
771; South British Insurance Company v Du Toit 1952 4 SA 313 (SR) 315-318; Kealey v 
Landsberg 1953 4 SA 605 (C) 609-613; Nel v Dobie 1966 3 SA 352 (N) 355-356. See further 
Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale & Lease 145; Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale 
and Lease 391; Cooper Landlord and Tenant 99 and 223-233; Wille Landlord and Tenant in 
South Africa (1910) 269-270; Wille Landlord and Tenant in South Africa 242-243; C Hugo & 
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landowner to place and maintain the dwelling in a condition that is reasonably fit for 
the purpose for which the property was rented will apply in each case. 
Defects caused by disrepair, deterioration, depreciation due to age, and action of 
weather or fair use, which may render the dwelling unfit for the purpose, are the 
obligation of the landowner to repair.77 The repair of such defects or flaws in the 
premises should be put in good order by the landowner if the defect or flaw 
unreasonably disturbs the tenant from properly using and enjoying the dwelling for the 
purpose for which it was let. However, the landowner does not have to effect structural 
alterations or improvements.78 As previously mentioned, the principle is that the tenant 
is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the property he has let. As such, the use of the 
property leased is diminished if the dwelling is in a state of disrepair and not reasonably 
fit for its intended purpose.79 
For instance, in Poynton v Cran (“Poynton”)80 the premises and a warmer required 
necessary repairs.81 The court remarked that the landowner was obliged to place the 
 
P Simpson “Lease” in R Zimmermann, D Visser & K Reid (eds) Mixed Legal Systems in 
Comparative Perspective Property and Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2005) 326. 
77 Regulation 6(1)(i) of the Unfair Practice Regulations to the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 
GN 340 in GG 30863 of 14-03-2008 issued by the Department of Housing. See further Radloff 
v Kaplan 1914 EDL 357 361; African Theatres Trust Ltd v Estate Mccubbin (1919) 40 NPD 
277 281-282; AJ Kerr & G Glover “Lease” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (2007) para 13; Van der Merwe “Case 5: Duty of the Holder of a Time-Limited 
Interest to Repair, Replace and Renew” in The Common Core of European Private Law Time 
Limited Interests in Land 262; Wille Landlord and Tenant in South Africa 146; Cooper Landlord 
and Tenant 99; JF Coaker & DT Zeffertt Wille & Millin’s Mercantile Law of South Africa 18 ed 
(1984) 313; Mohamed Rights and Obligations of Landlord and Tenant 168; D’Amato The 
Duties and Rights of Tenants and Landlords under Swiss and South African Law 13. 
78 Van der Merwe “Case 5: Duty of the Holder of a Time-Limited Interest to Repair, Replace 
and Renew” in The Common Core of European Private Law Time Limited Interests in Land 
262; Wille Landlord and Tenant in South Africa 146; Cooper Landlord and Tenant 99; Sharrock 
Business Transactions Law 326; JF Coaker & DT Zeffertt Wille & Millin’s Mercantile Law of 
South Africa 18 ed (1984) 313; Poynton v Cran 1910 AD 205 227; Bahadur v Phillipson 1956 
4 SA 638 (FC) 641; Harlin Properties (Pty) Ltd v Los Angeles Hotel (Pty) Ltd 1962 3 SA 143 
(A) 150. 
79 Poynton v Cran 1910 AD 205 221; Holborn House Ltd v Katz & Lourie Ltd 1941 TPD 10 12; 
Marais v Cloete 1945 EDL 238 242; Fourie No en ‘n Ander v Potgietersrusse Stansraad 1987 
2 SA 921 (A) 931; Visser et al Gibson South African Mercantile and Company Law 174. 
80 Poynton v Cran 1910 AD 205. 
81 210. 
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premises and a broken warmer forming part of the lease agreement in a condition that 
makes it reasonably fit for use by the tenant.82 This holding in Poynton confirms that 
the landowner has the obligation to ensure that the dwelling is habitable. Similarly, in 
the case of African Theatres Trust Ltd v Estate McCubbin (“McCubbin”),83 the court 
reaffirmed that deficient guttering (like any other thing connected to a house) should 
be renewed or replaced by the landowner with new parts to keep the premises fit for 
occupation.84 Therefore, a property owner should replace worn-out guttering due to 
reasonable wear and tear, which no longer transports rainwater properly and causes 
damage to the house and its furniture during rainy seasons as it makes the dwelling 
unfit for purpose. This is especially so if that guttering cannot be repaired by the 
landowner through patching or portions thereof being taken out and replaced with new 
ones.85 
In Harlin Properties (Pty) Ltd v Los Angeles Hotel (Pty) Ltd (“Harlin Properties”),86 
the court also dealt with the obligation that is placed on the landowner to effect 
necessary repairs. In Harlin Properties, the tenant found out that the building was not 
structurally sound in that it contained structural defects in the form of cracked floors, 
ceilings, walls, roofs and parapets of the building.87 As a result of these structural 
defects and damp from rainy weather conditions, the premises were unfit for human 
habitation. Beyers JA referred with approval to Poynton88 and held that structural 
alterations should be made by the landowner in the premises because the defective 
parts in the premises unreasonably impeded on the tenant’s use and enjoyment of the 
 
82 214. 
83 African Theatres Trust Ltd v Estate Mccubbin (1919) 40 NPD 277. 
84 279-280. See further Van der Merwe “Case 5: Duty of the Holder of a Time-Limited Interest 
to Repair, Replace and Renew” in The Common Core of European Private Law Time Limited 
Interests in Land 262; Cooper Landlord and Tenant 99. In Poynton v Cran 1910 AD 205 230, 
the court found that a corroded boiler, a cracked geyser or broken pipe was only practical for 
it to be replaced by the landowner with new parts. Similarly, in Sarkin v Koren (1) 1948 4 SA 
438 (C) 445, the court said that proper repairs involve making replacements by the landowner. 
85 African Theatres Trust Ltd v Estate Mccubbin (1919) 40 NPD 277 278-282. See also Van 
der Merwe “Case 5: Duty of the Holder of a Time-Limited Interest to Repair, Replace and 
Renew” in The Common Core of European Private Law Time Limited Interests in Land (2012) 
262-263. 
86 Harlin Properties (Pty) Ltd v Los Angeles Hotel (Pty) Ltd 1962 3 SA 143 (A). 
87 148 and 151. See also Sharrock Business Transactions Law 326. 
88 Poynton v Cran 1910 AD 205 227. 
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property for the purpose for which it was let.89 Consequently, the court in Harlin 
Properties endorsed the fact that in some instances it would be essential for the 
landowner to effect structural improvements so that the tenant may have the 
necessary use and enjoyment of the property as intended in terms of the leased 
agreement. 
Salmon v Dedlow (“Salmon”)90 is another case where the court alluded to the 
obligation of the owner to ensure that the property let is fit for the purpose. In this case, 
the guttering of the property was not sufficient enough to carry off rainwater from the 
roof, especially during heavy rainstorms.91 Thus during a rainstorm, excessive water 
entered through the roof and ceiling, flooding the leased house and causing damage 
to the tenant’s belongings in the house.92 The court held that where the roof of a house 
had leakages due to a structural defect, the landowner must make such repairs to the 
roof, doors or windows as it is necessary to prevent the rainwater from entering the 
house, causing damage and affecting the tenant’s occupation of the property.93 In light 
of the finding in Salmon, the obligation to ensure that a dwelling is habitable rests on 
the owner. 
Mpange is yet another case in which the court highlighted the obligation that rests 
on a landowner to make necessary repairs on the property that is rented out. In this 
case, the court found that since the premises were let by the landowner for the specific 
purpose of providing the tenants with residential accommodation, the landowner was 
obliged to effect necessary repairs to put the premises in a proper and habitable 
condition and to maintain the premises in the same condition.94 It is clear from the 
above principles that the landowner is responsible to place and maintain the dwelling 
in a condition that is reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was rented. However, 
the landowner is not obliged to effect repairs that are simply required for the more 
 
89 Harlin Properties (Pty) Ltd v Los Angeles Hotel (Pty) Ltd 1962 3 SA 143 (A) 150. See also 
Bowen v Daverin 1914 AD 632 650. 
90 Salmon v Dedlow 1912 TPD 971. 
91 975. 
92 974. 
93 978. See also Shapiro v Yutar 1930 CPD 92 97, where the court mentioned that the 
landowner should ensure that the building is closed and covered to protect the tenant, and 
make such necessary repairs to stop the rain from coming into the building; Wille Landlord 
and Tenant in South Africa 146-147; Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale and Lease 391. 
94 Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) paras 28-32. 
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efficient working of the premises in the leased property.95 Now that this part has shown 
that the common-law obligation primarily rests on the landowner to ensure habitability 
in the context of tenants’ dwellings, the subsection that follows indicates the impact of 
the RHA on the common-law obligation. 
 
3 4 2 The impact of the Rental Housing Act 
Apart from the common law as outlined above, the obligation of the landowner in terms 
of residential leases is regulated by the RHA. In section 13(4) of the RHA, read 
together with the regulations promulgated in terms of the RHA, the landowner is 
required to place and maintain the property to be let in an acceptable living condition 
so that it is fit for human habitation.96 This expressly confirms the common-law fit for 
purpose obligation. However, the RHA does not specifically and expressly incorporate 
the common-law obligation of habitability that was developed in cases like Mpange. 
That is, the landowner should provide tenants with adequate space, protection from 
the elements, threats to health, safety and premises that are free from defects.97 
In terms of section 2 of the RHA, the state is also responsible to promote rental 
housing. For example, this would ordinarily apply in instances where constitutional 
rights like the right to access to adequate housing or human dignity are implicated. 
Thus, the state must be concerned with the well-being of tenants and promote rental 
housing by improving the living conditions of tenants in the rental housing market.98 
 
95 Wille Landlord and Tenant in South Africa 147; Poynton v Cran 1910 AD 205 227; Bowen v 
Daverin 1914 AD 632 650. 
96 Section 13(4) of the RHA. See further Regulation 6(1)(b)(i) of the Unfair Practice 
Regulations to the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 GN 340 in GG 30863 of 14-03-2008 issued 
by the Department of Housing; Regulation 7(1)(b)(i) of the Gauteng Unfair Practice 
Regulations, promulgated under and in terms of the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 GN 4004 
in GG 30863 of 04-07-2001, as amended by GN 1472 of 04-06-2002; Regulation 4(1)(a)(i) of 
the Western Cape Unfair Practice Regulations, made in terms of the Rental Housing Act 50 
of 1999 GN 5822 in GG 20726 of 01-02-2002. 
97 Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) paras 28 and 51; Mohamed “Fit to Let Doesn’t Mean 
Habitable” (10-04-2012) Daily News. 
98 Section 2(1)(a)(i) of the RHA. See further PN Stoop “The South African Law of Lease and 
Socioeconomic Rights” (2013) 6 International Journal of Private Law 329 337-338. See also 
section 7 of the Constitution; section 152(1)(d) of the Constitution; section 2(1)(h) of the HA; 
Malan v City of Cape Town 2014 6 SA 315 (CC) paras 56 and 58; Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 
SA 578 (W) para 54. 
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That is, maintaining habitable public or private residential housing to ensure that 
tenants progressively have access to rental housing for the duration of the lease, the 
tenants are provided with adequate protection from the elements and have safe and 
healthy living conditions to ensure the elimination and prevention of uninhabitable 
conditions.99 This is because in instances where constitutional rights are at stake there 
is a need for the state to fulfil its constitutional obligation to provide adequately 
habitable housing to tenants.100 As the RHA does not amend or override the common-
law obligation of fit for the purpose, Parliament has intervened again in terms of the 
RHAA to protect the interest of tenants in view of the challenges that tenants face 
relating to the maintenance of leased properties. The next subsection indicates the 
impact of the RHAA on the existing common-law obligation of fit for the purpose that 
was confirmed by the RHA. 
 
3 4 3 The impact of the Rental Housing Amendment Act 
The common-law obligation of the landowner – as outlined above – will (perhaps more 
deliberately and expressly), be enshrined in section 4B(11) of the RHAA once this Act 
comes into force.101 This section will make it compulsory for the landowner to provide 
tenants with a dwelling that is in a habitable condition. This will be a statutory warranty 
of habitability.102 The landowner should ensure that the dwelling to be let is delivered 
in a habitable condition. This will give tenants the power to bargain for adequate 
habitable housing, and not accept property that is unsafe, inadequate or uninhabitable. 
 
99 Section 1, read together with section 2(1)(e)(iii) and (h)(i) of the HA; section 9(1)(a)(i) and 
(ii) of the HA; section 152(1)(d) of the Constitution. See further Malan v City of Cape Town 
2014 6 SA 315 (CC) para 56; Stoop (2014) Annual Survey of South African Law 820; CG van 
der Merwe & JM Pienaar “The Law of Property (including Real Security)” (2006) Annual 
Survey of South African Law 369-370. 
100 Section 7(2), read together with section 26 of the Constitution; supported by section 
152(1)(d) of the Constitution; section 2(1)(h) of the HA; section 2 of the RHA. See further Stoop 
(2013) International Journal of Private Law 329 337-338; Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 
(W) para 54; Malan v City of Cape Town 2014 6 SA 315 (CC) paras 56, 58, 119 and 124. 
101 Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale and Lease 385; Bapela & Stoop (2016) De Rebus 19; Viljoen 
The Law of Landlord and Tenant 200; Mohamed Landlord and Tenant 84. 
102 Viljoen The Law of Landlord and Tenant 200; Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale and Lease 385; 
Bapela & Stoop (2016) De Rebus 19; Stoop (2014) Annual Survey of South African Law 810; 
Mohamed Landlord and Tenant 45; Mohamed “Fit to Let Doesn’t Mean Habitable” (10-04-
2012) Daily News. 
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Apart from the landowner placing the tenants in a habitable dwelling, section 4B(11) 
of the RHAA will require that the landowner also maintain the existing structure of the 
dwelling in a habitable condition throughout the lease. In this regard, the RHAA added 
a new meaning of “maintain”. This meaning indicates that the landowner should make 
repairs and keep the dwelling in good condition, as it may be reasonably necessary 
for the tenant to use the dwelling in a habitable condition.103 The statutory obligation 
on the part of the landowner to place and maintain the existing structure of the dwelling 
in a habitable state (once the RHAA takes effect)104 will override the tenants’ ability to 
accept a dwelling that is in a state of disrepair because the RHAA does not allow for 
that. Furthermore, tenants will no longer be able to take over the landowner’s common-
law obligation to maintain the dwelling by contracting outside the common law.105 This 
means that landowners will no longer be able to hold all the aces in respect of the 
condition and undertaking to maintain the property that is subject to a lease 
agreement.106 In light of section 4B(11) of the RHAA, the obligation to provide and 
maintain the dwelling in a habitable condition will apply to every case and it will not 
depend on the circumstances of each case. 
In the final instance, section 4B(11) of the RHAA will require the landowner where 
possible to facilitate the provision of basic services to the dwelling.107 The contours of 
 
103 Section 1 of the RHAA. See further Viljoen The Law of Landlord and Tenant 200-201; 
Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale and Lease 385-387; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2014) Annual 
Survey of South African Law 844; Stoop (2014) Annual Survey of South African Law 811; 
Mohamed Landlord and Tenant 84; Mohamed “Safeguards for Tenants ‘Habitability will 
Replace Fit for the Purpose’ Obligation” (12-11-2014) Daily News. 
104 The RHAA has been assented to Parliament and signed by the President. However, the 
date on which the RHAA will come into operation is yet to be announced and there is no clarity 
as to when that will be done or why it has not come into operation yet. In the meantime, the 
common law applies as it stands. 
105 Viljoen The Law of Landlord and Tenant 201; Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale and Lease 385-
387; Mohamed Landlord and Tenant 85; Mohamed “Safeguards for Tenants ‘Habitability will 
Replace Fit for the Purpose’ Obligation” (12-11-2014) Daily News. 
106 Mohamed Landlord and Tenant 85; SI Mohamed “Landlords Hold all the Aces” (21-08-
2012) Daily News <http://www.iol.co.za/ .../consumer/landlords-hold-all-the-aces-1366479> 
(05-02-2018), he writes about the challenges faced by tenants in the rental housing market, 
but the position will soon change upon the operation of the RHAA; Mohamed “Safeguards for 
Tenants ‘Habitability will Replace Fit for the Purpose’ Obligation” (12-11-2014) Daily News. 
107 Section 4B(11) of the RHAA. See further Viljoen The Law of Landlord and Tenant 200; 
Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale and Lease 387; Stoop (2014) Annual Survey of South African Law 
811; Mohamed Landlord and Tenant 84. 
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where it will be possible (or not) for the landowner to provide basic facilities has not 
been defined in the RHAA or literature. That may be because the tenant’s entitlement 
to basic services will not be absolute.108 It is limited to the extent that the landowner 
can aid in the provision of basic services. In other words, what can be possible to 
provide by one landowner may not be possible for another. Nonetheless, the provision 
of basic amenities such as water, electricity, regular refuse removal, sufficient and 
hygienic lavatory facilities or any other essential service that is necessary for the 
tenant to use the dwelling in a habitable condition should, as a point of departure, be 
provided by the landowner. However, where there is a just cause for non-provision of 
basic facilities, the courts or tribunals will not hold the landowner liable because the 
landowner is only under the duty to assist in providing basic amenities where it is 
reasonably possible to do so.109 The duty of the landowner to facilitate basic services 
to the dwelling where possible (once the RHAA is signed into law) will have 
implications on the tenants’ common law entitlement of undisturbed use and 
enjoyment of the dwelling. For instance, if it becomes impossible, for whatever reason, 
for the landowner to provide basic services to the tenants, the use and enjoyment of 
the dwelling are diminished. In these instances, tenants will not easily have recourse 
to the common law remedies like the reduction of rent because the phrase “where 
possible” in the RHAA suggests that if the landowner proves impossibility to perform, 
an order of reduction of rent may not be granted against the landowner.110 However, 
it remains to be seen how this phrase will be interpreted in practice. 
A failure by the landowner to comply with the obligation of habitability is an offence. 
Thus, if the landowner is found guilty of contravening the habitability obligation he will 
be liable upon conviction to either a fine or imprisonment not exceeding two years or 
be liable for both a fine and imprisonment in terms of the RHAA.111 Consequently, 
whether the courts will impose a fine or imprisonment will depend on the 
circumstances of each case and how the court will exercise its discretion. However, it 
seems likely that liability for failure to ensure habitability will often result in fines and 
 
108 Stoop (2014) Annual Survey of South African Law 811. 
109 811-812. 
110 812. 
111 See section 16(aB) of the RHAA. See also Bapela & Stoop (2016) De Rebus 19; Stoop 
(2014) Annual Survey of South African Law 813 and 818. 
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not imprisonment, although imprisonment remains a possibility.112 However, this does 
not mean that the landowner as a first-time offender will not be punished if he has 
neglected to ensure that the dwelling is habitable. Nonetheless, aggravating factors 
such as a previous conviction of the landowner,113 or the dwelling being in dire need 
of repairs to make it habitable, should be sufficient reason to imprison the landowner 
for contravening section 4B(11) of the RHAA. The phrase “dire need of repairs” is set 
to mean property that seriously or urgently requires repairs, with the effect of exposing 
the tenants to unnecessary risk to injury or damage to life or property.114 Therefore, 
imprisonment should be used as a deterrent where the condition of the dwelling, on 
assessment by an expert, is a health hazard and unfit for human habitation. 
 
3 4 4 Concluding remarks 
As the law currently stands, landowners who rent residential property to tenants are 
obliged to place and maintain that property in a fit for the purpose condition in terms 
of the common law, unless the landowner’s common-law obligation has been 
expressly waived by the parties. The RHA reaffirms the common-law fit for purpose 
obligation. However, once the RHAA comes into effect the existing common-law 
obligation of fit for the purpose will be amended. In this regard, the RHAA will replace 
the fit for purpose obligation with habitability. In terms of the RHAA, habitability will 
now be a statutory requirement, which will form the basis of leasing of property. As 
such, it will be mandatory for the landowner to provide and maintain the dwelling in a 
habitable condition. Moreover, the landowner will provide tenants with access to basic 
amenities where it is possible. Furthermore, the RHAA will extend the nature of 
offences to include a fine or imprisonment, or both, for providing tenants with 
uninhabitable dwellings and failing to maintain the dwellings in terms of the required 
standard of habitability. 
 
 
112 This may be because of a mitigating factor, such as the landowner is a first-time offender. 
113 SS Terblanche “The Sentence” in JJ Joubert (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook 12 ed 
(2017) 381 and 385. 
114 In terms of PIE, a building is in need of dire repairs if it poses “real and imminent danger of 
substantial injury or damage to any person or property”. In terms of NBRBSA, property is in 
dire need of repairs if it is “dilapidated or in a state of disrepair or shows signs thereof”, or “is 
dangerous or is showing signs of becoming dangerous to life or property”. 
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3 5 Conclusion 
The meaning and obligation of habitability in the context of tenants are essentially 
based on the common-law fit for the purpose principle. This means that the common 
law specifically requires the property that is let to be in a condition that is reasonably 
fit for the purpose for which it was rented. As such, the landowner is obliged to 
guarantee the condition of the property and its maintenance (but subject to the terms 
of the lease) under the fit for the purpose requirement. This confirms the existing 
common law standard in this context. There is no real difference between the common 
law and the RHA with regard to the standard of habitability. The RHA provides for the 
same standard of habitability. In the RHAA, the standard of habitability will be 
deliberately and explicitly stated. In essence, the RHAA will inform tenants about what 
aspects to take into account when accepting property in terms of a lease agreement. 
In light of the cases decided in terms of the common-law fit for the purpose 
requirement, these cases endorse the meaning of habitability as envisaged in terms 
of the RHAA even though the cases were not brought in terms of the Amendment Act. 
Thus, interestingly, the elements of habitability were already applied by the court even 
though the RHAA – which has a specific definition of habitability unlike the common 
law – is not yet in operation. Therefore, the pronouncements made by courts seem to 
indicate that habitability forms part of our common-law fit for the purpose requirement. 
It is clear that the obligation towards the condition and maintenance of the property 
lies with the landowner both under the common law and the RHAA, but the landowner 
does not guarantee the same thing. In terms of the common law, he guarantees that 
the property is fit to let, while he guarantees that the property is habitable for rental 
under the RHAA. Accordingly, a warranty by the landowner that property is fit to let is 
not essentially the same as a property being habitable. 
The landowner is also responsible in terms of section 26(1) of the Constitution to 
provide tenants with habitable living conditions. This can be achieved by providing 
tenants with access to adequate rental housing with the same minimum standard of 
habitability as described in the RHAA and the CESCR’s General Comment 4.115 The 
impact of the Constitution on the standard of habitability in the context of tenants is 
that every tenant has the right to access to adequate housing, which includes the right 
 
115 See chapter 2 and 3 above. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
90 
of access to habitable housing.116 As such, all tenants should arguably be assisted by 
the state to live in habitable conditions in instances where constitutional rights are at 
stake.117 However, the state, through reasonable legislative and other measures like 
the RHA or RHAA, has enjoined private landowners to provide tenants with rental 
housing that is in a habitable condition so as to achieve the progressive realisation of 
the right to access to adequate housing. Therefore, both the state and the landowner 
should not impair the tenants’ rights to a habitable home.118 This means that where 
the property rented is in a state of disrepair, it may amount to a breach of the 
underlying lease agreement. 
 
 
116 See chapter 3 above. 
117 See chapter 3 above. 
118 See chapter 2 and 3 above. 
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CHAPTER 4: HABITABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF USUFRUCTUARIES 
4 1 Introduction 
A usufruct is a legal construct mostly created by testamentary will,1 but it is also 
possible to establish it between living parties in terms of a contractual agreement.2 It 
cannot exist beyond the lifetime of the usufructuary as it is a personal servitude 
attached to the usufructuary in his or her personal capacity.3 A usufruct is a personal 
 
1 MM Corbett “Usufruct, Usus and Habitatio” in HR Hahlo, MM Corbett, G Hofmeyr & E Kahn 
(eds) The Law of Succession in South Africa 2 ed (2001) 366 367; Van der Walt The Law of 
Servitudes 465; G Muller, R Brits, JM Pienaar & Z Boggenpoel Silberberg and Schoeman’s 
The Law of Property 6 ed (2019) 382-383; MJ de Waal & MC Schoeman-Malan The Law of 
Succession 4 ed (2008) 165; CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 165; RW Lee An 
Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law 4 ed (1946) 181 and 184; S Viljoen & J Strydom “Tenure 
Security and the Reform of Servitude Law” in G Muller, R Brits, B Slade & J van Wyk (eds) 
Transformative Property Law: Festschrift in Honour of AJ van der Walt (2018) 105; L Grobler 
The Salva Rei Substantia Requirement in Personal Servitudes LLD dissertation, Stellenbosch 
University (2015) 45. 
2 For an example of a usufruct constituted between living people, see generally Lola v Rimon 
(2012/42735) [2013] ZAGPJHC 65 (15 April 2013) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPJHC/2013/65.html> paras 1-5; Master v African Mines 
Corporation Ltd 1907 TS 925 927 and 929. 
3 See Bhamjee en v Mergold Beleggings (Edms) Bpk 1983 4 SA 555 (T) 557 and 563; Union 
Government (Minister of Finance) v De Kock NO 1918 AD 22 45; Lorentz v Melle 1978 3 SA 
1044 (T) 1049; Barclays Western Bank Ltd v Comfy Hotels Ltd 1980 4 SA 174 (E) 178; Felix 
en 'n ander v Nortier NO en andere [1996] 3 All SA 143 (SE) 148; Van Rensburg v Koekemoer 
2011 1 SA 118 (GSJ) para 14-17; National Stadium South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Firstrand Bank 
Ltd 2011 2 SA 157 (SCA) para 31-32; Section 66 of the Deed Registries Act 47 1937 (“DRA”) 
provides that no personal servitude of, inter alia, usufruct purporting to extend beyond the 
lifetime of the person in whose favour it is created shall be registered, nor may a transfer or 
cession of such personal servitude to any person other than the owner of the land encumbered 
thereby, be registered. See further Muller et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of 
Property 383; CG van der Merwe “Case 1: Various Instances of Time-Limited Interests” in CG 
van der Merwe & A Verbeke (eds) The Common Core of European Private Law Time Limited 
Interests in Land (2012) 125; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & 
JA Faris The Law of South Africa 2 ed Vol 24 (2010) para 581; CG van der Merwe, MJ de 
Waal & DL Carey Miller International Encyclopaedia of Laws (2004) 442; Corbett “Usufruct, 
Usus and Habitatio” in The Law of Succession in South Africa 367; Van der Walt The Law of 
Servitudes 455-456 and 464; AJ van der Walt “Property” (2011) 1 Juta’s Quarterly Review of 
South African Law 2.2.1; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Servitudes and Other Real Rights” in 
F du Bois (ed) Willie’s Principles of South African Law 9 ed (2007) 591 605; RP Pace 
“Usufruct” in RP Pace & WM van der Westhuizen (eds) Wills and Trusts (SI: 21 1995) 114; H 
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servitude that may be granted over immovable property with the effect of giving the 
usufructuary a limited real right to use and enjoy the property. The use and enjoyment 
of the property must be exercised in such a way that the nature of the property remains 
protected or preserved until such time that the property is given back to the owner.4 
The meaning of habitability of dwellings in the context of usufructuaries is not defined 
in legislation. However, there are common law principles that signal habitability to 
 
Mostert, A Pope, P Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The Principles of the 
Law of Property in South Africa (2010) 249; Hall & Kellaway Servitudes 1-5 and 165-166; Lee 
An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law 181; WM Gordon & MJ de Waal “Servitudes and Real 
Burdens” in R Zimmermann, D Visser & K Reid (eds) Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative 
Perspective Property and Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2005) 735 753; MJ de 
Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common 
Law in South Africa (1996) 785 811 and 813; Viljoen & Strydom “Tenure Security and the 
Reform of Servitude Law” in Transformative Property Law: Festschrift in Honour of AJ van der 
Walt 103-104. 
4 Van der Walt The Law of Servitudes 464; Hall & Kellaway Servitudes 164-165; Van der 
Merwe & De Waal “Servitudes” in The Law of South Africa para 581; Pace “Usufruct” in Wills 
and Trusts 114; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal The Law of Things and Servitudes (1993) 
210; Muller et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 383; Van der Merwe & Pope 
“Servitudes and Other Real Rights” in Willie’s Principles of South African Law 604-605; Corbett 
“Usufruct, Usus and Habitatio” in The Law of Succession in South Africa 366; De Waal 
“Servitudes” in Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa 809-811; Van der 
Merwe “Case 1: Various Instances of Time-Limited Interests” in The Common Core of 
European Private Law Time Limited Interests in Land 125; CG van der Merwe “Case 5: Duty 
of the Holder of a Time-Limited Interest to Repair, Replace and Renew” in CG van der Merwe 
& A Verbeke (eds) The Common Core of European Private Law Time Limited Interests in Land 
(2012) 265-266; R Sharrock Business Transactions Law 8 ed (2011) 892; De Waal & 
Schoeman-Malan The Law of Succession 166; Mostert et al The Principles of the Law of 
Property in South Africa 248; Gordon & De Waal “Servitudes and Real Burdens” in Mixed 
Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective Property and Obligations in Scotland and South 
Africa (2005) 735 755; G Steyn The Law of Wills in South Africa 2 ed (1948) 380; Lee An 
Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law 181; D Meyerowitz The Law and Practice of Administration 
of Estates and Their Taxation (2010) 24-1; G Muller “To Fell or Not to Fell: The Impact of 
NEMBA on the Rights and Obligations of a Usufructuary” (2018) 81 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse 
Romeins-Hollandse Reg 529 529; A Apers & AL Verbeke “Modern Usufruct – Empowering 
the Usufructuary” (2014) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 117 117; Grobler The Salva Rei 
Substantia Requirement in Personal Servitudes 45; Master v African Mines Corporation Ltd 
1907 TS 925 927; Day's Trustees v Registrar of Deeds 1910 CPD 361 367; Fourie v Munnik 
1919 OPD 73 79; Brunsdon’s Estate v Brunsdon’s Estate 1920 CPD 159 174; Ex Parte Estate 
Borland 1961 1 SA 6 (SR) 8. 
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mean a usufruct dwelling that is fit for human habitation.5 It is trite that in granting the 
limited real right of a usufruct, the owner gives the usufructuary the complete and 
undisturbed use and enjoyment of the usufruct dwelling. This is subject to the condition 
that the substance of the dwelling is well-looked-after by the usufructuary and returned 
to the owner when the usufruct comes to an end.6 Moreover, it can be expected of the 
owner to provide more entitlements or rights in terms of the notion of habitability or 
use and enjoyment. This may include accessories, which are reasonably necessary 
for the use and enjoyment of the dwelling, or that make the dwelling habitable.7 
Therefore, the owner who grants the limited real right of usufruct should ensure that 
the property is in a habitable condition to ensure that the usufructuary is able to use 
and enjoy the usufruct dwelling. This flows from the premise that the extraordinary 
repairs, which preserve the usufruct dwelling in a habitable standard, ordinarily rests 
upon the owner.8 Hence, the habitability of dwellings that are subject to a usufruct will 
be considered against this brief background. 
The first part of chapter 4 will look at the meaning of habitability of dwellings that 
are subject to a usufruct, and whether the owner can be expected to give 
usufructuaries other entitlements or rights in light of the notion of habitability. The 
reason for this is to determine whether a specific standard of habitability already exists 
for usufructuaries in terms of the common law. It is assumed that usufructuaries are 
entitled to use and enjoy the usufruct dwelling belonging to the owner, which may 
imply some standard of habitability of the dwelling, but this is not altogether clear and 
the idea will have to be unpacked further in the chapter. 
Subsequently, the second portion of chapter 4 will scrutinise the impact of the 
Constitution on the standard of habitability for usufructuaries in light of the 
constitutional rights to access to adequate housing and human dignity. In line with 
what is argued in chapter 2 of the dissertation, the assumption is that a link exists 
between habitability and the right to access to adequate housing and human dignity 
as enshrined in the Constitution. Although that link has not been made before or seen 
 
5 See part 4 2 below. 
6 See part 4 2 below. 
7 See part 4 2 below. 
8 See part 4 4 below. 
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in a case dealing with a usufruct, it will be argued that such a link in fact implies a 
minimum standard of habitability in this particular context. 
The third section of chapter 4 will, in turn, investigate on whom the obligation rests 
to ensure habitability. More specifically, it will question whether such an obligation 
rests on the owner who granted the usufruct, or on the occupier in line with the 
common law. Alternatively, it will be questioned whether the state can be expected to 
have any obligation to ensure that usufruct dwellings are habitable. The assumption 
is that the obligation to ensure habitability in the context of usufructuaries rests on the 
owner in so far as that obligation ensures the promotion of safe and suitable living 
conditions for usufructuaries. 
 
4 2 Meaning of habitability in the context of usufructuaries 
There is no clear or exact meaning of habitability in the case of dwellings occupied by 
usufructuaries, but literature and case law seem to focus on ensuring that a dwelling 
is habitable in the sense that it is fit for human habitation.9 Herewith are the cases that 
illustrate some indication of habitability, specifically in so far as the notion purports to 
mean a dwelling that is fit for human habitation in this context. 
In the case of Ex Parte De Douallier (“De Douallier”),10 property was left to the 
usufructuary.11 The property was to later devolve on the usufructuary’s firstborn minor 
child. The will stipulated that the property was not to be mortgaged or alienated.12 
However, the usufructuary was extremely poor and the property had become 
uninhabitable. The usufructuary could not afford to make the repairs necessary to 
 
9 Hall & Kellaway Servitudes 174; Muller et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 
386; Mostert et al The Principles of the Law of Property in South Africa 251; Corbett “Usufruct, 
Usus and Habitatio” in The Law of Succession in South Africa 376; Ex Parte Davy 1902 TH 
96 97-98; Ex Parte De Douallier 1907 24 SC 282 283; cited in Grobler The Salva Rei 
Substantia Requirement in Personal Servitudes 82; Ex Parte Atkins: In re Estate Lazarus 1933 
WLD 76 77; Philps v Cradock Municipality 1937 EDL 382 389; Brunsdon’s Estate v Brunsdon’s 
Estate 1920 CPD 159 174; Ex Parte Estate Borland 1961 1 SA 6 (SR) 7; Nel v Potgieter 1962 
2 SA 608 (T) 610-611. 
10 Ex Parte De Douallier (1907) 24 SC 282. 
11 283. The usufructuary was referred to in this matter as a pertitioner. 
12 283. See also Grobler The Salva Rei Substantia Requirement in Personal Servitudes 82, 
particularly footnote 288. 
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place the property in a habitable state of repair.13 She then applied for leave to 
mortgage the property to raise money to pay for necessary repairs to the property. 
After having regard to the special circumstances in casu, the court granted the 
usufructuary the leave to mortgage the property for the means necessary to place the 
dwelling in a habitable state of repair.14 Interestingly, the case shows how creative a 
court can be to ensure the right of a usufructuary to a habitable dwelling. The court’s 
finding also indicates that a usufruct is fit for human habitation if that property is placed 
in a habitable state of repair.15 This seems to imply that, at the very least, the dwelling 
in the context of a usufruct should be suitable to live in.16 Property that is in a 
dilapidated condition or state of disrepair is not fit or suitable for human habitation.17 
Furthermore, the decision of the court in De Douallier signals that necessary repairs 
to the building classify as the standard that the usufructuary can expect. 
The case of De Douallier was later followed in Ex Parte Praetorius (“Praetorius”).18 
In Praetorius, a husband and wife were married in community of property.19 They 
mutually bequeathed the usufruct of their estate to the surviving spouse, which in this 
case was the husband. However, the husband was too old and unable to look after 
himself out of the capital of the estate. Likewise, the husband could not pay for the 
rates or keep the property in good condition.20 The court, referring to De Douallier, 
authorised the husband to mortgage the estate property to cover the costs already 
incurred in terms of rates and repairs.21 The case of Praetorius endorses the idea that 
 
13 Ex Parte De Douallier (1907) 24 SC 282 283. See also Grobler The Salva Rei Substantia 
Requirement in Personal Servitudes 82, particularly footnote 288. 
14 Ex Parte De Douallier (1907) 24 SC 282 283; followed with approval in Ex Parte Praetorius 
1915 CPD 819 821; similarly in Ex Parte Fourie 1925 CPD 43 44. See further Grobler The 
Salva Rei Substantia Requirement in Personal Servitudes 82, particularly footnote 288; 
Meyerowitz The Law and Practice of Administration of Estates and Their Taxation 24-19. 
15 Ex Parte De Douallier 1907 24 SC 282 283. 
16 See chapter 2 above. 
17 Ex Parte Standard Bank Ltd: In re Estate Rodger 1963 3 SA 683 (SR) 684. 
18 Ex Parte Praetorius 1915 CPD 819. See also Grobler The Salva Rei Substantia 
Requirement in Personal Servitudes 82. 
19 Ex Parte Praetorius 1915 CPD 820. 
20 820. 
21 821; cited in Meyerowitz The Law and Practice of Administration of Estates and Their 
Taxation 24-19; discussed in Grobler The Salva Rei Substantia Requirement in Personal 
Servitudes 82. 
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habitability of a usufruct dwelling means a residence that is kept in a good condition. 
Consequently, if the dwelling is not in good condition, the usufructuary, with the leave 
of the court, can be expected to effect repairs necessary to place the dwelling in a 
habitable state of repair. Again, as in De Douallier the repairs that were necessary to 
put the dwelling in a habitable state of repair point towards the standard that can be 
expected when the owner grants the usufructuary a usufruct. The court’s decision in 
Praetorius is also laudable as it safeguards the usufructuary’s right to have a habitable 
dwelling. 
In another case of Ex Parte Davy (“Davy”),22 H and W entered into an ante-nuptial 
contract.23 In the contract, a certain property was vested in a trustee and a usufruct of 
that property granted to W. On W’s death, the usufruct property was to devolve among 
the children born in the marriage of H and W. The usufruct property was in a 
dilapidated state and needed to be repaired.24 The court in Davy allowed for money to 
be raised in order to pay for extraordinary repairs that were for the benefit of the 
property.25 The case of Davy further shows that fit for human occupation includes 
making repairs that are necessary for the benefit of the property and not luxurious 
repairs.26 Such necessary repairs in effect ensure the continued existence of the 
property.27 In Nel v Potgieter (“Nel”),28 the court also elaborated on the requirement of 
fit for human habitation. The court held that a house (including its accessories) that is 
subject to a usufruct must be delivered in a good condition so that the usufructuary 
can have the proper use of the house and its accessories, both of which are usually 
provided for the sake of comfortable living in the property.29 The Nel case indicates 
that a usufruct dwelling is fit for human occupation if the property is delivered with 
everything that makes it more comfortable to live in. 
Despite the lack of a clear definition of habitability in the case of usufructs, the 
statements in cases like De Douallier, Praetorius, Davy and Nel point toward an 
 




26 97-98. See also recently the case of Lola v Rimon (2012/42735) [2013] ZAGPJHC 65 (15 
April 2013) SAFLII <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPJHC/2013/65.html> para 7. 
27 Muller et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 386. 
28 Nel v Potgieter 1962 2 SA 608 (T). 
29 610-611. 
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outlining of the meaning of habitability as it can be derived from the requirement that 
the dwelling must be fit for human habitation. The following definition of habitability is 
proposed as derived from the above-mentioned judgments. Habitability in the sense 
of fit for human habitation means a dwelling that is placed in a habitable state of repair 
and allowed to be kept in a good condition for the duration of the usufruct. This, in turn, 
may imply allowing the usufructuary, with the leave of the court, to effect necessary 
(although not luxurious) repairs for the benefit of improving the property. Habitability 
in the sense of fit for human habitation further includes providing the usufructuary with 
all necessary accessories that would make living in the dwelling more comfortable or 
convenient. The statements such as “repairs done for the benefit of the property”,30 
“property kept in good condition”,31 “placing the property in a habitable state of 
repair”32 and that a “dwelling should include all that makes it more comfortable or 
convenient to live in”33 when put together imply a very specific (an arguably individual) 
standard for usufructuaries based on pronouncements in the cases mentioned above 
dealing with usufruct. The reference to an arguably “individual” standard for 
usufructuaries illustrates that just as adequate housing generally means more than 
just mere habitability, each category may imply unique characteristics when one looks 
at the content of “adequate housing” for each category beyond the minimum standard 
of habitability. 
 
4 2 1 Concluding remarks 
The meaning of habitability in the context of a usufruct is not clearly defined. Despite 
the lack of a definition, habitability in this context seems to mean that the usufruct 
property (or the property that is subject to the usufruct) is fit and habitable for human 
occupation.34 The meaning of habitability as set out above does not indicate an explicit 
 
30 Ex Parte Davy 1902 TH 96 97-98. 
31 Ex Parte Praetorius 1915 CPD 819 821. 
32 Ex Parte De Douallier 1907 24 SC 282 283. 
33 Nel v Potgieter 1962 2 SA 608 (T) 610-611. 
34 Ex Parte Davy 1902 TH 96 97-98; Ex Parte De Douallier (1907) 24 SC 282 283; Ex Parte 
Atkins: In re Estate Lazarus 1933 WLD 76 77; Philps v Cradock Municipality 1937 EDL 382 
389; Brunsdon’s Estate v Brunsdon’s Estate 1920 CPD 159 174; Ex Parte Estate Borland 
1961 1 SA 6 (SR) 7; Nel v Potgieter 1962 2 SA 608 (T) 610-611; Muller et al Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The Law of Property 386; Hall & Kellaway Servitudes 174. 
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standard of habitability. However, it does seem in terms of the common law that the 
standard of habitability is met when the dwelling is fit and habitable for human 
occupation.35 Therefore, the usufruct property must be fit for occupation in order to 
satisfy the standard of habitability in the context of usufructuaries. It is important to 
note that an obligation in terms of habitability may nonetheless be informed specifically 
by a usufruct agreement and/or constitutional rights (or imperatives) as shown in 4 3 
below, which is the next section that will be dealt with. 
 
4 3 Impact of the Constitution on the standard of habitability for 
usufructuaries 
This section considers the impact of the Constitution on the common-law construct of 
a usufruct. More specifically, it is important to determine whether the Constitution (or 
constitutional rights more specifically) inform a standard of habitability in the context 
of a usufruct other than the specific standard outlined in the section above in terms of 
the common law. The appropriate point of departure for constitutional scrutiny is the 
principle of constitutional supremacy in terms of section 2 of the Constitution.36 This 
section provides that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land and that all law 
or conduct that is not in line with the Constitution is invalid.37 The section further 
provides that obligations that are imposed by the Constitution must be fulfilled.38 
Another important principle in constitutional analysis is the “single-system-of-law” 
principle that was stated in the case of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of 
South Africa: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa (“Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers”).39 In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, the court held that there is only 
one system of law in the Republic. The Constitution as the supreme law shapes the 
 
35 Hall & Kellaway Servitudes 174; Muller et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of 
Property 386; Ex Parte Davy 1902 TH 96 97-98; Ex Parte De Douallier (1907) 24 SC 282 283; 
Ex Parte Atkins: In re Estate Lazarus 1933 WLD 76 77; Philps v Cradock Municipality 1937 
EDL 382 389; Brunsdon’s Estate v Brunsdon’s Estate 1920 CPD 159 174; Ex Parte Estate 
Borland 1961 1 SA 6 (SR) 7; Nel v Potgieter 1962 2 SA 608 (T) 610-611. 
36 See chapter 2 above. 
37 See chapter 2 above. 
38 See chapter 2 above. 
39 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex Parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC). See also Van der Walt The Law of Servitudes 
38; ZT Boggenpoel Property Remedies (2017) 10. 
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system. The court further mentioned that all law, including the common law, derives 
its force from the Constitution and is subject to constitutional control.40 In light of 
section 2 and the “single-system-of-law” principle, the common-law construct of a 
usufruct is part of a single system of South African law.41 It is shaped by the 
Constitution as the supreme law, and it should derive its force from the Constitution. 
This would mean that a usufruct is subject to constitutional control and regulation.42 
Considering the above framework, it is important to determine what source of law 
the usufructuary can use to find a remedy to protect his or her usufructuary interest. 
The sources of law that may generally apply are the Constitution and the common 
law.43 The common law seems to be the obvious source of law in the context of 
usufructuaries. This can be argued based on the subsidiary principles.44 For the 
purposes of a usufruct, the subsidiarity principles provide that where no legislation 
deals with the rights of a usufructuary, the common law should be directly relied 
upon.45 This would mean that the matter will be decided purely on the basis of common 
law principles – unless these principles are not in line with the Constitution.46 Once 
the relevant common-law position has been determined as set out above, the common 
law should be applied to the specific facts of the case at hand. What is important is to 
determine what the common-law position entails and what outcome is prescribed by 
the common law for the particular case.47 At this stage, it is not necessary to question 
whether the outcome of the case is fair, or acceptable, or whether the common law 
should be developed, but primarily to set out what the position is in terms of the 
common law.48 
In the context of the question of whether a usufruct dwelling is habitable, the 
assessment of the common law becomes relevant in the following case. The common 
 
40 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex Parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 44. See further Van der Walt The Law of 
Servitudes 38, especially footnote 97; Boggenpoel Property Remedies 10. 
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law, indicates that the usufructuary must ask the court to lift the restraint on the 
testator’s will, which stipulated that the property should not be mortgaged. The court 
will ordinarily assess the surrounding circumstances of the case to see whether the 
mortgage is in the best interest of the beneficiaries (that is, the usufructuary and the 
heir) of the bequest. If the mortgage beyond reasonable doubt benefits the 
beneficiaries, the court will normally lift the restrictive condition in the will so that the 
property can be mortgaged in order to raise money for necessary repairs. This shows 
how creative the courts have been to ensure that the dwelling of usufructuaries is in 
fact in a habitable state. 
As the common-law position has been established, the next step is to determine 
whether the outcome prescribed by the common law is adequate, acceptable and 
justifiable in light of constitutional rights.49 When a usufruct is granted against 
immovable property, it has the purpose of providing usufructuaries with personal 
residence and in effect protects their housing rights, security of tenure and provides 
human dignity in terms of the Constitution.50 As such, the personal servitude of a 
usufruct is not immune to the Constitution, nor can it be excluded from constitutional 
scrutiny especially where the usufruct dwelling is not habitable.51 If the dwelling that is 
subject to a usufruct is not habitable, it may constitute a contravention of rights 
 
49 41. 
50 AJ van der Walt “The Continued Relevance of Servitude” (2013) 3 Property Law Review 3 
30; Van der Walt The Law of Servitudes 30 and 41; Grobler The Salva Rei Substantia 
Requirement in Personal Servitudes 305; Viljoen & Strydom “Tenure Security and the Reform 
of Servitude Law” in Transformative Property Law: Festschrift in Honour of AJ van der Walt 
(2018) 96-120. 
51 Van der Walt The Law of Servitudes 38; AJ van der Walt Property and Constitution (2012) 
20-21; AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 South 
African Law Journal 722 738; DM Davis & K Klare “Transformative Constitutionalism and the 
Common and Customary Law” (2010) 26 South African Journal on Human Rights 403 430; 
Van der Walt (2013) Property Law Review 31-32; Grobler The Salva Rei Substantia 
Requirement in Personal Servitudes 286; E Cameron Justice: A Personal Account (2014) 212; 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex Parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 44; Carmichele v Minister of Safety and 
Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 33; Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 15; 
Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape 2015 6 SA 125 
(CC) para 46; FI Michelman “The Rule of Law, Legality and the Supremacy of the Constitution” 
in S Woolman , T Roux, J Klaaren, A Stein, M Chaskalson & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional 
Law of South Africa 2 ed Vol 1 (RS: 6 2014) 11-22 – 11-23 and 11-37 - 11-44. 
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enshrined in the Bill of Rights,52 such as the right to human dignity,53 security of 
tenure54 or access to adequate housing.55 Thus, the question is how the South African 
courts will, in future, deal with habitability in the context of usufructuaries given the 
constitutional right to human dignity, security of tenure and access to adequate 
housing, which arguably also applies to usufructuaries. In other words, it is important 
to consider whether a usufructuary will be able to rely on the Constitution, more 
specifically the right to human dignity, security of tenure or access to adequate 
housing, to argue that a usufruct dwelling is not habitable. Arguably, it needs to be 
established whether the common-law requirements of “fit for occupation” or “use and 
enjoyment” – as developed in case law dealing with usufructuaries – are sufficient to 
provide a usufructuary with a minimum standard to ensure that the usufructuary 
dwelling is in fact habitable. The aim is to highlight these links so that clarity can be 
established concerning the impact of the Constitution on the common-law construct of 
the usufruct, especially in so far as it pertains to a potential minimum standard of 
habitability for usufructuaries. 
The starting point to investigate the implication of the Constitution on the outcome 
that is prescribed by the current position of the common law is to determine whether 
the common law is in conflict with constitutional rights such as human dignity, and the 
others.56 The common-law position is illustrated by the cases of De Douallier and 
Praetorius discussed earlier in this chapter. Although the cases of De Douallier and 
Praetorius were decided solely on common law principles and essentially prescribe 
the ambit of the common-law position regarding habitability in the context of usufructs, 
the cases essentially show how imaginative courts can be to protect constitutional 
rights and do not pertinently indicate any visible infringement of constitutional rights. 
This is because the court permitted the restriction to mortgage in the will and allowed 
 
52 Grobler The Salva Rei Substantia Requirement in Personal Servitudes 8 and 305. 
53 Section 10 of the Constitution. It provides that “[e]veryone has inherent dignity and the right 
to have their dignity respected and protected.” 
54 Section 25(6) of the Constitution which states that “[a] person or community whose tenure 
of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, 
to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to 
comparable redress.” 
55 Section 26(1) of the Constitution. This section makes provision that “[e]veryone has the right 
to have access to adequate housing.” 
56 Van der Walt The Law of Servitudes 41-42. 
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the usufructuary to mortgage the dwelling to effect necessary repairs aimed at placing 
the property in a habitable condition. However, if the outcome of the common-law 
position was that a court cannot lift conditions in a will, the rigid application of the 
common law in that regard would arguably have resulted in usufructuaries being 
denied their right to live in a habitable dwelling that protects their human dignity, 
security of tenure or access to adequate housing. In my view, such an outcome would 
directly impact on constitutional rights such as human dignity or access to adequate 
housing. In such instances, the usufructuary should arguably be able to rely on 
constitutional rights to argue that the usufruct is not habitable or that the development 
of the common law should be considered.57 This is because such a rigid application 
of the common law would arguably be in direct conflict with constitutional provisions.58 
Nevertheless, as highlighted already, the manner in which the cases of De Douallier 
and Praetorius were decided ensured that a usufructuary dwells in adequate housing 
that is habitable and accords with human dignity. In this regard, a need has not arisen 
to develop the common law and the common law as applied currently is arguably 
unproblematic.59 
Given that the common law remains intact, a further interesting question that arises 
is whether the common-law requirements of “fit for occupation” or “use and 
enjoyment”, which were developed by the courts, are adequate to provide a 
usufructuary with a minimum standard that ensures that the usufructuary lives in a 
habitable dwelling. I would argue that the common-law fit for occupation requirement 
or the entitlement of use and enjoyment are sufficient to provide usufructuaries with a 
minimum standard of habitability in the case of the dwelling being uninhabitable. As a 
point of departure, a usufruct dwelling should be fit for human occupation.60 The 
principle is that a usufructuary is entitled to the use of the usufruct.61 The usufructuary 
cannot enjoy that use or even draw appropriate benefits from the usufruct unless it is 
fit for occupation. Consequently, the common law as it stands is likely to be sufficient 





60 See part 4 2 above. 
61 See parts 4 2 above and 4 4 below. 
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The way the court in De Douallier and Praetorius applied the common law in a 
flexible manner indirectly upheld constitutional rights due to the court’s willingness to 
safeguard the interests of the usufructuaries.62 Furthermore, the decisions of the court 
in De Douallier and Praetorius inherently indicate that the common-law construct of a 
usufruct is in fact part of a “single-system-of-law” which is shaped by the Constitution 
as the supreme law of the land.63 As such, the common-law construct of a usufruct 
derives its force from the Constitution and it is not immune to constitutional control and 
regulation.64 As a result, the common-law construct of a usufruct does in effect 
 
62 Section 2 of the Constitution. On the issue of constitutional supremacy, see Van der Walt 
The Law of Servitudes 38; Van der Walt Property and Constitution 19, particularly footnote 1; 
Van der Walt (2013) South African Law Journal 738; Van der Walt (2013) Property Law 
Review 31; I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 9; LR Ngwenyama 
The Impact of Section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 on Banking 
Law LLM dissertation, University of Johannesburg (2016) 8; Cameron Justice: A Personal 
Account 177 and 212; A Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) 
10; DE van Loggerenberg “Excerpts from the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996” in DE van Loggerenberg & E Bertelsmann (eds) Erasmus: Superior Court Practice 2 ed 
Vol 1 (OS: 6 2015) A1-2; Michelman “The Rule of Law, Legality and the Supremacy of the 
Constitution” in CLOSA 11-34 – 11-44; cited in Grobler The Salva Rei Substantia Requirement 
in Personal Servitudes 286; Carmichele v Minister of Safety & Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 
para 33. 
63 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex Parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) paras 44 and 49. See further Van der Walt The 
Law of Servitudes 38-39; Van der Walt Property and Constitution 20; Michelman “The Rule of 
Law, Legality and the Supremacy of the Constitution” in CLOSA 11-22 – 11-23 and 11-37 - 
11-44; Davis & Klare (2010) South African Journal on Human Rights 403 430. 
64 Van der Walt The Law of Servitudes 38-39; Van der Walt Property and Constitution 20; Van 
der Walt (2013) South African Law Journal 738; Van der Walt (2013) Property Law Review 
31-32; AJ van der Walt “Normative Pluralism and Anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 Term” 
(2008) 1 Constitutional Court Review 77 77-128; AJ van der Walt “The Modest Systemic 
Status of Property Rights” (2014) 1 Journal for Law, Property and Society 15 15-106; Grobler 
The Salva Rei Substantia Requirement in Personal Servitudes 286; Michelman “The Rule of 
Law, Legality and the Supremacy of the Constitution” in CLOSA 11-22 – 11-23 and 11-37 - 
11-44; ZT Boggenpoel “Does Method Really Matter? Reconsidering the Role of Common Law 
Remedies in the Eviction Paradigm” (2014) 25 Stellenbosch Law Review 72 72-98; ZT 
Boggenpoel “(Re)defining the Contours of Ownership: Moving Beyond White Picket Fences” 
(2019) 30 Stellenbosch Law Review 234 240, particularly footnote 41; G Muller “Evicting 
Unlawful Occupiers for Health and Safety Reasons in Post-Apartheid South Africa” (2015) 132 
South African Law Journal 616 637; Davis & Klare (2010) South African Journal on Human 
Rights 403 430, the authors say that the common law must be interpreted and assessed within 
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promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights in terms of the 
Constitution.65 It is important to state that when the Constitution was put into effect it 
was intended that the law, including the common law, should reflect the recognised 
normative value-based system as found in the Constitution.66 This is because the 
Constitution imposes new obligations on the owner concerning property rights, which 
 
the scope and lens of the Constitution, citing Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic 
Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In re Hyundai Motor Distirbutors (Pty) Ltd v 
Smit No 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) para 21 and Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International 
(Finance) BV t/a Sabmark International 2006 1 SA 144 (CC) paras 44 and 51; First National 
Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services; 
First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 
31; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex Parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) paras 44 and 49; In Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 
5 SA 323 (CC) para 15, the court mentioned that all law and the common law is subject to 
constitutional control; Carmichele v Minister of Safety & Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 33; 
Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape 2015 6 SA 125 
(CC) para 46. 
65 Section 39(2) of the Constitution. See further Van der Walt Property and Constitution 20-
21; Muller (2018) Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 533; Cameron Justice: 
A Personal Account 184; DM Davis “How many Positivist Legal Philosophers can be made to 
Dance on the Head of a Pin? A Reply to Professor Fagan” (2012) 129 South African Law 
Journal 59 66; Davis & Klare (2010) South African Journal on Human Rights 403 425-428; A 
Fagan “The Secondary Role of the Spirit, Purport and Objects of the Bill of Rights in the 
Common Law’s Development” (2010) 127 South African Law Journal 611 611-627; S 
Woolman “The Amazing, Vanishing Bill of Rights” (2007) 124 South African Law Journal 762 
768-782; AJ van der Walt “Transformative Constitutionalism and the Development of South 
African Property Law (Part 1)” (2005) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 655 655-689; AJ 
van der Walt Transformative Constitutionalism and the Development of South African Property 
Law (Part 2) (2006) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 1 1-31; AJ van der Walt “Developing 
the Law on Unlawful Squatting and Spoliation” (2008) 125 South African Law Journal 24 34; 
D Cornell & N Friedman “In defence of the Constitutional Court: Human Rights and the South 
African Common Law” (2011) 5 Malawi Law Journal 1 18; Viljoen & Strydom “Tenure Security 
and the Reform of Servitude Law” in Transformative Property Law:Festschrift in Honour of AJ 
van der Walt (2018) 97; Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 5 SA 30 (CC) para 45; 
Carmichele v Minister of Safety & Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 33. 
66 Davis (2012) South African Law Journal 59; Woolman (2007) South African Law Journal 
769; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex Parte President of 
the Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 49; Carmichele v Minister of Safety and 
Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 54; K v Minister of Safety & Security 2005 6 SA 419 (CC) 
paras 16-17; S v Thebus 2003 6 SA 505 (CC) para 27-28. 
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the common law did not recognise as valid.67 It follows from this that the owner (or 
heirs) cannot simply say that the usufruct property is his, and he can repair it when he 
wants to.68 The reason for this is that the moment the usufruct is constituted, the owner 
(or the heirs) are under the obligation to allow the usufructuary in property that is fit for 
occupation to exercise his or her rights pertaining to the usufruct property.69 In this 
regard, the owner (or the heirs) may be required to effect structural repairs, which are 
reasonably necessary to bring the usufruct property in a habitable state of repair.70 
 
4 3 1 Concluding remarks 
Literature and case law indicate that usufructuaries do not rely on their constitutional 
rights such as access to adequate housing, human dignity and security of tenure to 
ensure that their dwelling is brought in line with a standard of habitability.71 There is 
also currently no applicable legislation to regulate this part of the law. The common 
law will therefore have to be relied upon by usufructuaries as the applicable source of 
law as a point of departure.72 This would mean that the common-law position and 
outcome prescribed by the common law will have to be followed in the specific case.73 
If the outcome prescribed by the common law is inadequate or unacceptable or 
unjustifiable given the implication of constitutional rights, the development of the 
common law will have to be considered by the court in view of relevant constitutional 
rights.74 Thus, apart from the courts developing a normative framework for decisions, 
 
67 Compare Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 49 and 135. See also Port 
Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 23; referred to in City of 
Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W) para 28; Van der Walt Property 
and Constitution 22; Van der Walt The Law of Servitudes 45; ZT Boggenpoel “Property” (2017) 
2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Boggenpoel (2019) Stellenbosch Law 
Review 234 238. 
68 See, for example, Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 
20. Compare Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 133-142. See also Boggenpoel 
(2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1. 
69 Mostert et al The Principles of the Law of Property in South Africa 251. 
70 251. 
71 See Steyn The Law of Wills in South Africa 389; Hall & Kellaway Servitudes 175; Ex Parte 
De Douallier 1907 24 SC 282; Ex Parte Praetorius 1915 CPD 819 821. 
72 Van der Walt The Law of Servitudes 43. 
73 41. 
74 41-44. 
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the courts should always take into consideration the implication of the Constitution on 
the standard of habitability for usufructuaries, as shown in Douallier and Praetorius. 
Nevertheless, it was argued that an obligation in terms of habitability may not be 
informed directly by constitutional rights as shown in 4 3 above, but constitutional 
rights must still be given effect to by the common law. It remains to be seen whether 
an obligation to ensure habitability in fact rests on the owner of usufruct dwelling as 
will be questioned in 4 4 below. 
 
4 4 On whom does the obligation rest to ensure habitability in the context of 
usufructuaries? 
The purpose of this section is to examine whether the obligation to ensure habitability 
rests on the owner or the usufructuary. As previously mentioned, a usufruct ordinarily 
comes with the entitlement of use and enjoyment of the dwelling for the benefit of 
usufructuaries.75 In view of that, the usufruct property will arguably only be useful and 
 
75 Van der Walt The Law of Servitudes 464 and 472; Corbett “Usufruct, Usus and Habitatio” 
in The Law of Succession in South Africa 366 and 373; Hall & Kellaway Servitudes 166-167; 
Muller et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 383-384; Van der Merwe “Case 
1: Various Instances of Time-Limited Interests” in The Common Core of European Private Law 
Time Limited Interests in Land 125; Mostert et al The Principles of the Law of Property in South 
Africa 248-250; Van der Merwe & De Waal The Law of Things & Servitudes 210 and 212; Van 
der Merwe, De Waal & Carey Miller International Encyclopaedia of Laws 442 and 444; Van 
der Merwe & Pope “Servitudes and Other Real Rights” 604 and 606; Van der Merwe & De 
Waal “Servitudes” in The Law of South Africa paras 581 and 585; Gordon & De Waal 
“Servitudes and Real Burdens” in Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective Property 
and Obligations in Scotland and South Africa 755; De Waal “Servitudes” in Southern Cross: 
Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa 810-811; Sharrock Business Transactions Law 
892; Steyn The Law of Wills in South Africa 380; Lee An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law 
181; Meyerowitz The Law and Practice of Administration of Estates and Their Taxation 24-1 
and 24-17; Apers & Verbeke (2014) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 117; Muller (2018) 
Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 529 529; De Smidt v Burton, Master of the 
Supreme Court (1828-1849) 1 Menz 222 228; Furnivall v Cornwell's Executors (1895) 12 SC 
6 10; Master v African Mines Corporation Ltd 1907 TS 925 927; Day's Trustees v Registrar of 
Deeds 1910 CPD 361 367; Fourie v Munnik 1919 OPD 73 79; Brunsdon’s Estate v Brunsdon’s 
Estate 1920 CPD 159 174; Morkel v Malan 1933 CPD 370 374-375; Barnett v Rudman 1934 
AD 203 206 and 211; In re Cooper's Estate 1939 CPD 309 311; Ex Parte Estate Borland 1961 
1 SA 6 (SR) 8; Cowley v Hahn 1987 1 SA 440 (E) 446. 
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enjoyable to the usufructuaries if it is habitable.76 This implies a very particular 
standard of habitability for usufructuaries. Therefore, in this context, the owner (or heir) 
is obliged to ensure that the dwelling is in a liveable or habitable condition during the 
continuation of the usufruct.77 This is because the maintenance of special or 
extraordinary repairs of the dwelling to keep it fit for human habitation are on the 
owner’s account.78 The owner is responsible for the permanent maintenance of the 
 
76 Ex Parte De Douallier (1907) 24 SC 282 283. Followed in Ex Parte Praetorius 1915 CPD 
819 821. Compare Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 32. 
77 Hall & Kellaway Servitudes 174. Meyerowitz The Law and Practice of Administration of 
Estates and Their Taxation 24-19. Mostert et al The Principles of the Law of Property in South 
Africa 251, the authors point out that once the usufruct comes into existence, the owner is 
under the obligation to allow the usufructuaries to exercise their entitlements or rights. This 
means that necessary repairs to keep the usufruct dwelling habitable may have to be borne 
by the owner. Muller et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 386. Van der 
Merwe & De Waal The Law of Things & Servitudes (1993) 215. Corbett “Usufruct, Usus and 
Habitatio” in The Law of Succession in South Africa 373. Grobler The Salva Rei Substantia 
Requirement in Personal Servitudes 82. Ex Parte Praetorius 1915 CPD 819 821. Ex Parte De 
Douallier (1907) 24 SC 282 283. Nel v Potgieter 1962 2 SA 608 (T) 610-611. Ex Parte 
Standard Bank Ltd: In re Estate Rodger 1963 3 SA 683 (SR) 686-687. In Brett v Barclays Bank 
(D C & O) 1954 1 SA 260 (N) 263, the court found that a bequest stating that the usufructuary 
is entitled to the “free use and enjoyment of the usufruct” should mean that the testator’s 
intention was that the capital of the estate was to cover the heavy costs of putting the property 
in repair. Compare Crosbie v Crosbie's Executor (1904) 21 SC 597 606, where the court held 
that the obligation to ensure that a house is maintained in a habitable condition and not to 
allow that house to fall into a state of disrepair as to render it uninhabitable rests on the 
testator’s estate. 
78 Hall & Kellaway Servitudes 170 and 174, the authors point out that if the usufruct property 
has fallen into a state of disrepair by reason of no fault attributable to the usufructuary and the 
property can be regarded as reasonably unusable or uninhabitable, the owner or the main part 
of his estate is liable to cover the expenses of repair. Van der Merwe “Case 5: Duty of the 
Holder of a Time-Limited Interest to Repair, Replace and Renew” in The Common Core of 
European Private Law Time Limited Interests in Land 266. Muller et al Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The Law of Property 386. Mostert et al The Principles of the Law of Property in 
South Africa 250. Van der Walt The Law of Servitudes 478-479. Corbett “Usufruct, Usus and 
Habitatio” in The Law of Succession in South Africa 376-377. Van der Merwe & De Waal The 
Law of Things & Servitudes 215. Van der Merwe, De Waal & Carey Miller International 
Encyclopaedia of Laws 449. Van der Merwe & De Waal “Servitudes” in The Law of South 
Africa para 595. Van der Merwe & Pope “Servitudes and Other Real Rights” in Willie’s 
Principles of South African Law 609, citing Ex Parte Standard Bank Ltd: In re Estate Rodger 
1963 3 SA 683 (SR). Meyerowitz The Law and Practice of Administration of Estates and Their 
Taxation 24-19, the author mentions that the usufructuaries are not under the obligation to 
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usufruct dwelling as permanent maintenance relating to the habitability of the property 
is arguably not done regularly.79 For example, if a storm causes damage to the roof of 
the usufruct dwelling to the effect that it becomes impossible to live in the property, it 
is the owner who must repair the roof. Likewise, if the usufruct dwelling becomes 
seriously dilapidated with age or on account of weather or termites, the owner is 
obliged to make the required repairs. The reason for this is that the maintenance of 
the roof or the buildings is permanent in nature and therefore should be borne by the 
owner.80 
 
make improvements or repairs that are necessary where the usufruct buildings have become 
uninhabitable due to age. This also applies where the damage caused on the buildings is by 
accident and not attributable to the usufructuaries, or it is by action of heavy weather 
conditions. In effect, what the author says is that the usufructuaries cannot replace anything 
of the usufruct premises that has by reasonable wear and tear has worn out. Muller (2018) 
Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 538, states that the owner is to bear all the 
costs of extraordinary improvements to ensure the continued existence of the property. 
Executors of Meyer v Meyer (1880-1882) 1 SC 377 378. Ex Parte Davy 1902 TH 96 97-98. 
Ex Parte Becker (1908) 25 SC 418 419. In Schoon's Trustee v Schoon's Executors 1915 CPD 
786 788, the usufructuary's claim for useful expenses after having effected necessary repairs 
to preserve the usufruct property in a condition that is fit for human habitation was allowed to 
recover useful expenses to the extent to which the property was enhanced in value. Ex Parte 
Praetorius 1915 CPD 819 821. In Gibaud v Bagshaw 1918 CPD 202 205, the court opined 
that usufructuaries are not obliged to replace any property of the usufruct which has by good 
faith been diminished, or destroyed, or worn out. In support of this is the case of Furnivall v 
Cornwell's Executors (1895) 12 SC 6 10. Master v African Mines Corporation Ltd 1907 TS 925 
929. Brunsdon’s Estate v Brunsdon’s Estate 1920 CPD 159 174-175. Wait v Estate Wait 1930 
CPD 1 4. In Gordon's Bay Estates v Smuts 1923 AD 160 166, the court mentioned that a 
testatrix as an owner of a farm knows that the owner of property pays bills for the rates, repairs 
and taxes levied on the property. Ex Parte Atkins: In re Estate Lazarus 1933 WLD 76 78. 
Philps v Cradock Municipality 1937 EDL 382 389. Ex Parte Standard Bank Ltd: In re Estate 
Rodger 1963 3 SA 683 (SR) 686-687. Brett v Barclays Bank (D C & O) 1954 1 SA 260 (N) 
263. Lola v Rimon (2012/42735) [2013] ZAGPJHC 65 (15 April 2013) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPJHC/2013/65.html> para 2. Compare Crosbie v 
Crosbie's Executor (1904) 21 SC 597 606. 
79 Van der Merwe “Case 5: Duty of the Holder of a Time-Limited Interest to Repair, Replace 
and Renew” in The Common Core of European Private Law Time Limited Interests in Land 
266; Philps v Cradock Municipality 1937 EDL 382 389. 
80 Van der Merwe “Case 5: Duty of the Holder of a Time-Limited Interest to Repair, Replace 
and Renew” in The Common Core of European Private Law Time Limited Interests in Land 
266; Van der Walt The Law of Servitudes 478; Mostert et al The Principles of the Law of 
Property in South Africa 250; Hall & Kellaway Servitudes 170 and 174, the authors say that 
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The case of Ex Parte Estate Borland (“Borland”)81 is relevant in this regard. In this 
case, one of the usufruct farm dwellings of the testator was in a seriously dilapidated 
condition when the testator died.82 The farm dwelling was old due to age and it was 
subjected to the plundering of termites. Thus, if reasonable steps were not taken to 
make necessary repairs on the farm dwelling it would undoubtedly have fallen into a 
state of disrepair and would have been rendered useless and unfit for human 
habitation.83 Accordingly, the testator’s wife expended excess sums of money to effect 
necessary renovations, repairs and improvements. The wife, as one of the estate 
administrators, and other administrators approached the court to seek authority 
empowering them as administrators to reimburse her for the amount of money she 
used to preserve the dwelling in good condition and to protect it from collapsing.84 
In Borland, the court applied the case of Brunsdon’s Estate v Brunsdon's Estate 
(“Brunsdon”)85 and reiterated the general principle that usufructuaries are not entitled 
to claim reimbursement for improvements.86 This is because one of the obligations of 
a usufructuary is to keep the usufruct dwelling in a state of good repair and to meet all 
ordinary expenses at his or her own costs. However, the court held that it was only 
when the expenses incurred in putting the usufruct property in a state of good repair 
are special or extraordinary that the owner will have to reimburse the usufructuary for 
expenses incurred.87 Based on the evidence before the court, it seemed clear that the 
dwelling was dilapidated because it was old. As such, the court held that the 
preservation or protection of the dwelling in good condition by the usufructuary 
 
heavy expenses of an unusual kind aimed to prevent flood and damage caused by floods can 
be recovered from the owner; Philps v Cradock Municipality 1937 EDL 382 389. 
81 Ex Parte Estate Borland 1961 1 SA 6 (SR). 
82 7. 
83 7. See also Grobler The Salva Rei Substantia Requirement in Personal Servitudes 84. 
84 Ex Parte Estate Borland 1961 1 SA 6 (SR) 7. 
85 Brunsdon’s Estate v Brunsdon’s Estate 1920 CPD 159. 
86 Ex Parte Estate Borland 1961 1 SA 6 (SR) 8, citing Brunsdon’s Estate v Brunsdon’s Estate 
1920 CPD 159 174-175. See further Grobler The Salva Rei Substantia Requirement in 
Personal Servitudes 84-85; Van der Walt The Law of Servitudes 479; Muller (2018) Tydskrif 
vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 539, particularly footnote 96. 
87 Ex Parte Estate Borland 1961 1 SA 6 (SR) 8, quoting Brunsdon’s Estate v Brunsdon’s Estate 
1920 CPD 159 174-175 and 178-179. See further Grobler The Salva Rei Substantia 
Requirement in Personal Servitudes 84-85; Van der Walt The Law of Servitudes 479; Muller 
(2018) Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 529 539, particularly footnote 96. 
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amounted to extraordinary repairs. As the testator’s wife had actually made the 
required repairs, the court was satisfied that she was entitled to compensation from 
the owner or his estate in the amount claimed.88 The relevance of this case is that it 
indicates that the owner (or his capital estate) is responsible for repairs that are 
necessary to ensure that the dwelling is in a condition that is fit for human habitation 
in the context of usufructuaries. This is because the costs of necessary repairs to 
preserve a dwelling in a condition that is fit for human habitation or to protect the 
dwelling from being declared unfit for human habitation are so special or extraordinary 
in nature that they should be met by the owner or paid from his or her capital estate.89 
 
88 Ex Parte Estate Borland 1961 1 SA 6 (SR) 9-10. See further Ex Parte Atkins: In re Estate 
Lazarus 1933 WLD 76 78; Brunsdon’s Estate v Brunsdon’s Estate 1920 CPD 159 174; Philps 
v Cradock Municipality 1937 EDL 382 389; in Stamper v Estate Stamper 1910 CPD 442 450, 
the court found that where the usufructuary had paid out debts for the benefit of the estate, he 
is entitled to reclaim the amount of such payments out of the assets in the estate; Schoon's 
Trustee v Schoon's Executors 1915 CPD 786 788; Van der Merwe “Case 5: Duty of the Holder 
of a Time-Limited Interest to Repair, Replace and Renew” in The Common Core of European 
Private Law Time Limited Interests in Land 266, he mentions that when the usufructuaries 
have made repairs, they are entitled to claim compensation from the owner; similar point 
highlighted in Hall & Kellaway Servitudes 170 and 174; as well as in Van der Merwe & Pope 
“Servitudes and Other Real Rights” in Willie’s Principles of South African Law 591 609-610; 
the same statement is stated in Van der Merwe & De Waal “Servitudes” in The Law of South 
Africa paras 596 and 598; similarly in Van der Merwe, De Waal & Carey Miller International 
Encyclopaedia of Laws 449 and 450; too Van der Merwe & De Waal The Law of Things & 
Servitudes 216; same in Muller et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 386; 
similar point in Mostert et al The Principles of the Law of Property in South Africa 251; alike in 
Corbett “Usufruct, Usus and Habitatio” in The Law of Succession in South Africa 377; Van der 
Walt The Law of Servitudes 479; Muller (2018) Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse 
Reg 539, particularly footnote 96; Grobler The Salva Rei Substantia Requirement in Personal 
Servitudes 84. 
89 Hall & Kellaway Servitudes 170 and 174; Lee An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law 183; 
Van der Merwe “Case 5: Duty of the Holder of a Time-Limited Interest to Repair, Replace and 
Renew” in The Common Core of European Private Law Time Limited Interests in Land 266; 
Van der Merwe & De Waal The Law of Things & Servitudes 215; Van der Merwe, De Waal & 
Carey Miller International Encyclopaedia of Laws 449; Van der Merwe & De Waal “Servitudes” 
in The Law of South Africa para 595; Van der Merwe & Pope “Servitudes and Other Real 
Rights” in Willie’s Principles of South African Law 609; Meyerowitz The Law and Practice of 
Administration of Estates and Their Taxation 24-19; Van der Walt The Law of Servitudes 478-
479; Corbett “Usufruct, Usus and Habitatio” in The Law of Succession in South Africa 376-
377; Muller et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 386; Mostert et al The 
Principles of the Law of Property in South Africa 251; Brunsdon’s Estate v Brunsdon’s Estate 
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In this regard, it should be noted that the option of the usufructuary effecting 
preservation repairs and then claiming them back from the owner later is not always 
available to all usufructuaries especially those who are poor.90 
In another case of Ex Parte Standard Bank Ltd: in re Estate Rodger (“Rodger”),91 
the testatrix bequeathed certain farms to her husband. When the husband died, the 
farms were left to the son. After the son’s death, the farms devolved to the grandson.92 
In terms of the will, the beneficiaries had to lease other premises on the farms so that 
they could have money to cover living expenses.93 On one of the farms, there was a 
dwelling in a seriously dilapidated condition and to continue to rent the premises in a 
reasonable condition to tenants, it was necessary to have the dwelling repaired and 
renovated. In this case, the bank was the administrator of the testatrix’s estate and it 
obtained an estimated amount for the cost of the necessary work that had to be done. 
The bank sought authority to use the capital money of the estate to cover the estimated 
costs for the repairs.94 In light of the facts of the case of Rodger, the court authorised 
the administrator to effect the required repairs using the capital of the estate.95 This 
case confirms that if the usufruct dwelling has become dilapidated due to reasonable 
use, the lapse of time, or damage occasioned by an act of God or excessive weather 
conditions, it is the owner of the property that is essentially responsible to ensure the 
dwelling is fixed to make it habitable. Van der Walt properly holds the view that unusual 
expenses which are necessary for long-term maintenance of the usufruct dwelling like 
ensuring the prevention of erosion or flooding on the dwelling are the responsibility of 
 
1920 CPD 159 172-178; Ex Parte Estate Borland 1961 1 SA 6 (SR) 9; Ex Parte Standard 
Bank Ltd: In re Estate Rodger 1963 3 SA 683 (SR) 686. 
90 Compare generally with tenants: Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) para 55; G Glover 
Kerr’s Law of Sale and Lease 4 ed (2014) 396; G Bradfield & K Lehmann Principles of the 
Law of Sale & Lease 3 ed (2013) 146; S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication 
under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 365. 




95 686-687. See also Ex Parte Atkins: In Re Estate Lazarus 1933 WLD 76 77-78. In this case, 
the court held that the usufructuary was not liable for structural alterations and repairs as 
alterations or repairs amount to capital expenditure. See further Grobler The Salva Rei 
Substantia Requirement in Personal Servitudes 83. 
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the owner.96 Corbett similarly submits that the owner is bound to repair anything in the 
usufruct dwelling which has become dilapidated with time and to reinstate it as it calls 
for heavy expenditure.97 Likewise, Van der Merwe states that the owner is to handle 
the permanent maintenance of the dwelling.98 Hall and EA Kellaway also correctly 
mention that the owner should repair what has become reasonably useless or not 
habitable.99 
The above discussion clearly shows the default principles, which are compulsory 
whenever a usufruct is granted by the owner.100 The case of Lola v Rimon (“Lola”),101 
shows that the default principle as to the maintenance of the usufruct dwelling can be 
transferred by a deed of usufruct between the parties to the owner.102 In Lola, L and 
R entered into a notarial deed of usufruct.103 Among other terms of the deed of 
usufruct, R was to maintain the property. This means that L was released from the 
common-law duty to effect ordinary repairs on the property. In this case, by implication, 
the duty to maintain the dwelling was on the owner, R, in terms of the agreement.104 
At one point in time, L requested R to undertake the repainting on the property. 
However, R refused to repaint the property because it was seemingly in good 
condition. Furthermore, repainting the property amounted to a luxurious expense. As 
previously mentioned, fit for human occupation includes necessary repairs but not 
luxurious repairs. In this regard, R asserted that his obligation to maintain the property 
 
96 Van der Walt The Law of Servitudes 478. 
97 Corbett “Usufruct, Usus and Habitatio” in The Law of Succession in South Africa 376. 
98 Van der Merwe “Case 5: Duty of the Holder of a Time-Limited Interest to Repair, Replace 
and Renew” in The Common Core of European Private Law Time Limited Interests in Land 
266. 
99 Hall & Kellaway Servitudes 170. 
100 It should be mentioned that where the usufruct is created in terms of an agreement between 
living partners, the partners may opt to waive the default principles. However, where 
constitutional rights are implicated the partners cannot waive constitutional principles. See 
generally Van der Merwe “Case 5: Duty of the Holder of a Time-Limited Interest to Repair, 
Replace and Renew” in The Common Core of European Private Law Time Limited Interests 
in Land 266. 
101 Lola v Rimon (2012/42735) [2013] ZAGPJHC 65 (15 April 2013) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPJHC/2013/65.html>. 
102 Para 2. See also Van der Walt The Law of Servitudes 480. 
103 Lola v Rimon (2012/42735) [2013] ZAGPJHC 65 (15 April 2013) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPJHC/2013/65.html> para 6. 
104 Paras 2 and 5. 
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was triggered when there was a need to effect reasonably necessary repairs to keep 
the property in good condition.105 
The crux of the matter concerned the alleged breach by R in failing to repaint the 
property.106 The court illustrated the meaning of the requirement to maintain a 
dwelling, as noted in a notarial deed of the usufruct.107 The word “maintain” from the 
Merriam-Webster dictionary means to keep the property in an existing state of repair, 
efficient or valid, or to preserve the property from failure or decline.108 The court further 
noted that the word “maintain” from the Blacks Dictionary implies care for property, or 
involvement in the general repair and upkeep of the property.109 Finally, the court 
concluded that where the obligation to maintain the dwelling is not expanded on in the 
agreement itself, the dictionary and ordinary meaning of the word “maintain” will 
prevail.110 The duty to maintain is limited to keeping the property in the condition it was 
in at the time of signing the agreement and would exclude liability for other luxurious 
improvements.111 
In the end, it was concluded that L (as the usufructuary) failed to make out a case 
that R (as the owner) had neglected to maintain the property, by not repainting it, in 
the condition it was in at the time when the deed of usufruct was concluded.112 As 
such, R’s failure to repaint the property did not amount to a breach of his obligation in 
terms of the deed of usufruct.113 The court held that the onus was on L as the 
usufructuary to prove on a balance of probabilities that R as the owner was obliged to 
put the property in the same condition it was in when the deed of usufruct was entered 
into.114 Consequently, L did not discharge the onus to show that R indeed was in 
 
105 Para 7. 
106 Para 17. 
107 Para 17. 
108 Para 17. See also Grobler The Salva Rei Substantia Requirement in Personal Servitudes 
5. 
109 Lola v Rimon (2012/42735) [2013] ZAGPJHC 65 (15 April 2013) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPJHC/2013/65.html> para 17. See also Grobler The 
Salva Rei Substantia Requirement in Personal Servitudes 5. 
110 Lola v Rimon (2012/42735) [2013] ZAGPJHC 65 (15 April 2013) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPJHC/2013/65.html> para 17. 
111 Para 18. 
112 Para 19. 
113 Paras 19 And 29. 
114 Para 19. See also Van der Walt The Law of Servitudes 480. 
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breach of the provisions of the deed of usufruct in relation to maintenance. The court 
could therefore not specifically compel R to perform under the agreement.115 
The judgment of Lola proves that a usufructuary is the one who must show why an 
owner is obliged to make repairs to the property in order to comply with his obligation 
to maintain under the agreement.116 For example, if the painting of the property flakes 
off, the usufructuary must show that the property has deteriorated to the extent that 
the owner is obliged to paint the property to comply with his obligation to maintain the 
property in a good state of repair.117 By implication of the common law principles, if 
the paint flakes off and it involves major expenses the owner will have to cover the 
cost of the repair.118 
 
4 4 1 Concluding remarks 
In light of the principles discussed above, this part of chapter 4 concludes that the duty 
to ensure that the dwelling is in a state of good repair falls on the landowner (or heir). 
The owner (or the heir) is to ensure that the dwelling of the usufruct is maintained for 
 
115 Lola v Rimon (2012/42735) [2013] ZAGPJHC 65 (15 April 2013) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPJHC/2013/65.html> paras 30-31. 
116 Van der Walt The Law of Servitudes 480; Lola v Rimon (2012/42735) [2013] ZAGPJHC 65 
(15 April 2013) SAFLII <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPJHC/2013/65.html> paras 19 and 
30-31. 
117 Lola v Rimon (2012/42735) [2013] ZAGPJHC 65 (15 April 2013) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPJHC/2013/65.html> paras 19 and 30, the usufructuary 
must describe the area to be repainted, for instance only one wall or one or two rooms. The 
usufructuary must also give a detailed description of the area affected by moisture. 
118 See specifically Van der Merwe “Case 5: Duty of the Holder of a Time-Limited Interest to 
Repair, Replace and Renew” in The Common Core of European Private Law Time Limited 
Interests in Land 266. See further Hall & Kellaway Servitudes 170 and 174; Van der Walt The 
Law of Servitudes 479; Corbett “Usufruct, Usus and Habitatio” in The Law of Succession in 
South Africa 376-377; Ex Parte Estate Borland 1961 1 SA 6 (SR) 9-10; Ex Parte Standard 
Bank Ltd: In re Estate Rodger 1963 3 SA 683 (SR) 686; Philps v Cradock Municipality 1937 
EDL 382 389, where the court mentioned that where the usufructuary had effected a useful 
improvement by rebuilding what has fallen into ruin and the repair has become an exceptional 
expense, the usufructuary is entitled to recover from the owner; Ex Parte Atkins: In re Estate 
Lazarus 1933 WLD 76 78, where a certain building needed to be structurally altered and 
repaired for it to continue to be practically useful, the court found that the structural alterations 
and repairs were capital expenses not to be borne by the usufructuary but the use of capital 
estate to improve the building; Brunsdon’s Estate v Brunsdon’s Estate 1920 CPD 159 174. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
115 
the period of the usufruct.119 In this regard, the owner (or the heir) is bound to cover 
all extraordinary repairs reasonably necessary to keep the dwelling in a repaired 
condition and as such repairs that are permanent in nature are to be borne by the 
owner or the heir.120 These are default principles that are mandatory in all instances 
unless the usufruct is established by way of an agreement between living partners as 
shown in the Lola judgment as outlined above.121 
A usufruct created in terms of an agreement has the potential implication of 
absolving the usufructuary from any common-law obligations under the usufruct.122 
However, if a dispute does arise calling upon the owner to maintain the property and 
he does not do so, the onus is on the usufructuary to advance arguments to the court 
as to why the owner should be specifically compelled by the court to maintain the 
dwelling as required by that agreement.123 The definition of “maintain” in the context 
of usufructuaries was clearly set out in the case of Lola to mean keeping the property 
in an existing state of repair to prevent it from disrepair.124 Thus, where the obligation 
to maintain the dwelling is not expanded on in an agreement, the dictionary and 
ordinary meaning of the word “maintain” should prevail.125 The obligation to maintain 
a usufruct dwelling is thus limited to keeping the property in the condition in which it 
was at the time of the commencement of the deed of usufruct, and excludes liability 
for any luxurious improvements.126 
 
119 See part 4 4 above. 
120 See part 4 4 above. 
121 Lola v Rimon (2012/42735) [2013] ZAGPJHC 65 (15 April 2013) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPJHC/2013/65.html> paras 2 and 5; Van der Merwe 
“Case 5: Duty of the Holder of a Time-Limited Interest to Repair, Replace and Renew” in The 
Common Core of European Private Law Time Limited Interests in Land 266. 
122 Lola v Rimon (2012/42735) [2013] ZAGPJHC 65 (15 April 2013) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPJHC/2013/65.html> paras 2 and 5; Van der Merwe 
“Case 5: Duty of the Holder of a Time-Limited Interest to Repair, Replace and Renew” in The 
Common Core of European Private Law Time Limited Interests in Land 266; Van der Walt The 
Law of Servitudes 480. 
123 Van der Walt The Law of Servitudes 480; Lola v Rimon (2012/42735) [2013] ZAGPJHC 65 
(15 April 2013) SAFLII <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPJHC/2013/65.html> paras 19 and 
30-31. 
124 Lola v Rimon (2012/42735) [2013] ZAGPJHC 65 (15 April 2013) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPJHC/2013/65.html> para 17. 
125 Para 17. 
126 Para 18. 




4 5 Conclusion 
The principles discussed above brought to light the following ideas or notions which 
need to be commented on as they help in establishing a standard of habitability in the 
context of a usufruct, and essentially begin to form the baseline for a definition of 
habitability in this context. These notions are “fit for human occupation”, “use and 
enjoyment”, and “maintaining the property in good repair”. “Fit for human occupation” 
means that the dwelling is free from serious disrepair or dilapidation. “Fit for human 
occupation” translates to “habitability” when the dwelling is safe and suitable for 
humans to occupy or live in. The notion of “fit for occupation” helps in establishing a 
standard of habitability in the context of usufructs as it informs how the property should 
look at the outset of the usufruct. For the usufruct to be habitable, it arguably should 
be safe and suitable to inhabit and free from serious disrepair. 
The idea of “use and enjoyment” in turn encapsulates the rights to use the usufruct 
and to benefit from its fruits.127 The notion of “use and enjoyment” implies that the 
usufruct is habitable. This is because the usufructuary can arguably not use and reap 
benefits from a dwelling that is not habitable. Thus, “use and enjoyment” of a dwelling 
translate to habitability when the purpose of the dwelling is for human habitation or 
occupation. As such, if the owner undertakes to give the usufructuary the right to use 
the dwelling which is not habitable, it defeats the initial purpose of conferring the right 
of use and enjoyment. This is because the state of disrepair of the property diminishes 
or negatively impacts on the usefulness of the dwelling. For the right to use and enjoy 
the dwelling to be conferred (or even benefit the usufructuary) the dwelling must 
arguably be habitable. Habitability and “use and enjoyment” are closely linked to one 
another in the sense that you cannot enjoy the use of a dwelling without it being 
habitable. 
The concept of “maintaining the property in good repair” means the upkeep of the 
existing property in a condition that a reasonable person would expect of a usufruct. 
“Maintaining in good repair” is limited to repairs that are necessary to render the 
property useful and fit to inhabit so as to protect the dwelling from collapsing, 
deteriorating or falling into a state of ruin. This would mean that the owner or heir 
should ensure that the property is fixed to make it habitable or necessary repairs are 
 
127 Van der Walt The Law of Servitudes 464-465; Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale and Lease 342. 
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carried out to place the property in good condition. The notion of “maintain in good 
repair” does not include luxurious repairs. “Maintaining the property in good repair” 
translates to habitability when the existing structure of the property is kept in safe and 
suitable condition for the purpose for which the usufruct was granted. The notion of 
“maintaining the property in good repair” entails maintaining the property in order to 
ensure that the usufruct is in a habitable condition. Accordingly, the notion of 
“maintaining property in good repair” arguably helps to establish a standard of 
habitability in the context of usufructs. All of these ideas or notions, in essence, begin 
to form the baseline for a definition of habitability. Habitability in light of these notions 
means a usufruct dwelling that is fit for human occupation in the sense that the 
property is suitable for the purpose for which the usufruct was granted. This includes 
having the full use and enjoyment of all benefits arising from the property and a 
usufruct property that is maintained in good repair. This essentially confirms a very 
unique standard of habitability in the context of a usufruct. 
The minimum standard of habitability is presumably in line with the Constitution. 
This is because of the notions “fit for human habitation” or “use and enjoyment” or 
“maintain in good repair” as developed in case law, sufficiently protect the interests of 
usufructuaries. More importantly, these notions serve as a standard that could be used 
by usufructuaries to hold owners liable to ensure that the usufruct property is habitable. 
As such, there is arguably no need to develop the common-law construct of a usufruct 
as long as it is applied flexibly by courts. As I argued in part 4 3 above, courts are 
interpreting the lifting of certain restrictions in the will flexibly, but if they are rigid in 
their approach, it may potentially result in constitutional invalidity as certain 
constitutional rights may be disregarded. This arguably points towards a minimum 
standard of habitability for a usufruct. 
As argued in part 4 4 above, the owner who grants the usufruct (his heir or his 
estate) bears the responsibility to ensure the habitability of a usufruct. The obligation 
entails that the owner should keep the usufruct property in the same condition 
throughout the usufruct. Where necessary, the owner must effect repairs for the 
benefit of the property so that the usufructuary may continue to enjoy the use of the 
dwelling. If the owner no longer has capital for repairs and the usufruct property 
becomes dangerous to inhabit and constitutional rights are implicated, the state has a 
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duty to provide habitability in the case of usufructs.128 This is because the state has a 
duty to improve the quality of life of usufructuaries in line with the objectives of the 
preamble of the Constitution.129 More importantly, the state has a duty to respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights such as human dignity, security 
of tenure or access to adequate housing.130 If the state fulfils the obligation imposed 
by these constitutional provisions, the state acts in a manner that promotes the state’s 




128 Compare Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea Township & 197 Main Street Johannesburg 
v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) paras 25 and 44. 
129 See chapter 2 part 2 3 1 above. Compare Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea Township & 
197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 16. 
130 See chapter 2 parts 2 3 4, 2 3 5 and 2 3 6 above. Compare Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road 
Berea Township & 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 
(CC) para 16. 
131 See chapter 2 parts 2 3 1 and 2 3 6 above. Compare Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea 
Township & 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 
44. 
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CHAPTER 5: HABITABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF OCCUPIERS 
5 1 Introduction 
It has been 26 years of democracy in South Africa, but adequate housing that provides 
all occupiers1 with secure tenure and dignified living conditions has not yet been fully 
attained.2 As such, occupiers in South Africa are in search of attaining social justice 
by improving the quality of their lives for themselves and their families, especially since 
the state is failing to fulfil its obligation in this regard.3 The search to attain social justice 
by occupiers is motivated by what is contained in the preamble of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“Constitution”) which states that the founding 
values of our society are human dignity, equality and freedom.4 Thus, the pursuit of 
adequate housing that provides and protects one’s dignity lies at the heart of the 
Constitution on how to enforce human rights within an established constitutional 
 
1 The dissertation is limited to ESTA occupiers who had consent or a right in law to occupy 
unless otherwise stated, and not to occupiers of other types of property. See chapter 1 part 1 
1 footnote 3. 
2 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 22, 111 and 154; City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 2 SA 104 (CC) para 
2; Mwelase v Director-General for the Department of Rural Development & Land Reform 2019 
6 SA 597 (CC) para 3. 
3 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 1. 
4 The preamble of the Constitution; Section 1(a) of the Constitution; Government of the 
Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) paras 1 and 23; Soobramoney v 
Minister of Health, KawZulu-Natal 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) paras 8-9; Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 
SA 341 (CC) paras 110 and 132; Nelson Mandela Foundation Trust v Afriforum NPC 2019 6 
SA 327 (GJ) para 13; S Liebenberg “Violations of Socio-Economic Rights: The Role of the 
South African Human Rights Commission” in P Andrews & S Ellmann (eds) The Post-
Apartheid Constitutions: Perspectives on South Africa’s Basic Law (2001) 405 409; D Bilchitz 
Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of Socio-Economic 
Rights (2007) 188; AJ van der Walt “A South African Reading of Frank Michelman’s Theory of 
Social Justice” in H Botha, AJ van der Walt & J van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in 
a Transformative Constitution (2003) 163; D Moseneke “Transformative Adjudication in Post-
Apartheid South Africa – Taking Stock after a Decade” (2007) 21 Speculus Juris 2 4; JC 
Mubangizi The Protection of Human Rights in South Africa: A Legal and Practical Guide 2 ed 
(2013) 61-62; D Bhana “The Horizontal Application of the Bill of Rights: A Reconciliation of 
Sections 8 and 39 of the Constitution” (2013) 29 South African Journal on Human Rights 351 
352. 
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democracy.5 This is because the Constitution is a transformative document providing 
the mandate and framework that can be used to change our society into one where 
everyone (including occupiers in terms of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 
of 1997 (“ESTA”)) live in dignity.6 Accordingly, as stressed by Froneman J in Daniels 
v Scribante (“Daniels”),7 there is no need for occupiers to continue to live in inhumane 
and undignified living conditions on farms.8 The Constitution obliges the court in the 
adjudication of human rights to heal the injustices of the past and to improve the quality 
of lives of everyone, including those of occupiers.9 This brings us to the subject matter 
of this chapter, namely, the habitability of dwellings in the context of occupiers. 
Habitability in this context has become a constitutional issue of great significance 
to the development of the relationship between an occupier and an owner in South 
Africa. Interestingly, questions arose before the Constitutional Court in the decision of 
Daniels. In this case, the court found that an occupier of farmland was entitled in terms 
of ESTA to effect improvements on a dwelling belonging to a landowner without said 
landowner’s consent in order to make the occupier’s dwelling more habitable. ESTA 
did not specifically provide for such a right and the court had to adopt a purposive 
interpretation of the Act.10 The occupier’s rights that were implicated included the right 
to security of tenure in terms of section 25(6) of the Constitution and the right to human 
 
5 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 
2 SA 104 (CC) para 2; Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KawZulu-Natal 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) 
para 8. 
6 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 110; Sibanyoni v Holtzhausen (LCC143/2015) 
[2019] ZALCC 11 (9 May 2019) SAFLII <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2019/11.html> 
paras 33-34; Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KawZulu-Natal 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) para 8; 
Rates Action Group v City of Cape Town 2004 5 SA 545 (C) para 100; cited in S Liebenberg 
“South Africa: Adjudicating Social Rights under a Transformative Constitution” in M Langford 
(ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law 
(2008) 75 76. 
7 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC). 
8 Para 132. 
9 The preamble of the Constitution. See also Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 
132; ZT Boggenpoel “Property” (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; 
ZT Boggenpoel “(Re)defining the Contours of Ownership: Moving Beyond White Picket 
Fences” (2019) 30 Stellenbosch Law Review 234 246; J Brickhill, M Finn & K Moshikaro 
“Constitutional Law” (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.3.1. 
10 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 23-24. 
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dignity under section 10 of the Constitution.11 The judgment in Daniels has inspired 
some interesting issues for consideration such as the meaning of the habitability of 
dwellings inhabited by occupiers. More importantly, it becomes necessary to 
determine on whom the obligation rests to ensure that the dwelling of occupiers is 
“habitable”. 
The opening part of this chapter will reflect on the meaning of habitability in the 
context of occupiers to determine whether the legislation aimed at protecting occupiers 
provides for an individual standard of habitability for this category of inhabitants. The 
assumption is that occupiers enjoy the right to reside on, and use of, a dwelling 
accorded to them in terms of ESTA, which seems to imply an individual standard of 
habitability. 
The next segment of this chapter will scrutinise the impact of the Constitution on 
the standard of habitability for occupiers in light of the right to legally secure tenure, 
and the right to human dignity in section 10 of the Constitution. The assumption is that 
an analysis of the impact of the Constitution on the standard of habitability for 
occupiers will display a link between security of tenure and habitability, and the right 
to access to adequate housing and human dignity as enshrined in the Constitution and 
given effect to by ESTA. Consequently, it will be argued that such a link implies a 
minimum standard of habitability for occupiers. 
The third section will explore the obligation to ensure habitability to ascertain who 
bears such a duty in the owner-occupier relationship. More specifically, it will question 
whether such an obligation rests on a private landowner, the occupier, or the state. It 
is assumed that the obligation to ensure habitability rests on the owner in so far as it 
ensures the promotion of safe and suitable living conditions for 
 
5 2 Meaning of habitability in the context of occupiers 
5 2 1 ESTA and habitability 
ESTA, the legislation aimed at protecting the rights of occupiers, does not define the 
term “habitability” for purposes of the standard that occupiers can expect from the 
dwellings that they inhabit. As such, reliance has been placed on the common law of 
 
11 See chapter 2 above. 
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“suitable for human habitation” in the context of occupiers.12 The Constitutional Court 
has recently highlighted the meaning of habitability in the context of occupiers in the 
case of Daniels. This case is discussed in some detail below. 
 
5 2 2 Case law and habitability 
5 2 2 1 Daniels v Scribante 
In this case, the occupier was residing on a farm owned by a private landowner with 
rights protected in terms of ESTA.13 The dwelling of the occupier required certain 
necessary improvements to make it habitable.14 These improvements included: (a) 
levelling the floors; (b) paving an outside part of the yard; (c) installing an indoor water 
supply; (d) installing a washing basin; (e) adding a window; and (f) repairing the 
ceiling.15 The owner (or the person in charge) admitted that without the improvements 
the dwelling was not habitable and therefore resulted in a violation of the occupier’s 
right to human dignity.16 The occupier desired to effect the improvements to the 
dwelling at her own expense.17 She communicated her intention to make the 
 
12 See, for example, Daniels v Scribante (LCC164/2015) [2015] ZALCC 13 (4 December 2015) 
SAFLII <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2015/13.html> para 10, 14 and 20; Daniels v 
Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 7, 27, 193, 199 and 203. 
13 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 3-4. 
14 Paras 6-7. 
15 Paras 7, 112 and 207. 
16 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 7. See further Oranje v Rouxlandia 
Investments (Pty) Ltd 2019 3 SA 108 (SCA) para 15; Boggenpoel (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly 
Review of South African Law 2.1; Du Toit An Evaluation of the National Health Insurance 
Scheme 73; Madlanga (2018) Stellenbosch Law Review 359 372; C Pienaar “Improvement of 
Structures by Farm Dwellers” Stock Farm (04-12-2017) 14; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) 
Annual Survey of South African Law 991; Pienaar (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South 
African Law 2.2. 
17 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 8. See further Boggenpoel (2017) 2 Juta’s 
Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 
7; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey of South African Law 991; Pienaar (2017) 
2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.2; Slade (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review 
of South African Law 2.1; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of 
South African Law 2.3.1; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro (2017) Annual Survey of South African 
Law 169. 
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improvements to the person in charge of the farm.18 However, the occupier did not 
receive any response and she went on to effect the improvements herself.19 The 
landowner demanded that the maintenance work must cease on the grounds that the 
owner had refused consent for the effecting of improvements.20 
The occupier consequently approached the Magistrate’s Court and the Land Claims 
Court for relief on the grounds that the improvements could be effected in terms of 
sections 5 and 6 of ESTA. Both courts held that ESTA did not specifically provide for 
such a right. On this basis, the Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed an application for 
leave to appeal. Leave to appeal was however granted to the Constitutional Court 
where the court had to consider whether section 5 of ESTA afforded an occupier the 
right to make improvements to his or her dwelling to bring the dwelling to a standard 
that conforms to conditions of human dignity. The court had to further consider whether 
section 5 (read together with section 6) of ESTA provided for the right to make 
improvements without the consent of an owner.21 This is because ESTA did not 
 
18 Section 1 of ESTA provides that a person in charge of land is “a person who at the time of 
the relevant act, omission or conduct had or has legal authority to give consent to a person to 
reside on the land in question”. See also Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 4, 
especially footnote 8. 
19 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 8-9. See further Pienaar et al (2018) South 
African Public Law 1 7; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey of South African Law 
991; Pienaar (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.2; Brickhill, Finn & 
Moshikaro (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.3.1; Brickhill, Finn & 
Moshikaro (2017) Annual Survey of South African Law 169. 
20 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 9; Daniels v Scribante (LCC164/2015) [2015] 
ZALCC 13 (4 December 2015) SAFLII <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2015/13.html> 
para 12. See further ZT Boggenpoel (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 
2.1; J Brickhill, M Finn & K Moshikaro “Constitutional Law” (2007) 4 Juta’s Quarterly Review 
of South African Law 2.3.1; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro (2017) Annual Survey of South African 
Law 169; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 7; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) 
Annual Survey of South African Law 991; Pienaar (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South 
African Law 2.2; Matlala (2017) De Rebus 27 30; Morare (2017) Land Digest 1 1; Marais & 
Muller (2018) South African Law Journal 767; Du Toit An Evaluation of the National Health 
Insurance Scheme 73; C Pienaar “Improvement of Structures by Farm Dwellers” Stock Farm 
(04-12-2017) 14; Rautenbach (2017) Litnet Akademies 959 961. 
21 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 10-11. See further Oranje v Rouxlandia 
Investments (Pty) Ltd 2019 3 SA 108 (SCA) para 15 Boggenpoel (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly 
Review of South African Law 2.1; ZT Boggenpoel “Property” (2017) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review 
of South African Law 2.1; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 7; Van der Merwe 
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expressly provide for the right to make improvements without the permission of the 
owner. 
The Constitutional Court was also confronted with the question of whether in terms 
of sections 25(6) of the Constitution the occupier was entitled to effect improvements 
to the dwelling at the occupier’s own expense to make such a dwelling habitable.22 In 
this regard, it was also important to determine whether, in terms of section 8(2) of the 
Constitution, the private landowner owed a positive duty to the occupier to ensure that 
the occupier lived in habitable conditions with dignity.23 The last two issues on 
constitutional imperatives are dealt with later in this chapter.24 Nevertheless, to 
ascertain whether the right to make improvements was an entitlement in terms of 
ESTA, it was valuable for the court to analyse sections 5 and 6 of ESTA. 
Section 5 of ESTA deals with the fundamental rights of an occupier, an owner and 
a person in charge of land. Section 5(a) provides that: 
“Subject to limitations which are reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, an occupier … shall have the right 
to human dignity”.25 
 
 
& Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey of South African Law 991; Pienaar (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly 
Review of South African Law 2.2; Matlala (2017) De Rebus 27 30; Morare (2017) Land Digest 
1 1; Marais & Muller (2018) South African Law Journal 767-768; Davis (2019) South African 
Law Journal 420 421 and 426. 
22 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 11-13. 
23 Paras 37-49. See also Rautenbach (2017) Litnet Akademies 959 962; DM Davis “Judicial 
Education in a Transformative Context” (2018) 1 South African Judicial Education Journal 25 
27. 
24 See part 5 4 below. 
25 Section 5(a) of ESTA. See further Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 26 and 
212; Daniels v Scribante (LCC164/2015) [2015] ZALCC 13 (4 December 2015) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2015/13.html> para 17; Hattingh v Juta 2013 3 SA 275 
(CC) para 31; Sandvliet Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Mampies 2019 6 SA 409 (SCA) para 14; 
Sibanyoni v Holtzhausen (LCC143/2015) [2019] ZALCC 11 (9 May 2019) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2019/11.html> paras 53 and 55; Nkosi v Bührmann 
2002 1 SA 372 (SCA) para 24; MJ Roodt “Security of Tenure and Livelihood Options in South 
Africa – A Case Study of a Rural Community Facing Eviction under Post-Apartheid Legislation 
in the Eastern Cape Province” (2007) 37 Africanus 5; Slade (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review 
of South African Law 2.1; Marais & Muller (2018) South African Law Journal 768; Davis (2019) 
South African Law Journal 420 421. 
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It is clear that section 5 of ESTA includes the occupier’s right to human dignity.26 Thus, 
occupiers are entitled in terms of the right to human dignity enshrined in ESTA to have 
their security of tenure protected by law against forced removals from land due to 
intolerable conditions on that land, as was evident in Daniels.27 As such, the right to 
human dignity must be interpreted consistently with the right to security of tenure.28 
This follows from the fact that land with secure tenure is important for the dignity of 
occupiers.29 
Section 5(a) of ESTA originates from or is with due regard to section 10 of the 
Constitution, which states that “[e]veryone has inherent dignity and the right to have 
their dignity respected and protected.”30 The Constitutional Court has decided on 
human dignity in several cases and emphasised the importance of human dignity in 
our constitutional dispensation.31 More specifically, there are a number of cases 
decided on human dignity, especially in the context of occupiers, where the right to 
security of tenure and housing are also affected.32 The cases show that human dignity 
 
26 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 29 and 212. See further Erasmus v Mtenje 
(LCC 202/2017) [2018] ZALCC 12 (12 June 2018) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/12.html> para 19; Sandvliet Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v 
Mampies 2019 6 SA 409 (SCA) paras 14 and 27; Roodt (2007) Africanus 5; Boggenpoel 
(2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Pienaar et al (2018) South African 
Public Law 1 7 and 10; D Matlala “The Law Reports” (2017) De Rebus 27 30; TE Scheepers 
& W du Plessis “Extension of Security of Tenure Act – A Bone of Contention” (1998) 61 
Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 473 475; Davis (2019) South African Law 
Journal 420 422. 
27 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 23 and 31-34. See also Sibanyoni v 
Holtzhausen (LCC143/2015) [2019] ZALCC 11 (9 May 2019) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2019/11.html> para 55. 
28 Sibanyoni v Holtzhausen (LCC143/2015) [2019] ZALCC 11 (9 May 2019) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2019/11.html> para 55. See also Daniels v Scribante 
2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 23. 
29 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 2. 
30 Section 5 of ESTA. 
31 See chapter 2 part 2 3 4 above. 
32 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 83; Port 
Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) paras 29 and 42; Jaftha v 
Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) para 39; Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 
341 (CC) paras 1-34; Erasmus v Mtenje (LCC 202/2017) [2018] ZALCC 12 (12 June 2018) 
SAFLII <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/12.html> paras 19 and 32-38. 
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relates to the intrinsic worth of all human beings.33 This means that human beings 
should be treated as human beings and not as objects.34 Human dignity has been 
used by the courts to inform, enhance and possibly reinforce all the other rights 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights.35 This is because human dignity serves as a source of 
many other rights.36 
In the context of occupiers, human dignity is specifically invoked to contradict the 
result of past discriminatory laws and practices in which the human dignity of occupiers 
in South Africa was deliberately denied.37 In this respect, human dignity is used to 
inform the future and develop a democratic South Africa where the human dignity of 
everyone, including occupiers, is fully respected and protected.38 This would mean 
that occupiers are entitled to lead their present and future lives in conditions of human 
dignity no matter where they stay.39 It is here where section 6 of ESTA, which states 
the rights and duties of the occupier in respect of where they stay, is important. Section 
6(1) provides as follows: 
 
“Subject to the provisions of this Act, an occupier shall have the right to reside on and use 
the land on which he or she resided and which he or she used on or after 4 February, 1997, 
 
33 See specifically S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 328; Ferreira v Levin NO; 
Vryenhoek v Powell NO 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) para 48; Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 
2000 3 SA 936 (CC) para 35; National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of 
Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC) para 120, particularly footnote 140. 
34 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 83; Port 
Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 29, especially footnote 
29. 
35 Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) para 35; Khosa v Minister of Social 
Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 6 SA 505 (CC) para 41; 
Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape 2015 6 SA 125 
(CC) paras 43-51, where the court essentially pointed out that human dignity informs the rights 
to property; Marais & Muller (2018) South African Law Journal 774, particularly footnote 66. 
36 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 144 and 328. 
37 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 23. See also Dawood v Minister of Home 
Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) para 35. 
38 Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) para 35. See also Daniels v 
Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 131 and 137. 
39 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 137. See also Oranje v Rouxlandia 
Investments (Pty) Ltd 2019 3 SA 108 (SCA) para 18. 
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and to have access to such services as had been agreed upon with the owner or person in 
charge, whether expressly or tacitly.”40 
 
In light of the above, it is clear that the right enjoyed by an occupier in terms of section 
6(1) of ESTA is a right to reside on and use the land.41 Moreover, an occupier enjoys 
the right to human dignity in terms of section 5(a) of ESTA.42 In Daniels, the owner (or 
the person in charge) argued that section 6 does not provide for the right to make 
improvements as asserted by the occupier. This was so as section 6 does not have 
an explicit provision that stipulates that an occupier has a right to make improvements 
meant to bring his or her dwelling into a standard suitable for human habitation.43 
In Daniels, Madlanga J acknowledged that section 6 does not explicitly provide that 
an occupier has the right to make improvements aimed to make the dwelling more 
 
40 Section 6(1) of ESTA; quoted in Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 26; Daniels 
v Scribante (LCC164/2015) [2015] ZALCC 13 (4 December 2015) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2015/13.html> para 17; Dlamini v Joosten 2006 3 All 
SA 1 (SCA) para 16; Sibanyoni v Holtzhausen (LCC143/2015) [2019] ZALCC 11 (9 May 2019) 
SAFLII <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2019/11.html> para 56; Erasmus v Mtenje 
(LCC 202/2017) [2018] ZALCC 12 (12 June 2018) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/12.html> para 19; Hattingh v Juta 2013 3 SA 275 
(CC) para 31; Nkosi v Bührmann 2002 1 SA 372 (SCA) para 24; Mostert, Pienaar & Van Wyk 
“Land Reform” in LAWSA para 134; Matlala (2017) De Rebus 27 30; T Mbhense “Does ESTA 
still Protect Occupiers of Farm Land in South Africa?” (2014) De Rebus 22 23; Scheepers & 
Du Plessis (1998) Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 473 475; Davis (2019) 
South African Law Journal 420 421. 
41 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 31; Daniels v Scribante (LCC164/2015) [2015] 
ZALCC 13 (4 December 2015) SAFLII <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2015/13.html> 
para 18. See also Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 7; Scheepers & Du Plessis 
(1998) Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 473 475; Mbhense (2014) De 
Rebus 22 23. 
42 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 31. See also Erasmus v Mtenje (LCC 
202/2017) [2018] ZALCC 12 (12 June 2018) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/12.html> para 19; Scheepers & Du Plessis 
(1998) Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 473 475; Davis (2019) South 
African Law Journal 420 422. 
43 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 27. See also Oranje v Rouxlandia Investments 
(Pty) Ltd 2019 3 SA 108 (SCA) para 15; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro (2017) Annual Survey of 
South African Law 170; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South 
African Law 2.3.1. 
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habitable.44 However, he mentioned that whether the right to make improvements 
exists, depends on a purposive interpretation of section 6 read together with section 5 
of ESTA.45 Consequently, Madlanga J proceeded to interpret the word “reside” as it is 
used in section 6(1) of ESTA. He pointed out that on a proper interpretation of the 
word “reside”, an occupier could not live on property under the most deplorable 
conditions that impair his or her human dignity in terms of section 5(a) of ESTA.46 The 
word “reside” in ESTA was therefore interpreted to mean that the occupier’s right to 
reside on and use the dwelling must be on a level that is compatible with human dignity 
and other fundamental rights.47 In this regard, the court in Daniels gave substance to 
the word “reside” based on human dignity and other fundamental rights.48 Thus, to 
reside on implies, at the very least, that the dwelling must be habitable, which is linked 
to certain other fundamental rights such as security of tenure, human dignity and 
adequate housing, amongst others.49 This clearly confirms an individual standard of 
habitability for occupiers. 
 
44 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 27. See also Davis (2019) South African Law 
Journal 420 422; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro (2017) Annual Survey of South African Law 170; 
Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.3.1. 
45 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 27. See further Oranje v Rouxlandia 
Investments (Pty) Ltd 2019 3 SA 108 (SCA) paras 15-16; Davis (2019) South African Law 
Journal 420 422; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro (2017) Annual Survey of South African Law 170; 
Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.3.1. 
46 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 31. See also Davis (2019) South African Law 
Journal 420 422. 
47 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 31-32. See further Oranje v Rouxlandia 
Investments (Pty) Ltd 2019 3 SA 108 (SCA) para 16; C Pienaar “Improvement of Structures 
by Farm Dwellers” Stock Farm (04-12-2017) 15; A Nolan “Daniels v Scribante: South Africa 
Pushes the Boundaries for Horizontality and Social Rights” (2017) International Journal of 
Constitutional Law Blog 1/3; Boggenpoel (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African 
Law 2.1; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 7; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) 
Annual Survey of South African Law 991-992; Pienaar (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of 
South African Law 2.2; Matlala (2017) De Rebus 27 30; Rautenbach (2017) Litnet Akademies 
959 962; Davis (2019) South African Law Journal 420 422 and 426. 
48 Davis (2019) South African Law Journal 420 430. 
49 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 31-32; Oranje v Rouxlandia Investments 
(Pty) Ltd 2019 3 SA 108 (SCA) para 16; C Pienaar “Improvement of Structures by Farm 
Dwellers” Stock Farm (04-12-2017) 15; Nolan (2017) International Journal of Constitutional 
Law Blog 1/3; Boggenpoel (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Pienaar 
et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 7; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey of 
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The court in Daniels arguably adopted an interpretation that best advances the 
purpose of ESTA, which was not only about providing occupiers secure tenure, but 
also affording occupiers the human dignity that they were denied in terms of colonial 
and apartheid laws. In this regard, the court clearly adopted an interpretation of ESTA 
that promotes the spirit and object of the Bill of Rights.50 As such, it is submitted that 
section 39(2), which provides for legislation to be interpreted in a manner that 
promotes the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, would not have led to a 
stretched interpretation of ESTA as advanced by Marais and Muller.51 It would, 
however, allow for an interpretation that could give occupiers the best possible 
protection of their constitutional rights.52 In this regard, it should be emphasised that a 
court should adopt an interpretation that promotes constitutional rights and values 
even in instances where the meaning of the provision to be interpreted seems to be 
clear and not vague.53 In Daniels, the occupier argued that she was entitled, without 
the landowner’s consent, to effect improvements that are reasonably necessary to 
achieve the rights contained in section 5 of ESTA, more especially the right to human 
dignity.54 Based on the need for the occupier to live in a dwelling that accords with 
human dignity, the Constitutional Court interpreted ESTA in a manner that promoted 
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.55 
Thus, if an owner denies an occupier the right to make improvements to the 
dwelling, such a denial impacts on the habitability of the dwelling and may eventually 
 
South African Law 992; Pienaar (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.2; 
Matlala (2017) De Rebus 27 30; Rautenbach (2017) Litnet Akademies 959 962; Davis (2019) 
South African Law Journal 420 422 and 426. 
50 Section 39(2) of the Constitution. See also Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd 2009 
1 SA 337 (CC) para 46. 
51 See, for example, Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd; In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO 2001 1 SA 545 
(CC) para 24; Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 23. 
52 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 25, quoting Department of Land Affairs v 
Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 SA 199 (CC) para 53. 
53 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs & Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 
(CC) para 90; cited in Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 
2007 6 SA 199 (CC) para 53. 
54 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 8 and 10. 
55 Paras 25 and 29-30. 
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deprive the occupier of his or her human dignity.56 Moreover, if the dwelling is not 
habitable, it may lead to the occupier’s departure because the living conditions do not 
protect his or her human dignity and other constitutional rights.57 The court further 
cautioned owners and persons in charge not to unreasonably deny occupiers the right 
to make improvements as the lives of such occupiers are often organised around 
where they reside.58 Therefore, housing for occupiers is about living in conditions that 
are compatible with human dignity and the other fundamental rights itemised in section 
5 of ESTA.59 It was based on a combined reading of sections 5(a) and 6(1) that the 
Constitutional Court eventually held that ESTA provides an occupier with the right to 
make improvements to the dwelling to make it habitable without the owner’s consent.60 
However, the court limited the improvements to those that are reasonably necessary 
to save the dwelling from perishing, deteriorating or depreciating.61 
 
56 Paras 33-34. See also Davis (2019) South African Law Journal 420 422. 
57 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 33. See also Davis (2019) South African Law 
Journal 420 422. 
58 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 33. 
59 Para 31. 
60 Paras 57, 59-60, 193, 210, 212 and 217. See further Nolan (2017) International Journal of 
Constitutional Law Blog 1/3; IM Rautenbach “Overview of Constitutional Court Judgments on 
the Bill of Rights – 2017” (2018) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 367 372; Rautenbach 
(2017) Litnet Akademies 959 959-960; Boggenpoel (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South 
African Law 2.1; Boggenpoel (2019) Stellenbosch Law Review 234 246 and 247; Brickhill, 
Finn & Moshikaro (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.3.1; Brickhill, Finn 
& Moshikaro (2017) Annual Survey of South African Law 170; D Hornby, A Nel, S Chademana 
& N Khanyile “A Slipping Hold? Farm Dweller Precarity in South Africa’s Changing Agrarian 
Economy and Climate” (2018) 7 Land 1 12, particularly footnote 22; Pienaar et al (2018) South 
African Public Law 1 8-9; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey of South African 
Law 993-994; Pienaar (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.2; Slade 
(2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Matlala (2017) De Rebus 27 30; 
S Rosa The Means and the Ends of Justice: The Interaction Between Socio-Economic Rights 
and Administrative Justice in a South African Democratic Developmental State LLD 
dissertation, Stellenbosch University (2017) 138-139; Marais & Muller (2018) South African 
Law Journal 768-769; Du Toit An Evaluation of the National Health Insurance Scheme 74; C 
Pienaar “Improvement of Structures by Farm Dwellers” Stock Farm (04-12-2017) 14; Oranje 
v Rouxlandia Investments (Pty) Ltd 2019 3 SA 108 (SCA) para 16. 
61 See Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 32. For a discussion of necessary 
improvements, see Immaculate Truck Repairs CC v Capital Acceptances Ltd [2017] ZAFSHC 
20 (16 February 2017) SAFLII <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAFSHC/2017/20.html> para 
29; United Building Society v Smookler’s Trustees & Golombick’s Trustee 1906 TS 623 627; 
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Allowing the occupier to make necessary improvements without the owner’s 
permission does not mean that the owner of the dwelling does not have rights, or that 
the occupier can do what he or she wants in relation to the property. According to 
Ngcukaitobi AJ in Sibanyoni v Holtzhausen (“Sibanyoni”),62 transformative 
constitutionalism requires that an appropriate balance be struck between the 
conflicting rights or interests of landowners and occupiers in terms of ESTA.63 Thus, 
the right to make improvements to bring the dwelling to a habitable standard, which 
would conform to conditions of human dignity, can only be limited on the grounds that 
they “are reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom”.64 This limitation on the rights of the owner was 
taken into account implicitly when the court ordered that the entitlement to make 
improvements required engaging meaningfully65 with all parties concerned to avoid 
 
Land Bank v Mans 1933 CPD 16 24; Lechoana v Cloete 1925 AD 536 547; King’s Hall Motor 
Co v Wickens & Minicol 1931 NPD 37 39; JG Lotz “Enrichment” in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
(eds) The Law of South Africa 2 ed Vol 9 (2005) para 229; ZT Boggenpoel “Property” (2017) 
1 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.2; Boggenpoel (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly 
Review of South African Law 2.1; MM Corbett “Fideicommissa” in HR Hahlo, MM Corbett, G 
Hofmeyr & E Kahn (eds) The Law of Succession in South Africa 2 ed (2001) 259 312; Muller 
et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 520, particularly footnote 235; S Eiselen 
& G Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment: A Casebook 3 ed (2008) 218; J du Plessis The South 
African Law of Unjustified Enrichment (2012) 279; JC Sonnekus Unjustified Enrichment in 
South African Law (2008) 80; D Visser Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 600. 
62 Sibanyoni v Holtzhausen (LCC143/2015) [2019] ZALCC 11 (9 May 2019) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2019/11.html>. 
63 Para 50. 
64 Section 5(a) of ESTA, originating from section 36(1) of the Constitution. See further Daniels 
v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 54 and 212; Scheepers & Du Plessis (1998) Tydskrif 
vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 473 475. 
65 The concept of “meaningful engagement” generally means a process in which two or more 
parties talk and listen to each other meaningfully in order to achieve certain objectives. In this 
regard, meaningful engagement is used as a deliberative tool to resolve disputes and to 
increase the understanding and sympathetic care of the parties affected if the parties are 
willing to participate in the process. See generally Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea 
Township & 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) paras 
14-15. See further G Muller “Conceptualising ‘Meaningful Engagement’ as a Deliberative 
Democratic Partnership” (2011) 3 Stellenbosch Law Review 472 743-744 and 753-756; G 
Muller “Conceptualising ‘Meaningful Engagement’ as a Deliberative Democratic Partnership” 
in S Liebenberg & G Quinot (eds) Law and Poverty: Perspectives from South Africa and 
Beyond (2012) 301-302 and 311-314; S Mahomedy The Potential of Meaningful Engagement 
in Realising Socio-Economic Rights: Addressing Quality Concerns LLM thesis, Stellenbosch 
University (2019) 3-8; L Chenwi & K Tissington Engaging Meaningfully with Government on 
Socio-Economic Rights – A Focus on the Right to Housing (2010) 9; L Chenwi “‘Meaningful 
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the violation of the owner’s right to property under section 25 of the Constitution and 
those set out in ESTA.66 In this regard, the court ordered the parties to meaningfully 
engage with regard to implementing the proposed necessary improvements. Crucially, 
this included an engagement on the need and approval of the building to determine 
whether they were in fact necessary improvements. Furthermore, the parties had to 
agree on the arrival and departure time and the movement of the constructors on the 
farm.67 Thus, the court concluded that if meaningful engagement between the owner 
or person in charge and the occupier does not result in an acceptable outcome, any 
one of the parties can approach a court to have the dispute arising from failure to 
engage meaningfully resolved by a court of law.68 This is because if an occupier 
 
Engagement’ in the Realisation of Socio-Economic Rights: The South African Experience” 
(2011) 26 Southern African Public Law 128 129; S Liebenberg “Engaging the Paradoxes of 
the Universal and Particular in Human Rights Adjudication: The Possibilities and Pitfalls of 
‘Meaningful Engagement’” (2012) 12 African Human Rights Law Journal 1 13-28; S van der 
Berg “Meaningful Engagement: Proceduralising Socio-Economic Rights further or Infusing 
Administrative Law with Substance? (2013) 29 South African Journal on Human Rights 376 
381-388. 
66 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 61-65 and 217. See further Nolan (2017) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law Blog 1/3 3/3; Rautenbach (2018) Tydskrif vir die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 367 372; Rautenbach (2017) Litnet Akademies 959 962-963; 
Boggenpoel (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Pienaar et al (2018) 
South African Public Law 1 8-10; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey of South 
African Law 994; Pienaar (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.2; Slade 
(2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro (2017) 
Annual Survey of South African Law 170; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly 
Review of South African Law 2.3.1; Matlala (2017) De Rebus 27 30; Marais & Muller (2018) 
South African Law Journal 769; C Pienaar “Improvement of Structures by Farm Dwellers” 
Stock Farm (04-12-2017) 15; Davis (2019) South African Law Journal 420 422. 
67 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 71. See further Boggenpoel (2017) 2 Juta’s 
Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1, especially footnote 14; Pienaar et al (2018) South 
African Public Law 1 9; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey of South African Law 
994; Pienaar (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.2; Slade (2017) 2 Juta’s 
Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Matlala (2017) De Rebus 27 30; Rosa The Means 
and the Ends of Justice 139; Du Toit An Evaluation of the National Health Insurance Scheme 
74; Rautenbach (2017) Litnet Akademies 959 963; Davis (2019) South African Law Journal 
420 422. 
68 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 65, citing City of Tshwane Metropolitan 
Municipality v Link Africa (Pty) Ltd 2015 6 SA 440 (CC) para 152. See further Van Rensburg 
v Coetzee 1979 4 SA 655 (A) 676-678; Erasmus v Mtenje (LCC 202/2017) [2018] ZALCC 12 
(12 June 2018) SAFLII <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/12.html> para 35; 
Boggenpoel (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Pienaar et al (2018) 
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effects improvements on the dwelling to the total disregard of a private landowner 
and/or without recourse to a court of law, such an act amounts to self-help. This would 
effectively encourage the occupier to take the law into his or her own hands.69 Daniels 
indicates that habitability is fundamentally important to enjoy constitutional rights such 
as human dignity. If the dwelling is not habitable, it may impact on the human dignity 
of the occupier and that may lead to the occupier vacating the dwelling due to 
unacceptable living conditions. The meaning of habitability in the context of occupiers 
was also highlighted in the case of Erasmus v Mtenje (“Mtenje”).70 This case is 
discussed below. 
 
5 2 2 2 Erasmus v Mtenje 
In Mtenje, the occupier had a right to reside on land guaranteed in terms of ESTA. The 
occupier and his family were residing on a portion of immovable property belonging to 
the owner.71 The occupier was living in a small rented room and was found by the 
owner to be operating an illegal spaza shop on the property.72 On instruction of the 
landowner, the building where the occupier lived and operated the small store was 
 
South African Public Law 1 9; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey of South African 
Law 994; Pienaar (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.2; Slade (2017) 2 
Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Matlala (2017) De Rebus 27 30; C Pienaar 
“Improvement of Structures by Farm Dwellers” Stock Farm (04-12-2017) 15; Rautenbach 
(2017) Litnet Akademies 959 963. 
69 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 65, referring to Motswagae v Rustenburg 
Local Municipality 2013 2 SA 613 (CC) para 14. See further City of Tshwane Metropolitan 
Municipality v Link Africa (Pty) Ltd 2015 6 SA 440 (CC) para 87; Erasmus v Mtenje (LCC 
202/2017) [2018] ZALCC 12 (12 June 2018) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/12.html> para 35; Sibanyoni v Holtzhausen 
(LCC143/2015) [2019] ZALCC 11 (9 May 2019) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2019/11.html> para 99; Lesapo v North West 
Agricultural Bank 2000 1 SA 409 (CC) paras 17-8; discussed and analysed in LR Ngwenyama 
The Impact of Section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 on Banking 
Law LLM thesis, University of Johannesburg (2016) 12-16; Pienaar et al (2018) South African 
Public Law 1 9; Slade (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; C Pienaar 
“Improvement of Structures by Farm Dwellers” Stock Farm (04-12-2017) 15. 
70 Erasmus v Mtenje (LCC 202/2017) [2018] ZALCC 12 (12 June 2018) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/12.html>. 
71 Para 3. 
72 Para 9. 
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subsequently destroyed.73 Due to the building being demolished, the occupier and his 
family were left destitute in three army styled tents in the same area where the 
destroyed building was initially built.74 
After some time, the tents were no longer fit for human habitation as they started to 
fall apart. Importantly, the tents could not protect the occupier, for example, from 
weather conditions. This led the occupier, without the owner’s permission, to build for 
himself and his family a structure to ensure that he was protected from harsh 
conditions.75 It should be mentioned that the structure was not completely built.76 
Furthermore, the occupier erected the structure to avoid living in undignified conditions 
that he endured for a decade residing in tents.77 The structure was temporary in nature 
as it was built out of corrugated iron sheets and poles. The floor of the structure 
consisted of combined sand and concrete and there were no partitions. The structure 
had seven windows, a double door at the front and a single door at the back, but not 
all the windows had glass.78 The court conducted an in loco inspection to determine 
the living conditions of the occupier and his family and the physical condition of the 
structure.79 The court was specifically called upon to decide whether the newly erected 
structure was fit for human occupation. The inspection showed that the previous 
structure of the occupier had double brick walls outside and a concrete floor. 
Moreover, the inspection indicated that the occupier’s current location lacked lavatory 
facilities. As such, the occupier and his family had to use a nearby veld as a toilet 
facility.80 The inspection also revealed that the occupier had been denied a tap to 
access water. The only water supply was through a municipal tank or from a tank that 
was placed near the fence where the main house was located. Furthermore, the 
inspection revealed that the new structure in question was incomplete and not yet in 
a habitable state. Thus, the occupier and his family were still living in the tents.81 
 
73 Para 9. 
74 Para 9. 
75 Paras 12-13. 
76 Para 14. 
77 Para 13. 
78 Para 15. 
79 Para 2. 
80 Para 14. 
81 Para 14. 
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According to the court, following the case of Daniels concerning the habitability of 
a dwelling, the new structure that the occupier built was not habitable.82 In light of this, 
the court found that replacing tents with an informal structure provides occupiers with 
better protection from the elements and offers the occupiers of these tents with some 
measure of human dignity.83 The court in this regard correctly identified one element 
of habitability, namely protection from the elements as contained in the CESCR’s 
General Comment 4,84 but did not explicitly invoke the CESCR’s General Comment 4. 
Furthermore, the court envisaged a minimum standard of habitability that is based on 
human dignity. The court’s reliance on human dignity to inform the meaning of 
habitability (as shown in Mtenje) properly upholds the human dignity afforded to 
occupiers by section 5 of ESTA, reinforced by section 10 of the Constitution. 
In Mtenje, the owner sought interdictory relief and a demolition order from the Land 
Claims Court. The interdict was sought to prevent the occupier from continuing to build 
the structure which was erected without the consent of the owner on her immovable 
property.85 Moreover, the interdict was sought to prevent the occupier from living in 
the structure and order the occupier to vacate the structure. Furthermore, the owner 
wanted to be formally authorised to demolish the structure.86 The court had to decide 
whether the owner had met the requirements for an interdict.87 
The fact that Erasmus owned the property might have given her a clear right to 
launch an application of this nature under Roman-Dutch law. However, this was no 
longer the position in the new constitutional dispensation.88 The court mentioned that 
an occupier is entitled to certain residential rights in respect of land they reside on and 
 
82 Para 14. 
83 Para 34. 
84 See section 5 3 below. 
85 Erasmus v Mtenje (LCC 202/2017) [2018] ZALCC 12 (12 June 2018) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/12.html> paras 1 and 16. 
86 Paras 1 and 16. 
87 These requirements were: (a) a clear right; (b) an injury actually committed or reasonably 
apprehended; and (c) the absence of similar protection by any other ordinary remedy. 
However, the court was not satisfied that these requirements are met. See Erasmus v Mtenje 
(LCC 202/2017) [2018] ZALCC 12 (12 June 2018) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/12.html> paras 16-18. 
88 Erasmus v Mtenje (LCC 202/2017) [2018] ZALCC 12 (12 June 2018) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/12.html> para 19. 
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use. This entails, at the very least, a right to live on habitable land with dignity.89 The 
court concluded that the owner had failed to fulfil the first requirement of an interdict 
and it was therefore not necessary to deal with the other requirements.90 The court in 
Mtenje mentioned that despite the relationship between the occupier and owner being 
broken down, it was important for both parties to meaningfully engage with each other 
concerning the issue at hand prior to taking the law into their own hands. In this regard, 
the court essentially reinforced the earlier dictum of the court in Daniels.91 It should be 
mentioned that the duty to meaningfully engage with the owner rests on the occupier 
in so far as ensuring that the occupier’s dwelling is in a habitable state.92 Thus, the 
failure by the occupier to engage meaningfully with the owner regarding the necessity 
to upgrade the occupier’s living condition was contentious. Therefore, to deny the 
occupier the right to upgrade his dwelling in the circumstances of Mtenje was, 
according to the court, “too formalistic and unjust” in light of South Africa’s history of 
dispossessions.93 The following section provides an analysis of the cases of Daniels 
and Mtenje. 
 
5 2 3 Assessment 
The case of Daniels has practical implications when one reflects on the notion of 
habitability in the context of occupiers. The court held that to “reside on” for purposes 
of ESTA, means that the dwelling must be habitable.94 In this regard, the court in 
Daniels linked habitability to the right to reside in terms of ESTA. Reside generally 
means to live at a place permanently and depends on the facts of each case.95 As the 
 
89 Para 19. 
90 Para 19. 
91 Para 33, citing Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 62. 
92 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 62-65. 
93 Erasmus v Mtenje (LCC 202/2017) [2018] ZALCC 12 (12 June 2018) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/12.html> para 33, referring to Daniels v 
Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 67. 
94 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 32. See further Oranje v Rouxlandia 
Investments (Pty) Ltd 2019 3 SA 108 (SCA) para 16; C Pienaar “Improvement of Structures 
by Farm Dwellers” Stock Farm (04-12-2017) 14-15; Nolan (2017) International Journal of 
Constitutional Law Blog 1/3; Boggenpoel (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African 
Law 2.1; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 7; Matlala (2017) De Rebus 27 30. 
95 Section 1(h) of the Extension of Security of Tenure Amendment Act 2 of 2018. See further 
Sandvliet Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Mampies 2019 6 SA 409 (SCA) para 19; Kiepersol Poultry Farm 
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right to reside on for the purposes of ESTA means that the dwelling has to be 
habitable, it follows that an occupier is entitled to use the land on which he or she 
resides. However, the occupier cannot enjoy the use of the property if it is not 
habitable.96 The right to reside on then includes the right to make improvements meant 
to bring the dwelling to a standard suitable for human habitation so that the occupier 
can continue to reside on and use the property.97 The occupier’s right to reside on the 
property must be consonant with the rights contained in section 5 of ESTA, in 
particular, the right to human dignity. This would mean that reside in terms of ESTA 
relates to living in a dwelling that protects human dignity and the other fundamental 
rights itemised in section 5.98 Arguably, an occupier cannot enjoy his or her entitlement 
to reside on and use a dwelling if that occupier is relocated to a dwelling that is not 
habitable as the dwelling might impact on his or her human dignity. In such 
circumstances, it is now clear that an occupier can rely on and invoke sections 5 and 
6 of ESTA to resist the relocation to live in a dwelling that accords him or her habitable 
conditions with human dignity.99 However, since not every relocation may constitute 
an infringement of an occupier’s constitutional rights, every case will have to be dealt 
with according to its facts.100 
Daniels also linked habitability to tenure security.101 Security of tenure means the 
level of security that an occupier may possess in terms of ESTA when he or she 
 
(Pty) Ltd v Phasiya 2010 3 SA 152 (SCA) paras 8-9 and 22; Mkwanazi v Bivane Bosbou (Pty) 
Ltd, Msimango v De Villiers; Ngema v Van der Walt; Mdletshe v Nxumalo (LCC4/97, LCC9/97, 
LCC9/97, LCC10/97) [1998] ZALCC 13 (23 October 1998) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/1998/13.html> para 8; Barrie NO v Ferris 1987 2 SA 
709 (C) 714; Tick v Broude 1973 1 SA 462(T) 469; Ex Parte Minister of Native Affairs 1941 
AD 53 58; Buck v Parker 1908 TS 1100 1104; Beedle & Co v Bowley (1895) 12 SC 401 403; 
H Mostert, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk “Land Reform” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The Law 
of South Africa 2 ed Vol 14 Part 1 (2010) para 127. 
96 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 31-32. 
97 Para 32. 
98 Para 31. 
99 See Oranje v Rouxlandia Investments (Pty) Ltd 2019 3 SA 108 (SCA) para 17. See also JM 
Pienaar “Land Reform” (2019) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.3. 
100 Oranje v Rouxlandia Investments (Pty) Ltd 2019 3 SA 108 (SCA) para 18. See also JM 
Pienaar “Land Reform” (2019) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.3. 
101 See Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 32-33. 
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resides on and uses land belonging to another.102 Security of tenure may differ 
depending on the purpose for which the land is used.103 Marais and Muller mention 
that security of tenure is a specialised manifestation of human dignity in the property 
context.104 As such, security of tenure must imply that the property should be habitable 
so that the occupier could reside on and use the property in dignity. Moreover, since 
occupiers’ right to security of tenure means that the dwelling must be habitable, this, 
in turn, implies that the occupier is entitled to make reasonable and necessary 
improvements on the dwelling to ensure that the occupier has secure tenure.105 
Arguably, the right to access to adequate housing also means that the dwelling should 
be habitable, which implies that an occupier can make improvements that are 
reasonably necessary to ensure that such occupier resides in an adequate dwelling.106 
Here, habitability is read into security of tenure and adequate housing, which 
essentially points towards an individual standard of habitability that exists in this 
particular context. 
 
102 A Mahomed, P Benjamin, B Barry, S Magardie, P Naidoo, N Yazbek, M Mokhoaetsi, J Ntuli 
& V Mngwengwe “Tenure Security in SA Law” in A Mohamed (ed) Land Tenure Law (RS: 1 
2013) 2-1; A Mahomed, P Benjamin, B Barry, P Naidoo, S Magardie & N Yazbek “Tenure 
Security in SA Law” in A Mohamed (ed) Understanding Land Tenure Law: Commentary and 
Legislation (2009) 28 28; Pienaar Land Reform 384-385; L Royston “Security of Urban Tenure 
in South Africa: Overview of Policy and Practice” in A Durand-Lasserve & L Royston (eds) 
Holding Their Ground: Secure Land Tenure for the Urban Poor in Developing Countries (2002) 
8 and 174; P Dhliwayo Tenure Security in Relation to Farmland LLM thesis, Stellenbosch 
University (2012) 13; P Dhliwayo “Tenure Security and Farmland: Will Recent Policy and 
Legislative Developments Improve the Plight of Rural Dwellers” (2014) 25 Stellenbosch Law 
Review 143 145; J Pienaar & A Kamkuemah “Farm Land and Tenure Security: New Policy 
and Legislative Developments” in S Liebenberg & G Quinot (eds) Law and Poverty: 
Perspectives from South Africa and Beyond (2012) 282 282; J Pienaar & A Kamkuemah “Farm 
Land and Tenure Security: New Policy and Legislative Developments” (2011) 22 Stellenbosch 
Law Review 724 724; Rautenbach (2017) Litnet Akademies 959 960. 
103 Mahomed et al “Tenure Security in SA Law” in Land Tenure Law 2-1; CESCR’s General 
Comment No 4 (Sixth session, 1991) The Right to Adequate Housing (Article 11(1) of the 
ICESCR), UN Doc E/ 1992/23 para 8(a). 
104 Marais & Muller (2018) South African Law Journal 774. 
105 See Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 32. See also C Pienaar “Improvement 
of Structures by Farm Dwellers” Stock Farm (04-12-2017) 14-15; Boggenpoel (2017) 2 Juta’s 
Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Matlala (2017) De Rebus 27 30. 
106 See Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 57-58. See also Brickhill, Finn & 
Moshikaro (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.3.1. 
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The court in Daniels further linked habitability to human dignity.107 In other words, 
habitability is defined in the context of occupiers with reference to human dignity under 
section 5(a) of ESTA, but also with reference to section 10 of the Constitution. 
Concerning occupiers in terms of ESTA, human dignity of occupiers cannot be limited 
to personal dignity.108 The human dignity of occupiers must be understood to include 
the entitlement to a dignified standard of living despite insufficient and poor resources 
at the disposal of occupiers.109 This means that occupiers are entitled to live on 
property that is habitable and conducive to human dignity.110 Thus, by permitting an 
occupier who lives under the most deplorable circumstances to make improvements 
to his or her dwelling two purposes are served, namely (a) it brings the dwelling to a 
standard that accords with human dignity; and (b) it protects the occupier from 
suffering any form of indignity that might be caused by the possible departure from this 
standard based on intolerable living conditions in respect of the dwelling.111 Therefore, 
the right to property is informed by the right to human dignity.112 In light of the above 
discussion, the notion of habitability as used in case law, such as Daniels, is read into 
the right to reside, tenure security, adequate housing and human dignity. In a very real 
sense, habitability incorporates and implies all these rights that were discussed in 
Daniels. 
In light of the cases of Daniels and Mtenje, it is clear that occupiers are always 
entitled to inhabit a dwelling that accords with human dignity and other fundamental 
 
107 See Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 31-34. 
108 Sibanyoni v Holtzhausen (LCC143/2015) [2019] ZALCC 11 (9 May 2019) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2019/11.html> para 55. See also A Sachs The Strange 
Alchemy of Life and Law (2009) 22. 
109 Sibanyoni v Holtzhausen (LCC143/2015) [2019] ZALCC 11 (9 May 2019) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2019/11.html> para 55. See also Daniels v Scribante 
2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 31; BV Slade “Constitutional Property Law” (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly 
Review of South African Law 2.1. 
110 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 31-32. 
111 Para 34. 
112 Para 31. See further Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 
46 (CC) paras 23 and 83; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) 
para 15; Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape 2015 
6 SA 125 (CC) paras 43-51; EJ Marais “Expanding the Contours of the Constitutional Property 
Concept” (2016) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 576 584; Marais & Muller (2018) South 
African Law Journal 774, particularly footnote 66. 
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rights.113 This is evidently so from Madlanga J’s holding in Daniels when he said: “The 
occupier’s right to reside must be consonant with the fundamental rights contained in 
section 5, in particular – for present purposes – the right to human dignity”.114 The 
word “must” in the court’s decision indicates that the landowner has no option, but it is 
mandatory for the landowner to allow the occupier to live in his or her land with human 
dignity.115 Another interpretation could be that the dwelling should be in line with 
human dignity, which does not necessarily speak to who is responsible for the dwelling 
to be habitable, simply that it must be habitable. Furthermore, the word “must” points 
towards the occupiers’ two equally unsatisfactory options if the land is not compatible 
with human dignity and other constitutional rights, namely: (a) automatic eviction –
leading to homelessness - if the occupier leaves the dwelling due to intolerable living 
conditions; or (b) continue to reside in a property that is undignified and is not habitable 
for which the occupier may or may not be paying rent, depending on the agreement 
between the occupier and owner.116 Despite the decisions of Daniels and Mtenje being 
unique in the sense that Daniels concerned improving an existing structure and Mtenje 
was about replacing tents with a new structure, at the centre of each case inquiry is 
the important question that should be answered, namely whether the owner has 
housed the occupier in a dwelling that protects the human dignity of that occupier. The 
occupation should not necessarily (or even primarily) be concerned with a roof over 
 
113 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 31-34; Erasmus v Mtenje (LCC 202/2017) 
[2018] ZALCC 12 (12 June 2018) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/12.html> para 19. 
114 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 31 (own emphasis supplied). This holding 
has been adopted and applied in cases like Erasmus v Mtenje (LCC 202/2017) [2018] ZALCC 
12 (12 June 2018) SAFLII <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/12.html> para 19; 
Oranje v Rouxlandia Investments (Pty) Ltd 2019 3 SA 108 (SCA) para 16; Sibanyoni v 
Holtzhausen (LCC143/2015) [2019] ZALCC 11 (9 May 2019) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2019/11.html> para 55; Sandvliet Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v 
Mampies 2019 6 SA 409 (SCA) para 27. 
115 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 31-34; Erasmus v Mtenje (LCC 202/2017) 
[2018] ZALCC 12 (12 June 2018) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/12.html> para 19. 
116 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 32 and 52; Erasmus v Mtenje (LCC 
202/2017) [2018] ZALCC 12 (12 June 2018) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/12.html> paras 8-9 and 12-14, the occupier was 
paying monthly rent. Compare Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) para 1. 
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the occupier’s head and the four walls of the dwelling; occupation for occupiers is also 
about ensuring that an occupier’s dwelling is in line with the right to access to adequate 
housing (in terms of section 26(1)), the right to human dignity (in terms of section 10) 
and the right to security of tenure (in terms of section 25(6)). Therefore, the dwelling 
for occupiers should be compatible with human dignity and other fundamental rights 
as pointed out by Madlanga J in Daniels.117 
While the case of Daniels dealt with improvements to an existing building, Mtenje 
was concerned with the building of a new structure. In principle, there is arguably no 
difference between improving an existing building, which includes the addition of 
outside paving on the one hand, and the replacement of tents with an informal 
structure on the other.118 This is particularly so, as the existing building and the 
informal structure both aim to ensure better protection from the elements and to give 
their occupants a certain measure of dignity.119 Here, human dignity means that 
occupiers are entitled to reside on property belonging to another under conditions that 
are humane and presents a dignified standard of living. This is in line with section 5(a) 
of ESTA, with due regard to section 10 of the Constitution. Thus, the occupier in 
Daniels was entitled to improve an existing structure to achieve a certain habitable 
standard and live in dignity. Likewise, it was also correct for the court in Mtenje to allow 
an occupier to erect a new structure for the same purpose of achieving a standard of 
habitability. This is because occupying tents that are leaking can hardly be said to be 
living in a habitable state and with indignity.120 
In light of the above discussions, the court’s finding in Daniels seems to endorse 
the premise that habitability is presumed to include the right to effect improvements 
that are necessary to provide an occupier with adequate housing in order to live in 
dignity and for the occupier to possess a certain level of security of tenure. The case 
of Mtenje following the finding in Daniels, goes further to hold that habitability also 
 
117 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 31-34. See also Erasmus v Mtenje (LCC 
202/2017) [2018] ZALCC 12 (12 June 2018) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/12.html> para 19; City of Johannesburg v Rand 
Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W) para 49; Matlala (2017) De Rebus 27 30; Rautenbach 
(2017) Litnet Akademies 959 962. 
118 Erasmus v Mtenje (LCC 202/2017) [2018] ZALCC 12 (12 June 2018) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/12.html> para 34. 
119 Para 34. 
120 Para 35. 
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means the replacement of tents with an informal structure to provide better protection 
from the elements.121 
In light of the above recent developments in Daniels, later followed with approval in 
Mtenje, before an existing structure is improved to achieve habitable and dignified 
living conditions and a new structure is also built to maintain a similar standard, both 
occasions necessitate prior meaningful engagement between the parties concerned. 
If the engagement gives rise to a deadlock, the courts should be approached to resolve 
the dispute.122 Therefore, the occupier cannot rely on self-help.123 
Marais and Muller in their interpretation of Daniels argue that the court instead of 
transforming the law of property and the relationship between occupiers and 
landowners adopted a stretched interpretation of section 5(a) of ESTA.124 Such an 
interpretation, says Marais and Muller, may end up frustrating the spirit and objectives 
of the Bill of Rights in future similar cases.125 I do not agree with Marais and Muller. 
This is simply because section 39(2) of the Constitution does not permit unduly 
strained interpretations of legislation as will be explained below.126 In a different 
perspective on the Daniels case, Davis properly points out that Marais and Muller’s 
interpretation of the case is misplaced, especially their argument that there was a 
stretched interpretation of ESTA. Davis argues that Marais and Muller’s argument fails 
to properly explain how section 39(2) of the Constitution is inapplicable to the case of 
Daniels.127 In terms of section 39(2), a court must interpret ESTA to promote the spirit 
and objects of the Bill of Rights.128 This would mean that a court could adopt an 
 
121 Para 34. 
122 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 65; Erasmus v Mtenje (LCC 202/2017) [2018] 
ZALCC 12 (12 June 2018) SAFLII <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/12.html> para 
35. See further City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Link Africa (Pty) Ltd 2015 6 SA 
440 (CC) para 152; Van Rensburg v Coetzee 1979 4 SA 655 (A) 676-678. 
123 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 65; Erasmus v Mtenje (LCC 202/2017) [2018] 
ZALCC 12 (12 June 2018) SAFLII <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/12.html> para 
35. See also Motswagae v Rustenburg Local Municipality 2013 2 SA 613 (CC) para 14; 
Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank 2000 1 SA 409 (CC) paras 17-18. 
124 Marais & Muller (2018) South African Law Journal 769-770. 
125 770. 
126 See chapter 2 part 2 3 2 above. 
127 Davis (2019) South African Law Journal 420 427-428. 
128 Section 39(2) of the Constitution. See further Davis (2019) South African Law Journal 420 
428 and 431. 
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interpretation of ESTA that is in line with the Constitution and such an interpretation 
should be reasonably ascribed to section 5(a) of ESTA.129 It should be noted that 
section 39(2) only requires a court interpreting legislation such as ESTA, in light of the 
Bill of Rights, to interpret that legislation in a manner that gives effect to the Bill of 
Rights’ founding values such as human dignity.130 Pienaar mentions that in cases like 
Daniels, what is critical is context, the purpose for which ESTA was enacted and taking 
into account section 39(2) of the Constitution.131 Therefore, when the particular context 
in Daniels, the purpose for which ESTA was enacted and section 39(2) of the 
Constitution is taken into consideration, section 5(a) of ESTA must be given effect to 
in order to include the right asserted by Ms Daniels. This will ensure that occupiers’ 
rights are respected and protected. More importantly, occupiers could live in conditions 
that do not infringe their right to human dignity.132 
Davis mentions that Daniels is a transformative case.133 I agree with Davis for the 
following reasons. Firstly, in Daniels the court upheld an occupier’s right to human 
dignity over the owner’s right to property.134 This shows that all rights (even those of 
occupiers) are equally important and worthy of protection.135 Secondly, an occupier in 
Daniels was allowed to make improvements to the dwelling to make it habitable 
 
129 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) 
Ltd; In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) paras 21-26; 
followed in University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic v Minister of Justice & Correctional 
Services; Association of Debt Recovery Agents NPC v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid 
Clinic; Mavava Trading 279 (Pty) Ltd v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic 2016 6 SA 
596 (CC) para 135. 
130 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) 
Ltd; In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) paras 21-26; 
referred to in Minister of Safety & Security v Sekhoto 2011 5 SA 367 (SCA) para 15; Eskom 
Holdings Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers 2012 2 SA 197 (SCA) para 28; Daniels v 
Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 23. 
131 Pienaar (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.2; Van der Merwe & 
Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey of South African Law 992. 
132 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 23-34. 
133 Davis (2019) South African Law Journal 420 422. 
134 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 31-34. 
135 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) para 10. See further E van der Sijde “Tenure 
Security for ESTA occupiers: Building on the obiter remarks in Baron v Claytile Limited” (2020) 
36 South African Journal on Human Rights 1 9-11. 
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without an owner’s permission.136 The decision in this regard indicates that ownership 
is not absolute as it was perceived to be before the advent of the Constitution.137 
Thirdly, the right to reside in terms of section 6(1) of ESTA was interpreted to include 
to reside in a habitable dwelling.138 Finally, Daniels is a case where the notion of 
habitability in the context of occupiers was clearly and explicitly developed in light of 
the Constitution.139 In the following section, the dissertation investigates the 
implication of the Constitution on the standard of habitability for occupiers. This is done 
to establish what constitutional minimum standard of habitability exists for occupiers. 
 
5 3 Impact of the Constitution on the standard of habitability for occupiers 
Section 25(6) of the Constitution resonates in the context of ESTA. As explained in 
detail in chapter 2 above, ESTA is an Act of Parliament passed to give effect to the 
 
136 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 59-60. 
137 Para 133-137. On the fact that ownership is not absolute, see generally P Dhliwayo A 
Constitutional Analysis of Access Rights that Limit Landowners’ Right to Exclude LLD 
dissertation, Stellenbosch University (2015) 79-102 and 136; P Dhliwayo & R Dyal-Chand 
“Property in Law” in G Muller, R Brits, B Slade & J van Wyk (eds) Transformative Property 
Law: Festschrift in Honour of AJ van der Walt (2018) 309-312; AJ van der Walt and P Dhliwayo 
“The Notion of Absolute and Exclusive Ownership: A Doctrinal Analysis” (2017) 134 South 
African Law Journal 34 34-52; AJ van der Walt “Sharing servitudes” (2015) European Property 
LJ 162 200; AJ van der Walt Property and Constitution (2012) 29; Boggenpoel (2019) 
Stellenbosch Law Review 234 234-249; AJ van der Walt “Transformative Constitutionalism 
and the Development of South African Property Law (Part 2)” (2006) Tydskrif vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 1 2-31, the author essentially shows that the Constitution brings a shift away 
from absolute thinking on private common law property and hierarchical classification of rights; 
AJ van der Walt “Resisting Orthodoxy - Again: Thoughts on the Development of Post-
Apartheid South African Law” (2002) 17 South African Public Law 258 277-278; AJ van der 
Walt “Tradition on Trial: A Critical Analysis of the Civil-law Tradition in South African Property 
Law” (1995) 11 South African Journal on Human Rights 169 175-206; AJ van der Walt & DG 
Kleyn “Duplex Dominium: The History and Significance of the Concept of Divided Ownership” 
in DP Visser (ed) Essays on the History of Law (1989) 213 213-260; DP Visser “The 
‘Absoluteness’ of Ownership: The South African Common Law in Perspective” (1985) Acta 
Juridica 39 39-52; P Birks “The Roman Law Concept of Dominium and the Idea of Absolute 
Ownership” (1985) Acta Juridica 1-37. 
138 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 31-32. 
139 Paras 32-34. 
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constitutional right enshrined in section 25(6) of the Constitution.140 This provision 
states that any person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure due to 
past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled to the extent provided by ESTA, 
to legally secure tenure or to comparable redress.141 ESTA, therefore, affords 
occupiers with the right to secure tenure as envisaged in section 25(6) and (9) of the 
Constitution.142 In Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd (“Baron”),143 the court explained that for 
occupiers to enjoy a strong form of security of tenure as envisaged in section 25(6) of 
the Constitution and given effect to by ESTA, it must be acknowledged that ESTA 
occupiers enjoy the rights and entitlements over the land they inhabit and these rights 
and entitlements are as worthy of protection as those of owners.144 More specifically, 
the view of the court in Baron as referred to by Pretorius AJ is further underlined by 
section 6(2)(a) of ESTA, which provides that: 
 
“[w]ithout prejudice to the generality of the provisions section 5 and subsection (1), and 
balanced with rights of the owner or person in charge, an occupier shall have the right to 
security of tenure”. 
 
 
140 Para 12-13. See further Sandvliet Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Mampies 2019 6 SA 409 (SCA) 
para 14; Sibanyoni v Holtzhausen (LCC143/2015) [2019] ZALCC 11 (9 May 2019) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2019/11.html> paras 25-26 and 81; Hattingh v Juta 
2013 3 SA 275 (CC) para 24; I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 
561, particularly footnote 168; Rautenbach (2018) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 367 
372; Rautenbach (2017) Litnet Akademies 959 959-960; Marais & Muller (2018) South African 
Law Journal 767 and 774; Mbhense (2014) De Rebus 22 23; Davis (2019) South African Law 
Journal 420 424. 
141 Section 25(6) of the Constitution (own emphasis). 
142 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 13. See also Pienaar & Kamkuemah “Farm 
Land and Tenure Security” in Law and Poverty 282 284-285; Pienaar & Kamkuemah (2011) 
Stellenbosch Law Review 724 726-727. 
143 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC). 
144 Para 10. See further Van der Sijde (2020) South African Journal on Human Rights 1 9-11; 
Rautenbach (2018) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 367 372; JM Pienaar “Land Reform” 
(2017) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.2; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) 
Annual Survey of South African Law 1000; Pienaar & Kamkuemah “Farm Land and Tenure 
Security” in Law and Poverty 282 282; Pienaar & Kamkuemah (2011) Stellenbosch Law 
Review 724 724; Mahomed et al “Tenure Security in SA Law” in Land Tenure Law 2-1; 
Mahomed et al “Tenure Security in SA Law” in Understanding Land Tenure Law 28; Dhliwayo 
Tenure Security in Relation to Farmland LLM thesis, Stellenbosch University (2012) 13. 
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ESTA therefore prohibits conduct that has the impact of frustrating the exercise of 
rights occasioned by either an owner (or person in charge) and/or an occupier.145 
Section 6(2)(a) of ESTA provides occupiers with the right to security of tenure. Security 
of tenure is thus connected to the way in which individuals can own or occupy land 
and housing.146 Security of tenure may differ depending on the purpose for which the 
land is used.147 The right to tenure essentially gives occupiers a certain level of 
security to reside on, and use land, which they do not own.148 Hence, it provides 
occupiers with continued occupation as balanced relative to the rights of the owner (or 
person in charge).149 
With all this pointed out, what section 25(6) of the Constitution and ESTA aim to 
address is not inconceivable.150 Section 25(6) of the Constitution and ESTA not only 
aim to provide ESTA occupiers with legally secure tenure, but they also seek to give 
occupiers the human dignity that they did not enjoy during the apartheid era.151 In 
 
145 The preamble of ESTA holds that “. . . the law should extend the rights of occupiers, while 
giving due recognition to the rights, duties and legitimate interests of owners”. See also 
Daniels v Scribante (LCC164/2015) [2015] ZALCC 13 (4 December 2015) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2015/13.html> para 25; Sibanyoni v Holtzhausen 
(LCC143/2015) [2019] ZALCC 11 (9 May 2019) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2019/11.html> para 56. 
146 Mahomed et al “Tenure Security in SA Law” in Land Tenure Law 2-1; Mahomed et al 
“Tenure Security in SA Law” in Understanding Land Tenure Law 28; Pienaar Land Reform 
384-385; Royston “Security of Urban Tenure in South Africa” in Holding Their Ground (2002) 
8 and 174; Dhliwayo Tenure Security in Relation to Farmland 13; Dhliwayo (2014) 
Stellenbosch Law Review 143 145; Pienaar & Kamkuemah “Farm Land and Tenure Security” 
in Law and Poverty 282 282; Pienaar & Kamkuemah (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 724 
724; Rautenbach (2017) Litnet Akademies 959 960. 
147 Mahomed et al “Tenure Security in SA Law” in Land Tenure Law 2-1; CESCR’s General 
Comment No 4 (Sixth session, 1991) The Right to Adequate Housing (Article 11(1) of the 
ICESCR), UN Doc E/ 1992/23 para 8(a). 
148 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 13. See also Mahomed et al “Tenure Security 
in SA Law” in Land Tenure Law 2-2. 
149 Mahomed et al “Tenure Security in SA Law” in Land Tenure Law 2-2. 
150 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 23. See also Molusi v Voges NO 2016 3 SA 
370 (CC) para 7; Davis (2019) South African Law Journal 420 431. 
151 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 23. See further Nolan (2017) International 
Journal of Constitutional Law Blog 1/3; BV Slade “Constitutional Property Law” (2017) 2 Juta’s 
Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Rautenbach (2017) Litnet Akademies 959 962; 
Davis (2018) South African Judicial Education Journal 25 27; Davis (2019) South African Law 
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other words, the Constitution and ESTA aim to bring security of tenure for occupiers 
in line with constitutional imperatives such as human dignity, equality and freedom.152 
As such, section 25(6) of the Constitution was enacted as a vehicle to facilitate a move 
away from the past by emphasising the significance of security of tenure in our new 
constitutional dispensation.153 Furthermore, sections 25(6) was enshrined in the 
Constitution to rectify the indignity that was suffered by occupiers as a result of 
evictions or forced removals from their homes, and the relocation to land that was 
mostly inadequate for housing and that could not provide its occupiers with secure 
tenure, habitability and human dignity.154 
In Daniels, Madlanga J properly linked security of tenure with human dignity and 
observed that the right to human dignity is an indispensable pivot to the right to security 
of tenure.155 This would mean that “[t]here can be no true security of tenure under 
conditions devoid of human dignity.”156 This is because, without human dignity, human 
life is substantially diminished as human dignity serves as an important foundation of 
the right to security of tenure and several other rights contained in the Constitution.157 
In this regard, the court in Daniels envisaged an interpretation of the right to security 
 
Journal 420 431; Bhana (2013) South African Journal on Human Rights 351 352; Sandvliet 
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Mampies 2019 6 SA 409 (SCA) para 17; Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen 
v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) para 29; City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 
1 SA 78 (W) para 30. 
152 Pienaar & Kamkuemah “Farm Land and Tenure Security” in Law and Poverty 282 286-287; 
Pienaar & Kamkuemah (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 724 728-729; Dhliwayo (2014) 
Stellenbosch Law Review 143 152. 
153 Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) para 29; referred to in City 
of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W) para 30. 
154 Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) para 29; cited in City of 
Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W) para 30. 
155 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 2. 
156 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 2. See further Nolan (2017) International 
Journal of Constitutional Law Blog 1/3; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly 
Review of South African Law 2.3.1; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro (2017) Annual Survey of South 
African Law 170; Hornby et al (2018) Land 12, especially footnote 22; Pienaar et al (2018) 
South African Public Law 1 6, particularly footnote 39; Mbhense (2014) De Rebus 22 23, 
correctly points that security of tenure is important to the enjoyment of other right such as 
human dignity. He then argues that an occupier’s right to human dignity is violated when an 
occupier does not enjoy legally secure tenure. 
157 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 327; cited in Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 
341 (CC) para 2. 
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of tenure and human dignity to include the right to effect ordinary improvements to 
make the dwelling habitable and safe.158 This flowed from a purposive interpretation 
of ESTA.159 More importantly, section 25(6) and ESTA essentially set a minimum 
standard of habitability for occupiers. Thus, to achieve that minimum standard, the 
dwelling of the occupier must be habitable. 
It is against this backdrop that the explored implication of the Constitution on the 
standard of habitability for occupiers has revealed that occupation for occupiers should 
be compatible with human dignity and other fundamental rights. Now that it has been 
established that a minimum standard of habitability exists for occupiers as informed 
by constitutional imperatives, the section that follows explores the question of whether 
the landowner or the state must ensure a level of habitability. 
 
5 4 On whom does the obligation rest to ensure habitability? 
5 4 1 Introduction 
This section will consider whether the obligation to ensure the habitability of dwellings 
inhabited by occupiers rests on the landowner, the occupier, or the state. In terms of 
ESTA occupiers, the rights contained in chapter 2 of the Constitution impose a 
combination of obligations on the state and most importantly for this chapter, on 
owners in certain circumstances.160 The Constitution provides that the state must 
 
158 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 31-31. 
159 Purposive interpretation generally means interpreting legislation or a part of legislation or 
a provision of the Constitution in line with or within the context of what Parliament has enacted. 
In the context of ESTA, a purposive interpretation would mean adopting an interpretation that 
best advances the noble purpose of ESTA, which in turn will provide the necessary context. 
The injunction of section 39(2) of the Constitution should also be noted, which seeks to 
promote the spirit and objectives of the Bill of rights whenever legislation is interpreted. Taking 
into account section 39(2) will ensure that occupiers enjoy the total and possible protection of 
their fundamental rights. See generally Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 23-24 
and 57; Sibanyoni v Holtzhausen (LCC143/2015) [2019] ZALCC 11 (9 May 2019) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2019/11.html> paras 24-31. 
160 Nolan (2017) International Journal of Constitutional Law Blog 1/3; A Nolan “Holding Non-
State Actors to Account for Constitutional Economic and Social Rights Violations: Experiences 
and Lessons from South Africa and Ireland” (2014) 12 International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 61 76; S Khoza Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Resource Book (2007) 20; H 
Cheadle “Application” in MH Cheadle, DM Davis & NRL Haysom (eds) South African 
Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 2 ed (I: 18 2015) 3-1; Liebenberg “South Africa: 
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strive to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights”.161 This 
signals that all the rights in chapter 2 of the Constitution impose both a positive and 
negative obligation on the state and attempts to ensure that the state does not 
abdicate its responsibilities.162 This is because the Constitution applies to, and binds 
the state together with all its organs.163 Arguably, this includes the obligation to ensure 
that a dwelling must be habitable. The Constitution further states that a right in the Bill 
of Rights will bind a private person “if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into 
account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right”.164 
This explicitly confirms the direct application of the Bill of Rights in private 
relationships.165 According to Nolan, the Constitution generally, but especially in 
section 8(2), acknowledges that the extent to which rights may impose obligations may 
differ in terms of how they apply to private owners.166 However, the manner in which 
courts may exercise their discretion in respect of the application of certain obligations 
must be taken note of here.167 As such, when a court applies the rights contained in 
chapter 2 of the Constitution to private landowners in terms of section 8(2), so as to 
give effect to a right in the Constitution, the court must apply or where necessary 
develop the common law to the point where legislation fails to give effect to that 
 
Adjudicating Social Rights under a Transformative Constitution” in Social Rights 
Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law 78; Rosa The Means 
and the Ends of Justice 123; S Ellmann “A Constitutional Confluence: American ‘State Action’ 
Law and the Application of South Africa’s Socio-Economic Rights Guarantees to Private 
Actors” in P Andrews & S Ellmann (eds) The Post-Apartheid Constitutions: Perspectives on 
South Africa’s Basic Law (2001) 444 444; Rautenbach (2017) Litnet Akademies 959 963. 
161 See section 7(2) of the Constitution. 
162 See chapter 2 above. 
163 See chapter 2 above. 
164 See chapter 2 above. 
165 See chapter 2 above. 
166 Nolan (2014) International Journal of Constitutional Law 78; Nolan (2017) International 
Journal of Constitutional Law Blog 1/3 2/3. 
167 Nolan (2014) International Journal of Constitutional Law 78; Nolan (2017) International 
Journal of Constitutional Law Blog 1/3 2/3; S Liebenberg “The Application of Socio-Economic 
Rights to Private Law” (2008) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 464 466; M Pieterse 
“Indirect Horizontal Application of the Right to Have Access to Health Care Services” (2007) 
23 South African Journal on Human Rights 157 161; A Cockrell “Private Law and the Bill of 
Rights: A Threshold Issue of ‘Horizontality’” in Y Mokgoro & P Tlakula (eds) Bill of Rights 
Compendium (SI: 35 12015) 3A-14. 
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right.168 Moreover, where a right in the Constitution is implicated, the court must 
interpret any legislation or develop the common law in a manner that promotes the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.169 Therefore, ESTA should then be 
interpreted in line with the Constitution, or if necessary developed to bring it in line with 
the Constitution. If a court adopts an interpretation that promotes the spirit, purport 
and objectives of the Constitution, it affords occupiers with the necessary enjoyment 
and protection of their constitutional rights.170 It is clear from the above discussion that 
the Constitution makes it possible for socio-economic rights to apply between 
occupiers and private owners.171 Interestingly, the issue of whether socio-economic 
rights apply to private owners did arise in Daniels.172 This is indicated by the 
subsection that follows. 
 
5 4 2 Imposing an obligation on private landowners to ensure habitability 
5 4 2 1 Obligation in terms of section 8(2) 
 
168 Section 8(3) of the Constitution. 
169 See chapter 2 above. 
170 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 25, citing Department of Land Affairs v 
Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 SA 199 (CC) para 53; Sibanyoni v Holtzhausen 
(LCC143/2015) [2019] ZALCC 11 (9 May 2019) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2019/11.html> paras 31, 51 and 85. 
171 Liebenberg “South Africa: Adjudicating Social Rights under a Transformative Constitution” 
in Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law 78-
79; S Liebenberg “The Application of Socio-Economic Rights to Private Law” (2008) Tydskrif 
vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 464 464; S Liebenberg “The Interpretation of Socio-Economic 
Rights” in S Woolman, T Roux, J Klaaren, A Stein, M Chaskalson & M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed Vol 2 (RS: 6 2014) 33-57; S Liebenberg Socio-
Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 319; P de Vos, W 
Freedman, D Brand, C Gevers, K Govender, P Lenaghan, D Mailula, N Ntlama, S Sibanda & 
L Stone “Socio-Economic Rights” in P de Vos & W Freedman (eds) South African 
Constitutional Law in Context (2014) 319-320. 
172 Before the Daniels case, the Constitutional Court in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 2 SA 104 (CC) paras 39-40, dealt 
with the issue of the imposition of socio-economic rights obligations on private actors. In Blue 
Moonlight, the court imposed a direct positive obligation on a private owner by ordering the 
landowner to continue to house unlawful occupiers who, if evicted, would immediately be left 
homeless. The case of Blue Moonlight was subsequently confirmed and applied in Marialdo 
Tre (Pty) Ltd v Dlamini unreported decision, referred to as (45617/2017) [2019] ZAGPJHC 299 
(23 August 2019) SAFLII <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPJHC/2019/299.html > paras 3 
and 16. 
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In Daniels, the court held that section 8(2) of the Constitution imposes a positive 
obligation in terms of habitability under certain circumstances on landowners to give 
effect to socio-economic rights and section 25(6) of the Constitution.173 However, the 
court mentioned that an owner will bear a positive obligation only after a court has 
taken into account the following considerations: (a) the nature of the right in question; 
(b) the history behind the right; (c) the aim of the right; (d) the best way to achieve the 
intended goal of the right; (d) the potential that the right in issue can be interfered with 
by a private owner other than the state or its arms; and (e) whether not holding the 
landowner liable for infringing the right will not render the right ineffective.174 Therefore, 
if the considerations apply to an owner, the private landowner (and not the state) may 
 
173 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 39-49. See further Erasmus v Mtenje (LCC 
202/2017) [2018] ZALCC 12 (12 June 2018) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/12.html> para 32; Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 
5 SA 329 (CC) para 35; Lynn v Nene (LCC95/2016) [2018] ZALCC 21 (29 January 2018) 
SAFLII <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/21.html> para 61; Rautenbach (2017) 
Litnet Akademies 959 and 967; Rautenbach (2018) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 367 
372-373; Nolan (2017) International Journal of Constitutional Law Blog 1/3; Madlanga (2018) 
Stellenbosch Law Review 372-373; Matlala (2017) De Rebus 27 30; B Dickson “Apex of 
Courts and the Development of the Common Law” in P Daly (ed) Apex Courts and the 
Common Law (2019) 36 48; Boggenpoel (2017) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African 
Law 2.1; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 
2.3.1; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 7-8, 10 and 13; BV Slade “Constitutional 
Property Law” (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Morare (2017) Land 
Digest 1 1; S Rosa The Means and the Ends of Justice: The Interaction Between Socio-
Economic Rights and Administrative Justice in a South African Democratic Developmental 
State LLD dissertation, Stellenbosch University (2017) 139; CESCR’s General Comment No 
24 (Sixty-first session, 2017) on State Obligations under the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Context of Business Activities, part ii para 4, 
particularly footnote 16. 
174 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 39. See further Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 
SA 401 (CC) para 33; Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essay NO (CCT 
29/10) [2011] ZACC 13 (11 April 2011) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2011/13.html> paras 57-58; Jaftha v Schoeman; Van 
Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) paras 25-30; Jooste v Botha 2000 2 SA 199 (T) 205; 
Nolan (2017) International Journal of Constitutional Law Blog 2/3; Rautenbach (2018) Tydskrif 
vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 367 373; Rautenbach (2017) Litnet Akademies 959 968; BV Slade 
“Constitutional Property Law” (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1, 
particularly footnote 11; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 8; Madlanga (2018) 
Stellenbosch Law Review 359 372. 
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be obliged to ensure that occupiers live in dwellings that are in a habitable condition 
and provide them with dignity. 
It is important to note that the question of whether an owner can or should be 
saddled with a positive obligation to ensure habitability in the context of occupiers was 
arguably purely academic in Daniels, since Ms Daniels was willing to effect the 
improvements herself. Furthermore, not all the judges agreed on the extent to which 
an owner could be held liable to ensure the habitability of the dwelling of the occupier. 
The majority judgment in Daniels was penned by Madlanga J with Cameron J, 
Froneman J, Khampepe J, Musi AJ and Mbha AJ concurring. As already mentioned, 
the majority of the court mentioned that the Constitutional Court has not held that under 
no circumstances may an owner bear a positive obligation in respect of the Bill of 
Rights.175 Whether a positive obligation can be imposed on an owner, depends on 
certain factors mentioned above.176 In Daniels, the court noted that it would be 
appropriate in certain instances to impose a positive obligation on the owner because 
of the nature of the right argued by Ms Daniels and the tenuous nature of the obligation 
imposed by the right.177 For instance, it would arguably be appropriate to impose a 
positive obligation on the owner if the state of disrepair of the dwelling renders useless 
the constitutional rights of occupiers. 
In a separate concurring judgment, Froneman J pointed out that before the 
aspirations of the Constitution could be made a reality to everyone, including 
occupiers, three things had to be acknowledged. These included: (a) an honest and 
deep recognition of the past injustices; (b) a re-appraisal of the South African notion 
of ownership and property rights; and (c) an acceptance (as opposed to an avoidance) 
of the significance of constitutional change.178 It is important to acknowledge these 
three things mentioned above because most white people on farms had benefited from 
 
175 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 48. 
176 Para 39. 
177 Paras 49 and 51. 
178 Para 115. See further Boggenpoel (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 
2.1; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 9; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) 
Annual Survey of South African Law 995; Pienaar (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South 
African Law 2.2; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro (2017) Annual Survey of South African Law 171; 
Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.3.1. 
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the social and political efforts of apartheid.179 He further mentioned that the injustices 
of the past had to be rectified so that black and coloured people on farms could also 
enjoy the same socio-political benefits as white people.180 This would mean that 
landowners should ensure that occupiers on farms do not reside on property in 
conditions that are inhumane and undignified to live in.181 The judgment of Froneman 
J in this regard points towards the obligations that ordinarily come with ownership of 
property like ensuring that property inhabited by occupiers is habitable. 
In another separate concurring judgment written by Cameron J, he cautioned 
judges to refrain from writing history.182 This is because it is not a judge’s primary 
competence to write on history, especially if the account of history was not complete 
and not directly functional to the determination of the matter at hand.183 Jafta J and 
Nkabinde ACJ concurred with the separate judgment of Cameron. Both judges 
generally agreed with the main judgment and the proposed order of the court. 
However, the two judges did not agree with the main judgment on the issue of whether 
section 8(2) of the Constitution imposes a positive obligation on a private landowner 
to ensure that occupiers gain access and enjoy the rights enshrined in chapter 2 of the 
Constitution.184 Despite section 8(2) indicating the possibility that the rights in the Bill 
 
179 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 122-125. See also Brickhill, Finn & 
Moshikaro (2017) Annual Survey of South African Law 172; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro (2017) 
2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.3.1. 
180 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 132. 
181 Para 132. See further Boggenpoel (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 
2.1; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 9; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) 
Annual Survey of South African Law 995; Pienaar (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South 
African Law 2.2. 
182 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 149. See further Pienaar et al (2018) South 
African Public Law 1 9; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey of South African Law 
995; Pienaar (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.2. 
183 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 148-149. See further Boggenpoel (2017) 2 
Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public 
Law 1 9; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey of South African Law 995; Pienaar 
(2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.2; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro (2017) 
Annual Survey of South African Law 172; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly 
Review of South African Law 2.3.1. 
184 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 156. See further Boggenpoel (2017) 2 Juta’s 
Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 9 
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of Rights can bind owners in certain circumstances, Jafta J and Nkabinde ACJ found 
that section 8(2) could not be construed to impose any positive obligation on 
owners.185 According to Jafta J and Nkabinde ACJ, Ms Daniels sought to prevent an 
owner from unreasonably interfering with her right to reside on the property accorded 
to her by ESTA.186 This meant that an owner had only a negative obligation to refrain 
from impairing Ms Daniels’ right to housing.187 
Finally, Zondo J agreed with the order of the court in the main judgment. Most 
importantly, Zondo J noted that sections 5 and 6 of ESTA necessitate the importation 
of the principles of equity and fairness into the owner-occupier relationship.188 As such, 
a just and equitable balance had to be struck between the rights of an occupier and 
those of an owner. This was especially so if the dispute between the owner and the 
occupier was that the occupier wanted to effect improvements to make the property 
belonging to the owner habitable without the necessary consent from the owner.189 In 
essence, the main judgment shows that an owner can, in certain instances, bear a 
positive obligation in respect of the Bill of Rights to ensure that occupiers enjoy those 
rights. In this respect, the decision is in line with the ideology that our constitutional 
 
Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey of South African Law 995; Pienaar (2017) 2 
Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.2. 
185 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 156 and 162. See further Boggenpoel 
(2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Pienaar et al (2018) South African 
Public Law 1 9; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey of South African Law 995; 
Pienaar (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.2. 
186 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 203. 
187 Paras 193-194 and 201. See further Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 10; 
Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey of South African Law 996; Pienaar (2017) 2 
Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.2; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro (2017) Annual 
Survey of South African Law 171; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review 
of South African Law 2.3.1. 
188 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 216. See further Boggenpoel (2017) 2 Juta’s 
Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 
10; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey of South African Law 997; Pienaar (2017) 
2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.2. 
189 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 217. See further Pienaar et al (2018) South 
African Public Law 1 10; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey of South African 
Law 997; Pienaar (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.2; Brickhill, Finn & 
Moshikaro (2017) Annual Survey of South African Law 172; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro (2017) 
2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.3.1. 
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dispensation recognises that ownership of land comes with certain obligations or 
responsibilities.190 The following subsection further shows that the obligation to ensure 
habitability may be informed by taking into consideration section 39(2) of the 
Constitution. 
 
5 4 2 2 Taking account of section 39(2) 
In Daniels, the rights in the Bill of Rights were implicated in two ways. Firstly, Ms 
Daniels had the right to have her human dignity respected and protected under section 
10 of the Constitution, supported by section 5 of ESTA.191 Secondly, Ms Daniels had 
the right to security of tenure in terms of section 25(6) of the Constitution as given 
effect to by ESTA (section 6(2)(a)).192 Jafta J in Daniels disagreed in terms of whether 
the Constitution imposes a positive obligation on a private owner to enable occupiers 
to gain access to and enjoy the rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights seem to place 
the focus only on section 8(2) of the Constitution.193 His disagreement disregards the 
injunction of section 39(2) of the Constitution, which requires the court to interpret 
 
190 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 135, citing Port Elizabeth Municipality v 
Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 23. See further Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 
SA 329 (CC) para 35; City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W) 
para 28; Jordaan v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality; City of Tshwane Metropolitan 
Municipality v New Ventures Consulting & Services (Pty) Limited; Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality v Livanos 2017 6 SA 287 (CC) para 51; City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 2 SA 104 (CC) paras 34-40 and 
97; City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Link Africa (Pty) Ltd 2015 6 SA 440 (CC) paras 
59, 64, 102, 106, and 108-110; Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic 
Development, Eastern Cape 2015 6 SA 125 (CC) para 50; AJ van der Walt Property and 
Constitution (2012) 22; Boggenpoel (2017) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 
2.1; Boggenpoel (2019) Stellenbosch Law Review 234 238 and 248-249; Liebenberg “South 
Africa: Adjudicating Social Rights under a Transformative Constitution” in Social Rights 
Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law 79; Pienaar (2017) 3 
Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.2; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public 
Law 1 13; Morare (2017) Land Digest 1 1; KK Noko A Critical Analysis of the Constitutional 
Concept of Property in Light of the Judgment in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for 
Economic Development, Eastern Cape 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC), LLM thesis, University of 
KwaZulu-Natal (2018) 52. 
191 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 3 and 26. 
192 Paras 3 and 12-13. 
193 Paras 156-203 (per Jafta J). 
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ESTA through the prism of the Bill of Rights.194 When ESTA is interpreted in light of 
the Bill of Rights, it would bring private relationships between occupiers and owners in 
line with the Constitution. The Constitution, therefore, regulates the relations between 
the owners and the occupiers. Consequently, the obligations imposed by the 
Constitution, in particular sections 10, 25(6) and 26 of the Constitution, must be 
complied with and fulfilled by private landowners,195 if the nature and obligations 
imposed by sections 10, 25(6) and 26 applies to the private landowner.196 In light of 
the imperatives of these sections, weighed against the need of an occupier to have 
his or her dwelling improved in order to achieve a standard of living that provides 
human dignity, it would arguably be justifiable to impose a positive obligation on the 
owner to ensure habitability. This would be in line with promoting the spirit, purport 
and objectives of the Constitution.197 
According to Rautenbach, when a purposive interpretation of the Constitution is 
done in light of section 39(1)(a) of the Constitution, it also results in the imposition of 
a positive obligation on owners to give effect to socio-economic rights. This is arguably 
in line with the purposive value-based interpretation prescribed by the Constitution.198 
For example, a purposive value-based interpretation can place a positive obligation in 
terms of habitability on owners when a court interpreting the Bill of Rights promotes 
the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom.199 In Daniels, this would mean that the owner – at his own cost 
– could be compelled to make certain improvements to the dwelling to make it 
habitable and compatible with human dignity. The improvements were not luxurious 
items, but basic human amenities.200 Where the landowner has failed in his or her 
 
194 See Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors 
(Pty) Ltd; In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) para 21; 
referred to in Minister of Safety & Security v Sekhoto 2011 5 SA 367 (SCA) para 15. 
195 Section 2 of the Constitution. 
196 Section 8(2). 
197 Section 39(2). 
198 Rautenbach (2017) Litnet Akademies 959, 964-965 and 968-969. See also Matatiele 
Municipality v President of the Republic of South Africa 2007 6 SA 477 (CC) para 36; CJ Botha 
Value-Activating Constitutional Interpretation: The Embodiment of the Material Rule of Law 
LLD dissertation, University of Pretoria (1991) 60-61. 
199 See section 39(1)(a) of the Constitution. See further Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 
(CC) paras 48-49; Rautenbach (2017) Litnet Akademies 959 959. 
200 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 7. 
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obligation to ensure that the dwelling is habitable, according to the court in Daniels, an 
occupier who wishes to bring a dwelling to a standard that is habitable and conforms 
to human dignity (in terms of section 5(a) of ESTA) could, without the owner’s consent, 
effect improvements necessary to achieve the desired standard.201 If the obligation is 
on the owner, the occupier may arguably be able to claim back the amount for the 
improvements if she effected them. Whether compensation will be ordered will depend 
on the need of an occupier to improve his or her dwelling to a standard that provides 
him or her with human dignity.202 
Canca AJ in the Mtenje judgment similarly found merit in the argument that the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, and the provisions of section 5 of ESTA, 
do impose a positive obligation on landowners to ensure ESTA occupiers live in 
habitable dwellings and consonant with the right to human dignity.203 According to the 
court in Mtenje, a purposive interpretation of the Constitution and the provisions of 
ESTA that would result in imposing a positive obligation on the owner meant that an 
occupier could not be expected to carry out the financial constraint of building a 
structure that complied with the title deed of the property.204 However, the occupier 
could erect an informal structure to replace those tents that had worn out, so as to 
have a structure that is habitable and provides the occupier with a certain level of 
human dignity.205 The cases of Daniels and Mtenje are not different in principle as the 
occupiers in both cases primarily wanted to inhabit a dwelling that is in a habitable 
condition and safeguard their human dignity in the process.206 The cases are not clear 
that the responsibility to ensure that occupiers live in habitable dwellings lies with the 
owner. Some judges differ, some cases differ, but the argument is that the 
responsibility should be on the owner. The following subsection provides reasons why 
it is important to hold private landowners liable to ensure habitability. 
 
 
201 Paras 32 and 60. See also Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro (2017) Annual Survey of South 
African Law 169; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro (2017) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African 
Law 2.3.1. 
202 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 51. 
203 Erasmus v Mtenje (LCC 202/2017) [2018] ZALCC 12 (12 June 2018) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/12.html> para 32. 
204 Para 32. 
205 Paras 34-35. 
206 Paras 34-35. 
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5 4 3 Reasons why an obligation to ensure habitability should be imposed on private 
landowners 
As a starting point, for landowners to be held accountable for the habitability of 
dwellings for occupiers, it will depend on the considerations mentioned by the court in 
Daniels.207 The owner should arguably also be held responsible to ensure habitability 
because he or she owns the land and all the attachments to the land. As such, 
ownership of land comes with certain obligations or responsibilities.208 One such 
obligation could be ensuring that property is in a habitable state so that it may be 
suitable to live in. 
Another reason for imposing the obligation to ensure habitability of dwellings that 
occupiers inhabit would be the fact that the owner is best placed to decide what 
happens on the land. This is basically why in Daniels the court ordered the occupier 
and the landowner to meaningfully engage with each other regarding the 
improvements which were necessary to ensure that the occupier lived in habitable 
conditions that accords with human dignity. 
Moreover, the landowner could be obliged to place the dwelling in a habitable 
condition because when the occupier leaves, the buildings and all its attachments 
remain behind and essentially revert back to the possession of the owner. 
Furthermore, the occupier-landowner relationship is based on initial consent (express 
or tacit) of the owner or a right in law (ie the owner granted permission for the occupier 
to live and work on the farm). If the property owner or person in charge out of his own 
will allowed the occupier to live in his or her land, it could be argued that the property 
has to be liveable, in other words, habitable. A longer period of occupation and/or 
service by occupiers could also be an indication why a landowner may be held liable 
to keep the dwelling in a habitable condition. 
In the final instance, where constitutional rights are implicated, the argument that 
property should be seen to fulfil a social function carries more weight to hold 
landowners liable to ensure habitability.209 The social obligation of ownership means 
 
207 See part 5 4 2 1 above. 
208 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) para 35. 
209 Para 135. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
159 
that rights in property come with a share in certain responsibilities.210 Thus, in 
instances where constitutional rights are implicated, the social obligation of property 
in contrast to the notion of absolute ownership has been used to argue for the limitation 
on the use of property by its owner and/or the imposition of an obligation on a private 
owner to provide others with constitutional rights.211 In the constitutional dispensation, 
property arguably also safeguards non-property constitutional rights like human dignity 
and is therefore not only aimed at protecting purely economic or private interests.212 
The argument in favour of the social function of property is usually made where there 
are competing constitutional rights and/or interests of occupiers and landowners.213 In 
those circumstances, the argument is used to reconcile and balance the interests of 
the owner with those of occupiers in order to promote democratic rights and human 
flourishing.214 It should be mentioned that whether the owner may bear the obligation 
to ensure habitability should be decided on a case-by-case basis taking into the 
account the relevant circumstances of the occupier. The following subsection builds 
on the narrative of what can be expected of landowners. 
 
5 4 4 Obligations of a private landowner: Building on the narrative of what can be 
expected of owners in Baron 
The place of ownership and the obligations that ownership imposes in our 
constitutional dispensation is further captured by the case of Baron. It should be noted 
 
210 Dhliwayo & Dyal-Chand “Property in Law” in Transformative Property Law: Festschrift in 
Honour of AJ van der Walt (2018) 309. 
211 309. See further MC Mirow “The Social-Obligation Norm of Property: Duguit, Hayem and 
Others” (2010) 22 Florida Journal of International Law 191 192; GS Alexander “Pluralism and 
Property” (2011) 80 Fordham Law Review 1017 1022-1023; C Crawford “The Social Function 
of Property and the Human Capacity to Flourish” (2011) 80 Fordham Law Review 1089 1089-
1134. 
212 AJ van der Walt The Law of Servitudes (2016) 41. 
213 Dhliwayo & Dyal-Chand “Property in Law” in Transformative Property Law: Festschrift in 
Honour of AJ van der Walt 309; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 
217 (CC) para 23; Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essay NO (CCT 
29/10) [2011] ZACC 13 (11 April 2011) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2011/13.html> para 70; Nolan (2014) International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 84. 
214 Dhliwayo & Dyal-Chand “Property in Law” Transformative Property Law: Festschrift in 
Honour of AJ van der Walt 309. See also Crawford (2011) Fordham Law Review 1089-1134. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
160 
that although the case does not deal with the habitability of a dwelling, it adds to the 
narrative of what can be expected of owners in relation to occupiers. In Baron, the 
occupiers were evicted from private land.215 The court had to consider whether the 
eviction of the occupiers complied with section 10 of ESTA. More specifically, the court 
had to determine whether the granting of the eviction order against the occupiers was 
just and equitable.216 The occupiers were all former workers of the brick manufacturing 
business on the farm. The occupiers were thus entitled to reside in housing units on 
the farm for the duration of their employment.217 The employment of the occupiers was 
terminated based on misconduct on their part.218 The occupiers’ housing was 
supposed to be linked to their employment. However, the occupiers continued to 
reside in the housing units on the farm, although the occupiers were no longer 
employed by the owner for years.219 The owner gave the occupiers written eviction 
notices to vacate the farm. However, the occupiers failed to comply with the notices 
and continued to reside on the farm.220 As a result, the owner instituted eviction 
proceedings in the Magistrate’s Court against the occupiers. 
 
215 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) para 1. 
216 Paras 2 and 4. See further Boggenpoel (2017) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African 
Law 2.1; Pienaar (2017) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.2; Van der Merwe 
& Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey of South African Law 999; Pienaar et al (2018) South African 
Public Law 1 11. 
217 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) para 8. See further Boggenpoel (2017) 3 
Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Pienaar (2017) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review 
of South African Law 2.2; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey of South African 
Law 999; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 11; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro 
(2017) Annual Survey of South African Law 172. 
218 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) para 8. See further Boggenpoel (2017) Juta’s 
Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey 
of South African Law 999; Pienaar (2017) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.2; 
Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 11; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro (2017) Annual 
Survey of South African Law 172. 
219 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) para 9. See further Boggenpoel (2017) 3 
Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Pienaar (2017) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review 
of South African Law 2.2; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey of South African 
Law 999; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 11. 
220 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) para 9. See further Boggenpoel (2017) 3 
Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual 
Survey of South African Law 999; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 11. 
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After considering the interests of the occupiers and the owner, the Magistrate’s 
Court granted the eviction order as it was just and equitable to order so in the 
circumstances.221 The occupiers were ordered to vacate the premises for the following 
reasons. Firstly, the owner had housed the occupiers free of charge for too long 
despite the fact that the occupiers’ employment had been fairly and lawfully 
terminated. Secondly, the owner needed the houses for its new employees as it 
experienced delays in production due to the late coming of the new workers. Thirdly, 
the new workers were sometimes absent from work due to lack of worker’s 
accommodation on the farm. Finally, the state indicated that it would make provision 
for alternative housing for the occupiers.222 
The order of the Magistrate’s Court was sent for automatic review to the Land 
Claims Court. The Land Claims Court confirmed the eviction order of the Magistrate’s 
Court.223 The occupiers appealed to the Land Claims Court and the appeal was 
dismissed. The Land Claims Court mentioned that the constitutional obligation to 
ensure access to adequate housing rested solely on the state and not on private 
landowners.224 The Land Claims Court concluded that the owner had already housed 
the occupiers for years, and it was supposed to be the state’s responsibility to provide 
 
221 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) para 9. See further Boggenpoel (2017) 3 
Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Pienaar (2017) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review 
of South African Law 2.2; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey of South African 
Law 999; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 11-12; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro 
(2017) Annual Survey of South African Law 172. 
222 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) paras 13-14. See further Boggenpoel (2017) 
3 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Pienaar (2017) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review 
of South African Law 2.2; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey of South African 
Law 1000; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 12. 
223 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) para 15. See further Boggenpoel (2017) 3 
Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Pienaar (2017) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review 
of South African Law 2.2; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey of South African 
Law 1000; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 12; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro 
(2017) Annual Survey of South African Law 172. 
224 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) para 17. See further Boggenpoel (2017) 3 
Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Pienaar (2017) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review 
of South African Law 2.2; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey of South African 
Law 1000; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 12. 
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housing for the occupiers.225 As there was an immediate need for the owner to use 
the housing units to accommodate its new workers, the appeal had to fail. The 
occupiers made an application to the Supreme Court of Appeal for special leave to 
dismiss the appeal of the Land Claims Court. The Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed 
the application on the ground that the requirements for special leave to appeal were 
not met.226 
The occupiers approached the Constitutional Court for relief. The issues to be 
considered by the Constitutional Court, amongst others, was whether a private 
landowner had an obligation to provide alternative accommodation to evicted 
occupiers.227 It is important to note that the question of whether a private owner could 
provide suitable alternative accommodation to occupiers after an eviction in terms of 
ESTA was not directly at issue in Baron because the state was joined in the 
proceedings and the question of a positive obligation on the owners was eventually 
purely academic.228 The case is nonetheless interesting because the court found that 
it was in the interest of justice to decide the case on the issue of alternative housing 
to bring about legal certainty regarding the obligations of the state and private 
landowners in these and similar circumstances, where occupiers have been evicted in 
terms of ESTA.229 
The court went on to deal with the obligation of a private landowner to provide 
alternative housing for occupiers. It acknowledged in line with the case of Daniels that 
 
225 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) para 18. See further Boggenpoel (2017) 3 
Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Pienaar (2017) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review 
of South African Law 2.2; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey of South African 
Law 1000; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 12. 
226 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) para 22. See also Boggenpoel (2017) 3 
Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro (2017) Annual 
Survey of South African Law 173. 
227 See Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) para 28. See also Boggenpoel (2017) 
3 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1. 
228 Boggenpoel (2017) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1. 
229 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) para 29. See also Boggenpoel (2017) 3 
Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Pienaar (2017) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review 
of South African Law 2.2; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey of South African 
Law 1001. 
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ESTA can, in certain instances, place a positive obligation on a private landowner.230 
It should be noted that although a landowner can bear a positive obligation in terms of 
constitutional rights as held in Daniels, that does not imply that owners should carry 
out similar obligations as the state so that constitutional obligations may be fulfilled.231 
The court in Baron concluded that where a private owner wants to evict an occupier 
and there had been no breach or breakdown of the employment relationship, it would 
be appropriate to expect a private landowner to assist in finding alternative 
accommodation.232 An owner could be required to provide suitable alternative 
accommodation to evicted occupiers.233 It should be noted that imposing an obligation 
on the owner to provide, or help to find, suitable accommodation is a context-sensitive 
enquiry, with due regard to all relevant circumstances.234 As such, an owner could only 
be excluded from liability in circumstances where there was a breach of the 
employment relationship. In casu, the employment relationship had broken down and 
 
230 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) para 31. See further Boggenpoel (2017) 3 
Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Pienaar (2017) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review 
of South African Law 2.2; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey of South African 
Law 1001; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 13; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro 
(2017) Annual Survey of South African Law 173. 
231 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) para 35. See further Lynn v Nene 
(LCC95/2016) [2018] ZALCC 21 (29 January 2018) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/21.html> para 61; Pienaar (2017) 3 Juta’s 
Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.2; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey 
of South African Law 1001; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 13; Brickhill, Finn 
& Moshikaro (2017) Annual Survey of South African Law 173. 
232 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) para 37. See further Boggenpoel (2017) 3 
Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Pienaar (2017) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review 
of South African Law 2.2; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey of South African 
Law 1002; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 14; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro 
(2017) Annual Survey of South African Law 173. 
233 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) para 37. See further Boggenpoel (2017) 3 
Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual 
Survey of South African Law 1002; Pienaar (2017) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African 
Law 2.2; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 14; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro (2017) 
Annual Survey of South African Law 173. 
234 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) para 37. See further Pienaar (2017) 3 Juta’s 
Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.2; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey 
of South African Law 1002; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 14. 
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the contract of employment was lawfully terminated. Consequently, the owner could 
no longer be saddled with an obligation to provide free housing to the occupiers.235 
The court cited various cases as authority for the view that it cannot be expected of 
a private landowner to provide housing indefinitely to occupiers who have been legally 
evicted and an offer of alternative accommodation has been made by the state.236 The 
court found that where an offer of alternative suitable accommodation had been made 
by the state, the occupiers cannot delay their eviction any further by stating that they 
find the alternative accommodation offered by the state to be unsuitable.237 It is 
important to point out that the obligation to provide alternative suitable accommodation 
cannot be avoided simply by submitting reports stating that housing is not available.238 
As the state had offered alternative housing units to the occupiers within its available 
resources, the court found the accommodation to be suitable and ordered that the 
occupiers vacate the owner’s property.239 
Although the Baron judgment dealt with the responsibility to provide alternative 
accommodation in the eviction context, it is interesting in so far as it can be expected 
in certain instances for a landowner to accommodate occupiers on his land. This is 
because the Baron case made a principled decision on where the landowner’s 
obligation to provide housing to occupiers should start and stop. An owner’s positive 
obligation to provide housing for occupiers seems to start when a relationship has 
 
235 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) para 37. See also Boggenpoel (2017) 3 
Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1. 
236 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) paras 41 and 43, citing City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 2 SA 104 (CC) para 
40. See further Pienaar (2017) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.2; Van der 
Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey of South African Law 1002; Pienaar et al (2018) South 
African Public Law 1 14; Brickhill, Finn & Moshikaro (2017) Annual Survey of South African 
Law 173. 
237 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) paras 43 and 50. See also Pienaar (2017) 
3 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.2; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual 
Survey of South African Law 1003; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 14. 
238 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) para 46. See further Pienaar (2017) 3 Juta’s 
Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.2; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual Survey 
of South African Law 1002; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 14. 
239 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) para 50. See further Boggenpoel (2017) 3 
Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1; Van der Merwe & Pienaar (2017) Annual 
Survey of South African Law 1003; Pienaar (2017) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African 
Law 2.2; Pienaar et al (2018) South African Public Law 1 15. 
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been legally established between the owner and occupier. The existence of a 
relationship impacts on a landowner’s responsibility in this regard. If he fails to house 
an occupier, the owner could be held liable to provide housing as enjoined by the 
Constitution through ESTA.240 Baron also indicates that an owner’s obligation to 
provide housing ends when an occupier’s employment or occupation has been 
terminated fairly and lawfully.241 Furthermore, Baron also shows when the state should 
begin its obligation to provide housing to evicted occupiers, which is when the 
employment or occupation of the occupier has been legally terminated.242 
Another interesting aspect of the Baron case is that it indicates the application of 
the Bill of Rights between private persons, and the application of the Bill of Rights 
between the state and private persons. According to the court, the Bill of Rights should 
not be applied rigidly because a rigid application sometimes leads to avoidance of 
addressing the real issue,243 which is when it can be expected of private landowners 
to provide housing to evicted occupiers in the context of ESTA.244 The case of Baron 
points out that in instances where it is justifiable to impose a positive obligation on the 
owner to provide rights, this should be done in line with the Constitution.245 
 
5 4 5 Concluding remarks 
In light of the reasons given above why landowners may be liable to ensure habitability 
of dwelling inhabited by occupiers, I would argue that the obligation to ensure 
habitability should primarily rest on the landowner (and not the state). Regardless of 
whether an owner will be bound to ensure habitability, the enquiry should initially start 
with questioning whether the owner is enjoined in terms of section 25(6) of the 
Constitution through ESTA to accommodate the occupier. If the landowner makes the 
property available out of his or her own accord, the result is that a right to reside on 
and use the property belonging to the landowner ensues. Therefore, if the property is 
 
240 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) para 35. 
241 Para 14. 
242 Paras 35, 37-38, 40 and 46. 
243 Para 36. See also Boggenpoel (2017) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1. 
244 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) para 36. See also Boggenpoel (2017) 3 
Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1. 
245 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) para 36. See also Boggenpoel (2017) 3 
Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1. 
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made available to reside on, it must equally be habitable in line with ESTA. In light of 
this, the primary obligation to provide a habitable dwelling should arguably rest on the 
landowner in certain instances, not the state. The standard for assessing whether the 
landowner should bear the obligation to ensure habitability is reasonableness. 
The circumstances that may be taken into consideration whether the owner should 
be responsible to ensure habitability include the following: (a) whether the owner 
granted the occupier consent to reside in the dwelling; (b) the fact that the owner owns 
the property and that ownership of land has certain responsibilities; (c) the owner is in 
the best position to decide what happens on the property; (d) the social function that 
property should play in the new constitutional dispensation; (e) upon departure of the 
occupier the owner regains possession; (f) the occupier cannot be expected to carry 
the costs of improving the dwelling due to being poor; and (g) the financial position of 
the owner to build a dwelling which complies with conditions of habitability and human 
dignity. Here again, it should be mentioned that whether a landowner may or may not 
be saddled with a positive obligation to ensure habitability in the context of occupiers 
will depend on the circumstances of the case. 
It is clear that the obligation to ensure habitability on the landowner is as a result of 
a balancing exercise between constitutionally protected property rights, tenure rights 
and/or housing rights that are necessary for the purposes of ESTA. In an instance 
where there are conflicting rights between parties, the Constitution also obliges the 
courts to recognise the injustices of the past and promote constitutional values such 
as human dignity, equality and freedom.246 This entails taking into account rights or 
interests that could not legitimately stand up against ownership.247 In this regard, the 
Constitution provides both landowners and occupiers with a right not to be subjected 
to arbitrary deprivation of property.248 The courts recognise that there may at times be 
competing interests between landowners and occupiers in serious need of housing.249 
In such circumstances, the Constitution places an obligation on the courts to assist 
 
246 See chapter 5 above. 
247 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 23. 
248 Section 25(1) of the Constitution. This section provides that “[n]o one may be deprived of 
property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary 
deprivation of property.” 
249 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 23. 
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occupiers who are confronted with uninhabitable conditions.250 This is achieved when 
the courts apply the principles of equity, fairness and justice to the occupier-landowner 
relationship with the ultimate purpose of balancing the competing rights of occupiers 
and owners. For example, this may apply in a case where there is a dispute between 
an owner and an occupier as a result of the occupier desiring to effect improvements 
to the dwelling at his or her own cost to make it habitable. However, the landowner 
may then demand that improvements should not be effected on the basis that the 
owner did not permit such improvements to the dwelling, as shown in Daniels.251 The 
same arguably applies where the occupier wants the owner to effect the improvements 
and foot the bill at the owner’s cost. 
Ultimately, the main principle that will make an owner shoulder the obligation to 
ensure habitability for occupiers is still the general requirement of section 8(2) of the 
Constitution, which holds that constitutional rights will bind private actors only if the 
right in question is applicable in the circumstances.252 This should not be construed to 
mean that the landowner would always be responsible in the context of occupiers to 
ensure that the dwelling is habitable. 
If it is clear that the owner cannot provide habitable housing, the courts should make 
a pronouncement on when the state is duty bound in this regard, for example, on the 
evidence that the owner has reasonably done everything he or she can, but still, there 
are insufficient resources at the owner’s disposal to ensure habitability. It has to be 
noted that where constitutional rights are at stake, the state should bear the obligation 
to ensure habitability. It is therefore suggested that factual situations akin to those that 
emerged in Daniels should, in South African law, be approached from the perspective 
of a purposive value-based interpretation in terms of section 39(2) of the 
Constitution.253 This would entail that, if Ms Daniels did not (or could not) make the 
improvements, the court should compel the landowner to carry the cost of 
improvements to make the dwelling fit for human habitation and not constitute an 
infringement of Ms Daniels’s right to human dignity. In this regard, it would not be 
inappropriate or unreasonable to compel the owner as the improvements were basic 
 
250 Compare Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W) paras 1 and 54. 
251 See Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC). 
252 See chapter 2 and 5 above. 
253 See chapter 2 and 5 above. 
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human amenities and the landowner conceded that the dwelling did not accord Ms 
Daniels with the necessary human dignity. 
 
5 5 Conclusion 
Habitability for occupiers is not defined in ESTA. The case of Daniels has defined 
habitability for occupiers. In this context, habitability was defined to mean the right to 
reside on and use a dwelling belonging to another. Furthermore, habitability was said 
to imply a certain level of security of tenure. Habitability was defined to include the 
right to make improvements, reasonably necessary, to bring a dwelling to a standard 
befitting human dignity.254 This constitutes an individual standard of habitability for 
occupiers in this context, and it is a welcome milestone for the protection of occupiers’ 
rights in South Africa. The Constitution directly gave the result of the existing standard 
of habitability for occupiers in Daniels. The impact of the Constitution on the standard 
of habitability indicates that the right of an occupier to reside on another’s property 
must be consonant with other fundamental rights contained in the Constitution and 
ESTA, but as the Daniels case shows, human dignity in particular.255 More importantly, 
the impact of the Constitution on the standard of habitability shows that, for occupiers, 
it is about adequate housing that provides security of tenure, habitability and protects 
human dignity.256 The link between these rights implies a constitutional minimum 
standard of habitability for occupiers derived from the Constitution and given effect to 
by ESTA. This link forms what would be constitutional imperatives that occupiers can 
rely on to hold landowners liable for failure or neglect to maintain a dwelling in a 
habitable condition. 
The obligation to ensure habitability is further informed by constitutional 
imperatives, but this time, guided by the constitutional provisions of sections 8(2) and 
39(2) of the Constitution. This will give the right bearer the necessary protection to 
enjoy access to socio-economic resources and basic amenities necessitated by social 
rights.257 The enquiry of whether the landowner or the state will bear a positive 
obligation to ensure habitability for occupiers is further guided by the following factors. 
 
254 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 32. 
255 Para 31. 
256 Paras 31-34. 
257 See chapter 2 above. 
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These factors include the nature of the right; the historical background of the right; the 
purpose of the right and the best way to achieve that purpose; the possibility that the 
right can be impaired by a private person other than the state; and whether by 
imposing a positive obligation on the private landowner it will result in affecting the 
essential core entitlements that are attached to the right at hand.258 
The other reasons for why an obligation to ensure habitability may potentially rest 
on the owner include the social function that property plays in the constitutional 
dispensation, the existence of a right of residence, the owner owns the land and 
therefore has the power to decide what happens with the property, and the owner’s 
right to possession is temporarily limited until the occupiers vacate the land. These 
reasons will serve as an appropriate manner to reconcile and balance the owner’s 
interests with those of occupiers so that democratic rights may be promoted.259 More 
importantly, the above-mentioned reasons may ensure that the quality of life of 
occupiers is taken into account and will enable the position of occupiers to be subject 
to substantial improvement. It can therefore be said that the obligation to ensure 
habitability for occupiers depends on the facts of each case. 
It has become clearer that the Constitutional Court is more willing to take vigorous 
strides to protect constitutional rights.260 This is evident from the Daniels case, which 
gave effect to the right to security of tenure and human dignity. In terms of the scope 
and nature of the right to security of tenure, the Constitutional Court adopted a 
purposive interpretation of security of tenure as envisaged by the Constitution and 
given effect to by ESTA.261 The court found that an occupiers’ right to security of tenure 
means that the dwelling must be habitable, which in turn implies that the occupier is 
entitled to make reasonable and necessary improvements on the dwelling to ensure 
its habitability without the owner’s consent.262 The court further mentioned that ESTA 
could, in certain circumstances, impose a positive obligation on the owner to ensure 
 
258 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 39. 
259 Dhliwayo & R Dyal-Chand “Property in Law” in Transformative Property Law: Festschrift in 
Honour of AJ van der Walt 309. 
260 CM van Heerden & A Boraine “Reading Procedure and Substance into the Basic Right to 
Security of Tenure” (2006) 39 De Jure 319 351. 
261 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 23-24. 
262 Para 32. 
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that occupiers have secure tenure.263 The standard of whether or not to place a 
positive obligation on a private landowner is reasonableness. Where the obligation 
requires the owner to spend money unreasonably, the state should be called upon to 
assist occupiers.264 
Nevertheless, it is submitted that the case of Daniels is context specific.265 Thus, 
the attempt of the court to afford occupiers the security of tenure and human dignity 
that eluded most of them throughout the colonial and apartheid regimes, through 
adopting an interpretation that best advances the noble purpose of section 25(6) and 
ESTA, should not be seen as a blanket application to future cases. The question that 
arises is how the protection given to Ms Daniels can or should be given by courts in 
future cases, especially where the occupier requires the owner to be the one who must 
bring the dwelling to a habitable standard at the owner’s cost. The Land Claims 
Court266 and the Supreme Court of Appeal267 have taken a similar stance as the 
Constitutional Court in light of the dignity ratio in Daniels. These courts applied the 
case of Daniels and held that an occupier’s right to reside on and use a dwelling 
belonging to another entitles occupiers to live on the property of the owner with human 
dignity.268 
Although the Constitutional Court may have had one particular occupier in mind, 
namely those that can effect the basic improvements at their own cost, it is apparent 
that the Daniels case does have implications for occupiers who may require the owner 
to bear the costs of improvements. This is so, as it does not discriminate or exclude 
between the right of security of tenure and human dignity enjoyed by an occupier who 
can in fact make improvements and the one who may need the owner to carry out 
improvements. It must be emphasised here again, as the court pointed out in Daniels, 
that an owner’s consent is not a requirement for an occupier to exercise his or her right 
to make necessary reasonable improvements to the dwelling, but the occupier and the 
 
263 Paras 49 and 39. 
264 Para 40. 
265 Boggenpoel (2017) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law 2.1. 
266 See Erasmus v Mtenje (LCC 202/2017) [2018] ZALCC 12 (12 June 2018) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/12.html> paras 18-19 and 32-38. 
267 See Oranje v Rouxlandia Investments (Pty) Ltd 2019 3 SA 108 (SCA) paras 15-18. 
268 Erasmus v Mtenje (LCC 202/2017) [2018] ZALCC 12 (12 June 2018) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/12.html> para 19; Oranje v Rouxlandia 
Investments (Pty) Ltd 2019 3 SA 108 (SCA) para 16. 
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owner must meaningfully engage with each other regarding the improvements to be 




269 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 61-65. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION – TOWARDS A COMMON (OR MINIMUM) 
STANDARD OF HABITABILITY? 
6 1 Introduction 
The habitability of dwellings rented, occupied with permission from the owner, or in 
terms of a right in law is important. Broadly speaking, this is because a dwelling can 
arguably not be useful to an occupant if it is not habitable. It is important to note that 
not only is the dwelling not useful to the inhabitant, but to provide occupants with 
uninhabitable dwellings does not comply with South African law. Establishing an 
adequate and sufficient definition of habitability in the context where one person 
occupies the property of another is therefore crucial. What do we mean when we say 
that a dwelling must be habitable, and more importantly, according to what standard 
do we measure this notion of habitability? Clearly, on a basic level, a dwelling has to 
be properly looked after, presumably by the owner, to ensure that it is habitable. 
Property owners, as apparent from the decisions in Mpange v Sithole (“Mpange”)1 and 
Daniels v Scribante (“Daniels”),2 have consistently and deliberately neglected or 
refused to provide tenants and occupiers with dwellings that comply with what the 
court has termed “habitability”. The denial of dwellings that comply with habitability to 
these type of inhabitants seems to be based on the common law (for instance in the 
context of tenants and usufructuaries) and legislation (in the context of occupiers). The 
common law (regulating tenants and usufructuaries) and legislation (regulating 
occupiers) do not recognise that the right to live in a habitable dwelling could 
legitimately stand up against ownership. The common law and legislation in the 
respective contexts primarily recognised the right of ownership to be at the pinnacle 
of all rights, interests and/or entitlements and as such, the property owner could do as 
he or she pleases with his or her property. If the dwelling is not habitable, the inhabitant 
can either continue to stay in the premises or choose to vacate the dwelling due to the 
property being in an unacceptable condition. It is therefore unsurprising to see that 
when the above-mentioned cases came before the courts, the necessity to protect the 
tenants’ and occupiers’ right to a habitable dwelling while occupying property 
belonging to another was clear. It was these cases, namely Mpange and Daniels that 
 
1 Mpange v Sithole 2007 6 SA 578 (W). 
2 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC). 
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initially sparked the interest in this dissertation. It is still not clear what would constitute 
a “habitable” dwelling, especially regarding the question of whether different contexts 
would necessitate different meanings of habitability. Would a dwelling be habitable in 
one context and fail to comply with habitability in another? Or should there be a 
common standard that should determine that all dwellings made available to another 
by an owner for residential purposes comply with a basic level of habitability? More 
importantly, it is necessary to provide clarity on a particular minimum standard for the 
type of inhabitants in Mpange and Daniels, but also other contexts where owners make 
their dwellings available to others for residential purposes. To answer these questions, 
it was necessary to assess three categories of inhabitants in which the question of a 
minimum or common standard of habitability potentially arises. To achieve this goal, 
the dissertation is divided into six chapters. 
Chapter 1 sets out the research aims that are addressed by the dissertation. The 
first aim of the dissertation is to provide a comparison between tenants, usufructuaries 
and occupiers in South Africa as categories of inhabitants that occupy property 
belonging to another. The second aim is to determine whether a common or more 
importantly, a minimum, standard of habitability exists for tenants, usufructuaries and 
occupiers in South African law. The third aim is to consider whether a common 
standard of habitability for tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers in South African law 
can be derived from the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(“Constitution”). In the fourth place, the dissertation aims to investigate whether the 
obligation to ensure habitability for tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers rests on the 
owner of the property, or the state, or even the actual inhabitant of the property. Finally, 
if a minimum standard of habitability is not present in one (or all) of these categories 
of inhabitants, the goal is to determine whether the absence of a minimum standard 
of habitability is (un)constitutional. If unconstitutionality exists because a particular 
category of inhabitant does not comply with a minimum standard of habitability, it is 
necessary to determine the best approach for South African law to the habitability of 
dwellings in that particular category. The following sections of chapter 6 evaluate the 
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6 2 Conclusions from each chapter dealing with the categories of comparison 
6 2 1 Introduction 
In light of the literature and case law concerning habitability of dwellings discussed in 
chapters 3, 4 and 5 of the dissertation, it is clear that no common standard of 
habitability exists across the categories of tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers in 
South African law.3 This is because these inhabitants are not entirely the same and 
the underlying relationship in each context is regulated by different principles and 
sources of law such as the common law as opposed to legislation, which cannot 
wholesale be transplanted from one category of inhabitant to another. However, a 
closer analysis of these type of inhabitants clearly indicates that, at the very least, a 
minimum standard of habitability exists in all three categories. This minimum standard 
is present on the basis of the common law (in terms of tenants and usufructuaries) 
and legislation (in the context of tenants and occupiers) in South African law. Thus, 
the existing minimum standard as pronounced in case law (for example in the context 
of tenants and occupiers) and stipulated in a statute (for instance in the case of 
tenants) is an appropriate approach to habitability in that category of inhabitants. There 
are, however, particular nuances between the categories that will be highlighted 
below. 
 
6 2 2 Conclusions relating to tenants 
For tenants, habitability is essentially based on the common-law requirement that the 
property to be let must be in a condition that is reasonably fit for the purpose for which 
the dwelling was hired. It should be mentioned that the courts in any event in a number 
of cases applied habitability even though it was not a specific requirement. In this 
regard, reference to habitability was essentially an extension of the common-law fit for 
the purpose requirement. Tenants could use this standard to hold the landowner 
responsible to place the dwelling leased in a condition reasonably fit for use unless 
specifically excluded in the lease contract. In terms of the RHA, habitability means that 
the dwelling must be in acceptable living conditions.4 In essence, the dwelling in terms 
 
3 For a similar view, see also Z Boggenpoel & B Slade “Where Is Property? Some Thoughts 
on the Theoretical Implications of Daniels v Scribante” (2020) 10 Constitutional Court Review 
379 391. 
4 See section 13(4) of the RHA. 
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of the RHA must be fit and suitable for human habitation, which reinforces the 
common-law requirement of fit for the purpose. In this respect, the common law and 
the RHA arguably point towards a minimum standard of habitability in the context of 
tenants. However, once the RHAA comes into effect, the common-law position and 
the RHA as it relates to property rented will be changed or amended from the “fit for 
the purpose” requirement specifically to the requirement of “habitability”.5 Therefore, 
a dwelling will be habitable if at the commencement of the lease the dwelling is safe 
and suitable to live in, which includes a structurally sound building with adequate 
space that protects tenants from weather elements, threats to health, and provides the 
tenants, the tenants’ household and visitors with physical safety.6 
The introduction of a minimum standard of habitability for tenants in the RHAA is a 
welcome improvement in the rental housing industry. This is because it will put 
landowners and tenants on notice regarding the condition of the property, especially 
on what the property should look like when the landowner hands it over to the tenant. 
If the property does not display the necessary standard as set out in the RHAA, tenants 
will have the power to bargain for habitable dwellings before the commencement of 
the lease. This will give tenants more protection against unscrupulous landowners and 
the tenants will not be confronted with a residence that is unsafe, undignified and a 
building that is inadequate to live in. Given the authority that courts or tribunals will 
now have due to the express and deliberate inclusion of a standard of habitability in 
the RHAA, and the fact that the standard for tenants is limited to the physical condition 
for which the property is rented in terms of the RHAA, there is a possibility that when 
courts or tribunals interpret habitability under the RHAA the courts or tribunals may 
include other elements to the existing standard.7 This will ensure that other parts of 
the property that go beyond the physical condition of the property, like plumbing, 
gutters and the outside part of the property, which are necessary for the dwelling to be 
habitable, are also covered. This will arguably provide even better protection for 
tenants when it comes to the habitability of the dwelling. 
 
5 See chapter 3 above. 
6 See section 1 of the RHAA. 
7 See S Viljoen The Law of Landlord and Tenant (2016) 200. 
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It is clear that the obligation to ensure habitability for tenants rests on the private 
landowner and not the state or the tenants.8 According to the common-law standard, 
this means that when a tenant enters into a lease agreement, the landowner must 
place and maintain the dwelling in a condition reasonably fit for the purpose for which 
it was let.9 The RHA confirms the common-law obligation by requiring the owner to 
handover and maintain the property leased in acceptable living conditions to ensure 
that the tenants have reasonable use.10 As mentioned already, the common law and 
the RHA obligation of fit for the purpose will be replaced with habitability once the 
RHAA is signed into law. In this regard, an owner will specifically be obliged in terms 
of the RHAA to provide tenants with a dwelling that is in a habitable condition.11 In this 
context, habitable condition means that the dwelling must have adequate space, 
protection from the elements and threats to health, physical safety and the dwelling 
must be sound in terms of its physical structure.12 The owner also has the obligation 
to maintain the existing structure of the dwelling in the same condition for the duration 
of the lease.13 In this context, maintain means to effect repairs that may be necessary 
to ensure that the dwelling is kept in a habitable condition.14 This will provide greater 
protection to tenants in that the landowner will expressly warrant that the dwelling is 
habitable. This means that the property will be safe and suitable for tenants to inhabit. 
If it is not habitable, the tenant will have recourse to the courts and/or tribunals as the 
courts or tribunals have more authority to deal with landowners who fail or neglect to 
place and maintain the property in a proper and habitable condition. Tenants will no 
longer reside on property that is in an unacceptable condition due to their lack of 
bargaining power or fear of being left homeless if they do not accept the property as it 
is. In this regard, the RHAA is assuring in terms of protecting the interests of tenants 
and ensuring that tenants live in habitable conditions. Arguably, the RHAA confirms 
the minimum standard of habitability in this context. 
 
 
8 See chapter 3 above. 
9 See chapter 3 above. 
10 See Section 13(4) of the RHA. 
11 See section 4B(11) of the RHAA. 
12 See section 1 of the RHAA. 
13 See section 4B(11) of the RHAA. 
14 See section 1 of the RHAA. 
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6 2 3 Conclusions relating to usufructuaries 
There is no clear definition of habitability of dwellings in the context of usufructuaries 
in South African law.15 Therefore, we turn to define habitability in the sense of what 
can be crystallised from the interpretation of the common law regarding the fact that 
the dwelling should be fit for human habitation. In this context, fit for human habitation 
means that property subject to a usufruct must be suitable for human beings to live in 
and should be free from defects.16 Habitability in the sense of fit for human habitation 
has been pronounced in case law to mean that the dwelling of a usufruct must be 
placed in a habitable state of repair. In this context, habitable state of repair suggests 
that the usufruct dwelling must be in a safe, liveable and good condition for the duration 
of the usufruct.17 Habitability in the context of the usufructuary relationship further 
implies allowing the usufructuary, with the leave of the court, to effect necessary 
repairs for the benefit of the property. Furthermore, it includes providing the 
usufructuary with accessories that are necessary to live in the dwelling more 
comfortably or accessories that make the property more convenient to use.18 Given 
the reason why a usufruct is granted, such a minimum standard of habitability is 
reasonable. It ensures that the bequest contained in the testator’s will does not end 
prematurely. More importantly, the property remains in good condition in the interest 
of the usufructuary and the heirs.19 In this regard, the common-law construct of a 
usufruct is presumably in line with the Constitution. This is because the usufructuary 
can live in adequate housing that will provide him or her with security of tenure and 
human dignity. However, if the common law is applied rigidly and no allowance is made 
to make improvements aimed at preserving the dwelling in a habitable state, the 
common law may need to be developed. The development of the common law would 
be necessary to ensure that a dwelling is habitable in instances where the court 
unreasonably refuses to lift a restraint in the will so that money is raised to make 
necessary improvements in order to ensure the habitability of the dwelling. 
 
15 See chapter 4 part 4 2 above. 
16 See chapter 4 part 4 2 above. 
17 See chapter 4 part 4 2 above. 
18 See chapter 4 part 4 2 above. 
19 Ex Parte De Douallier (1907) 24 SC 282 283. 
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The obligation to ensure that the property subject to a usufruct is in a habitable state 
of repair in the context of usufructuaries primarily rests on the owner.20 Therefore, an 
owner who grants a usufruct must ensure that the dwelling is placed in a liveable 
condition and that the dwelling is maintained in good repair. In this context, maintain 
in good repair means keeping the property in a reasonable condition and includes 
such repairs that are necessary to ensure that the dwelling is fit for human habitation. 
When the property is in good repair and maintained according to the same standard, 
it will ensure that the usufructuary uses the property for his or her comfort and can 
enjoy benefits arising from the property. In this context, use and enjoyment mean the 
entitlement to use the property subject to a usufruct and acquire fruits that can be 
derived from the continued existence of the dwelling. Thus, for the usufructuary to 
enjoy the usufruct and reap benefits as well, the property must be placed in a habitable 
state of repair by the owner. This will ensure that the dwelling remains useful to the 
usufructuary and in line with South African law in terms of the standard required for 
residential premises. In the context of usufructuaries, the minimum standard of 
habitability is not clearly and explicitly stated. However, notions such as “fit for human 
habitation”, “use and enjoyment of the usufruct” and “maintained in good repair”, 
arguably point towards a possible minimum standard of habitability for usufructuaries. 
 
6 2 4 Conclusions relating to occupiers 
The minimum standard of habitability of dwellings inhabited by occupiers is focused 
on the notion of “reside on” in terms of section 6(1) of ESTA as seen in Daniels.21 
Thus, the fact that an occupier resides on and uses the property of the owner implies, 
at the very least, that the dwelling should be habitable.22 This is by far the category of 
inhabitant where the notion was developed very clearly and explicitly relying on the 
Constitution. It is clear in this context that the notion of habitability includes making 
improvements without the landowner’s consent that are reasonably necessary to 
ensure that the dwelling is habitable.23 This is a major milestone for South African law 
in the context of occupiers in terms of ESTA, especially when one reflects on the living 
 
20 See chapter 4 part 4 4 above. 
21 See chapter 5 part 5 2 above. 
22 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 32. 
23 Paras 32 and 59-65. 
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conditions of occupiers who live on farms. The conditions of dwellings on certain farms 
do not always meet a standard of habitability that can be described as dignified for 
purposes of section 10 of the Constitution and reinforced by section 5(a) of ESTA.24 
Consequently, the above-mentioned standard of habitability as developed in Daniels 
will arguably bring about uniformity in terms of the living conditions on farms. There is 
no doubt that in light of Daniels more protection will be granted to occupiers in terms 
of the dwellings that they occupy. More crucially, an existing minimum standard for 
occupiers has now been established and the debates relating to whether a minimum 
standard exists or not has essentially been laid to rest. 
I would argue that there is still an avenue for courts to extend the standard of 
habitability in future cases as the existing standard is presumably only limited to the 
physical condition of the dwelling and reasonably necessary improvements. There is 
a possibility that in future the courts may include useful improvements to the existing 
standard. This is because what is useful is sometimes necessary for the occupier to 
live in acceptable conditions. A big question that potentially remains unanswered after 
this dissertation is, should the notion of habitability of dwellings for occupiers 
encompass internal and external factors? Should habitability be about ensuring that 
the dwellings of occupiers are accessible and close to amenities? Habitability could in 
future be possibly read into accessibility and closeness of the dwelling to basic 
amenities if these are necessary for occupiers to live in habitable conditions and with 
human dignity. It should be mentioned that it is currently not done in this way. 
As I argued in chapter 5, it is clear that the obligation to ensure habitability should 
rest on the owner concerning occupiers in terms of ESTA.25 According to the Daniels 
case, the Constitution and ESTA (in terms of section 25(6)) do not bar a court from 
imposing a positive obligation in respect of habitability for occupiers on a private 
landowner. Whether or not an owner will be bound to ensure habitability will depend 
on whether the right in question is applied to private landowners.26 The source of the 
owner’s obligation is the constitutional provision of section 8(2), dealing with the 
application,27 and section 39(2) concerning the interpretation of rights.28 Furthermore, 
 
24 Para 111. 
25 See chapter 5 part 5 4 4 above. 
26 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 38. 
27 Paras 38-47. 
28 Paras 23-25. 
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whether an owner is bound will depend on the following factors, namely the nature of 
the right; the historical background of the right; the purpose of the right and how the 
purpose of the right can best be achieved; the possibility that the right may be infringed 
by a private landowner; and whether failure to hold the private landowner accountable 
for infringing the right will impact on the essential entitlements of the right.29 
Moreover, the landowner could arguably be saddled with the responsibility to 
ensure habitability based on the following observations, namely the owner granted the 
occupier permission to live and/or work on the farm; the owner owns the property and 
all the attachments thereto; the owner is in a position to decide what happens on the 
property; when the occupier’s right of residence is legally terminated, the property and 
all the attachments remain behind and possession is essentially restored to the owner; 
the significance of promoting the social function of property; and the occupier is not in 
a position to cover the costs of improving the dwelling. It should also be emphasised 
here that the main provision for holding the landowner liable to ensure habitability is 
section 8(2) of the Constitution, which provides for the Bill of Rights to apply to a private 
landowner, only where the nature of the right and the nature of the duty allows it to be 
binding on private persons.30 In this regard, if that provision applies to an owner who 
is enjoined by section 25(6) of the Constitution through ESTA to house occupiers, the 
owner must ensure that the dwelling is habitable so that the occupier can reside on 
and use the dwelling.31 
The application of the Bill of Rights between occupiers and private landowners has 
not yet played out fully in practice.32 This is evident from the judgment penned by Jafta 
J in Daniels who pointed out that he does not read section 8(2) of the Constitution as 
being a source of any obligation.33 According to Jafta J, the Bill of Rights is enforceable 
against the state and private owners, but the reading of section 8(2) does not suggest 
that a positive obligation (in terms of habitability for occupiers) may be imposed on a 
 
29 Para 39. 
30 Paras 38-41. 
31 Paras 32 and 49. 
32 For a similar view, see A Nolan “Holding Non-State Actors to Account for Constitutional 
Economic and Social Rights Violations: Experiences and Lessons from South Africa and 
Ireland” (2014) 12 International Journal of Constitutional Law 61 63; A Nolan “Daniels v 
Scribante: South Africa Pushes the Boundaries for Horizontality and Social Rights” (2017) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law Blog 1/3 3/3. 
33 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 156. 
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private person.34 It will be interesting to see how courts will deal with future cases on 
the obligation to ensure habitability in the context of occupiers. For instance, if the 
rights in the Bill of Rights can never be provided by a private owner, the question that 
arises is what will happen to occupiers who do not have money to carry the cost of 
improvements. Should the state be tasked with the responsibility of providing a 
dwelling that is habitable in the case where the owner neglects to do so, and the 
occupier does not have the means to upgrade the dwelling? 
It is submitted that it would not be appropriate for the court to impute neglect or 
refusal to maintain a dwelling on the part of the landowner on the state. The state (in 
terms of section 25(5)) has enjoined private owners in terms of section 25(6) of the 
Constitution through ESTA to accommodate an occupier on the owners’ land. If the 
occupier is an occupant of the dwelling with rights protected under ESTA and who had 
express or tacit authority to reside on the property, the occupier’s right to reside on the 
property is therefore valid. Accordingly, the owner must provide the occupier with a 
habitable dwelling. The landowner should also maintain the dwelling in the same 
standard until the right to reside on the property is legally terminated. Consequently, 
the owner should be held liable to ensure the habitability of the dwelling. However, the 
situation of occupiers is unclear, and it will have to be dealt with on a case by case 
basis. Having observed that, it seems that in the categories of comparison, the 
obligation to ensure habitability more clearly rests on the owner of the property (in the 
context of tenants and usufructuaries) and the landowner only in certain circumstances 
(for instance in the occupier context). This may have implications as one reflects on a 
common standard of habitability. Thus, the fact that the owner is responsible for the 
habitability of the dwelling only in the context of tenants and usufructuaries but not 
clearly responsible in the context of occupiers points towards the fact that there is 
currently no common standard of ensuring habitability.35 This is because the 





34 Paras 156-157. 
35 See also Z Boggenpoel & B Slade “Where Is Property? Some Thoughts on the Theoretical 
Implications of Daniels v Scribante” (2020) 10 Constitutional Court Review 379 391. 
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6 3 Habitability and the Constitution 
The fact that an owner is obliged to ensure habitability in terms of the common law or 
legislation in the respective categories of inhabitants may arguably not be enough to 
provide for a common standard of habitability.36 A minimum standard of habitability 
between tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers in South African law is evidently 
essential. This is because the Constitution requires everyone including the categories 
of comparison to live in an environment that is safe and healthy.37 Thus, if the 
Constitution applies to all forms of habitation (including all the categories of inhabitants 
under discussion in this dissertation), that would justify some minimum standard in all 
instances. That is, of course, presuming that the Constitution is in fact applicable in all 
cases. It has certainly not been applied in all three categories of comparison, but that 
does not mean the Constitution is not applicable as was argued in this dissertation. 
The Constitution should arguably apply in the context of all types of inhabitants so 
that, at the very least, there is a standard of habitability that should be complied with. 
Although the standard may vary in each category, there should be a threshold. For the 
threshold standard to work, habitability on its own – as a stand-alone concept – may 
be difficult to maintain if it is not linked to the Constitution to determine a common (or, 
perhaps more appropriate, minimum) standard. Thus, for a minimum standard of 
habitability to have a practical effect, it may require habitability to be linked with 
constitutional rights, such as human dignity (section 10), access to adequate housing 
(section 26) and/or security of tenure (section 25(6)) to potentially have applicability in 
all three categories of occupation.38 This is because the rights to access to adequate 
housing, human dignity and/or security of tenure are interrelated and interdependent 
and to a large extent should inform the baseline standard for habitability.39 As such, 
the Constitution requires that when dealing with these rights the values of human 
dignity, freedom and equality should be promoted.40 Respect for these foundational 
 
36 See also Z Boggenpoel & B Slade “Where Is Property? Some Thoughts on the Theoretical 
Implications of Daniels v Scribante” (2020) 10 Constitutional Court Review 379 391. 
37 See section 152(1)(d) of the Constitution. 
38 G Budlender “Towards a Right to Housing” in AJ van der Walt (ed) Land Reform and the 
Future of Landownership in South Africa (1991) 52. 
39 See chapter 3 part 3 3, chapter 4 part 4 4 and chapter 5 part 5 3 above. See further Daniels 
v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 2 and 12; JM Pienaar, E Johnson, W du Plessis & N 
Olivier “Land Matters: 2017 (2)” (2018) 33 South African Public Law 1 6. 
40 See section 39(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
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values, more especially human dignity, can be a guide towards a standard of 
habitability. This is because both the right to access to adequate housing and the right 
to security of tenure cannot be separated from the right or value of human dignity.41 
This means that a standard that is different in each category of inhabitant may be 
inappropriate; a common standard may need to be pronounced to give effect to the 
rights and values in the Constitution. 
The question that emerges is whether there can be a minimum (or common) 
standard. Arguably, there can be an individual standard as established in chapters 3, 
4 and 5 of the dissertation but not a common standard as the meaning of habitability 
in each category may differ.42 This is because each category of comparison is so 
legally disparate that requiring a common standard will not work in all three contexts. 
However, as was argued in this dissertation, the Constitution forms the baseline 
standard that eventually establishes a common element that will be required for 
dwellings in all three categories. As observed in chapters 3, 4 and 5 above, each 
category has different approaches to the sources of law and their remedial options. As 
such, the manner in which a remedy is sought by tenants, usufructuaries and 
occupiers is characterised by complexity and makes it difficult for exactly the same 
standard to be sustained for all three inhabitants. 
Chapter 3 showed that a minimum standard of habitability for tenants can be 
derived from the Constitution. Similarly, chapter 5 discovered that a minimum standard 
of habitability for occupiers can also be derived from the Constitution. In the context of 
usufructuaries, such a minimum standard of habitability for usufructuaries has not yet 
been derived from the Constitution. This is because the need to derive a minimum 
standard from the Constitution has not pertinently arisen in case law as usufructuaries 
do not ordinarily rely on their constitutional rights to bring the usufruct dwelling into a 
habitable state of repair. Instead, usufructuaries directly rely on the common law to 
argue that the dwelling is not habitable. It is the common law that will prescribe the 
position and outcome of the case at hand. Nonetheless, it was argued that a 
usufructuary should be able to rely on the Constitution, particularly the right to human 
dignity or access to adequate housing or security of tenure, to petition that the usufruct 
 
41 See chapter 2 part 2 3 above. See further A Sachs The Strange Alchemy of Life and Law 
(2009) 179. 
42 See also Z Boggenpoel & B Slade “Where Is Property? Some Thoughts on the Theoretical 
Implications of Daniels v Scribante” (2020) 10 Constitutional Court Review 379 391. 
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is not in a habitable state of repair. It should be noted that having established that a 
minimum standard is not currently present – at least not overtly – in the case of 
usufructuaries does not mean that such a state of affairs is necessarily 
unconstitutional. This is because the common-law construct of a usufruct is not 
necessarily inconsistent with the Constitution, especially when one reflects on the 
subsidiarity principle in the context of usufructuaries. The subsidiarity principle, where 
usufructuaries are concerned, prescribes that where there is no legislation crafted to 
deal with rights of usufructuaries, the common law should directly be relied on by the 
usufructuary to protect the usufructuary interest.43 If the common-law position is not in 
conflict with constitutional rights as observed in chapter 4, where case law like De 
Douallier showed how creative a court can be to ensure the right of a usufructuary to 
a habitable dwelling, the common law should arguably be left intact as it is presumed 
to be in line with the Constitution. This, however, may not always be the case. Thus, 
in instances where the common law is found to be in conflict with constitutional rights 
such as human dignity, the common law must be developed to promote the spirit and 
objectives of the Constitution.44 This may occur in instances where a usufructuary 
seeks to ensure a dwelling is habitable and application of the common law does not 
allow for that possibility. In those instances, the Constitution could arguably be invoked 
to derive a minimum standard of habitability. Considering these results, it is necessary 
to provide some indications of the best approach for South African law going forward 
when it comes to habitability for all three categories of comparison. 
 
6 4 The way forward on habitability for all three types of inhabitants 
Many of the sources that were discussed on the standard of habitability for tenants, 
usufructuaries and occupiers in chapters 3, 4 and 5 of the dissertation were based on 
literature and case law. The analysis of literature and case law tried to establish what 
should be the minimum standard of habitability for tenants, usufructuaries and 
occupiers in South African law. The salient issue about habitability for these types of 
inhabitants is the manner in which these inhabitants approach their respective sources 
of law to find a remedy, as it relates to habitability, to ensure that the property is in a 
 
43 AJ van der Walt The Law of Servitudes (2016) 40. 
44 See section 39(2) of the Constitution. See further Van der Walt The Law of Servitudes 43-
44. 
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habitable condition. The sources of law that tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers rely 
on are characterised by similarities, differences, and nuances.45 However, the way 
forward for these types of inhabitants will not be as simple and smooth as it may seem. 
For instance, there is concern whether the amendments in the RHAA will go beyond 
the pages of the RHAA and be implemented to ensure that both the rich and poor 
tenants are fully protected or covered. In this regard, where the property let is in 
disrepair the courts should not be reluctant to order the owner of the property to 
specifically perform the clearly stated mandatory requirements of the RHAA. This will 
give tenants substantive rights as it is the actual aim of the RHAA. 
For usufructuaries, it is not clear whether the leap to ensure that the usufruct is 
placed in a habitable state of repair that was made in De Douallier will be done in a 
similar case in future. Consequently, it will be interesting to see whether South African 
courts link habitability with human dignity or other fundamental rights as in the context 
of tenants and occupiers to ensure the protection of human dignity, security of tenure 
or access to adequate housing, even in the context of usufructuaries, where no such 
recognition has been seen before. Usufructuaries should begin to also rely on the 
Constitution as a possible source of law to find their remedy instead of heavily relying 
on the common law, unless of course the common law is read in line with the 
Constitution. 
Concerning occupiers, the concern is with poor occupiers who do not have the 
means to bring the dwelling into a habitable state. What will happen to those poorer 
occupiers if the landowner is found not to be liable to ensure that the dwelling is 
habitable? Will they have to depart from the dwelling due to appalling conditions, or 
will the state be called upon to ensure that they dwell in conditions that protect their 
human dignity? Arguably, the dissertation shows that there should be a minimum 
standard even in the context of occupiers. It is not clear in terms of case law what will 
happen, but one surely hopes that those occupiers will be taken care of. Here again, 
an argument is made concerning poor occupiers that they too should deserve a 
minimum standard. It should be mentioned that this would be an extension of the 
existing law, which currently allows the occupier to make the improvements, 
presumably not catering for less wealthy occupiers. 
 
45 See chapter 3, 4 and 5 above. 
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Nonetheless, there are interesting observations that must be taken into 
consideration when one reflects on the way forward on habitability for tenants, 
usufructuaries and occupiers in the new constitutional dispensation. Habitability 
essentially includes entitlements like the right to reside on, use and enjoy the property; 
security of tenure; and the right to make improvements with(out) the owner’s consent. 
These entitlements ordinarily go with these categories of inhabitants, which indicate 
that when the respective owners provide the tenants, usufructuaries and occupiers 
with permission to occupy or use the dwelling, they have certain obligations 
immediately. These obligations cannot be denied or negated. Consequently, these 
types of inhabitants can use these entitlements as measures to hold their landowners 
liable to place and maintain their dwellings in a habitable state. This shows that owning 
property in the constitutional era comes with certain responsibilities that cannot be 
avoided and that the right to ownership is no longer classified as a higher right in the 
order of rights.46 
In this regard, it was flagged in chapters 3, 4 and 5 that all three categories of 
inhabitants are entitled to the right to use and enjoy the property belonging to the 
owner, which is informed by the Constitution. As Madlanga J held in Daniels, in respect 
of occupiers in terms of ESTA, the notion of residing on and use of a dwelling must 
mean that the dwelling is habitable.47 Arguably, all three types of inhabitants of 
property belonging to owners must reflect on this idea. As it is evident from the 
chapters of the dissertation dealing with the categories of comparison, the tenant, 
usufructuary or occupier is generally standing up against an owner who has failed, 
neglected or refused to provide and ensure that the dwelling is in a habitable state of 
repair, and case law shows that the contestation by these types of inhabitants is valid 
and should be protected in terms of the Constitution, legislation or the common law in 
the respective context. It is therefore submitted that the existing individual standard 
revealed in each category of comparison should be followed. However, where the 
individual standard is not enough in the respective category to cover areas that are 
not specifically listed by the existing standard, the courts should interpret habitability 
broadly in that particular context to include additional features closely related to the 
existing minimum standard as required by the Constitution. This should be done in 
 
46 Baron v Claytile (Pty) Ltd 2017 5 SA 329 (CC) para 35. 
47 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 32. 
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instances where the law might be flawed and shows inconsistencies in terms of what 
constitutes habitability. The flaws of the law should not be left intact. This will create 
unnecessary tensions. As such, any defects in the law in respect of what comprises a 
“habitable dwelling” should be either developed or even amended to reflect the ethos 
or values of the Constitution.48 
Finally, it must be noted that South African law on the question of the habitability of 
dwellings for these different categories of inhabitants has made interesting progress, 
especially in the context of tenants and occupiers. For tenants, habitability will be 
included in legislation for the first time and South Africa will become part of the few 
countries where the habitability of dwellings for tenancy is a statutory requirement.49 
Thus, the express inclusion of habitability in the RHAA will give tenants greater 
protection against unfair landowners. For occupiers, the common law formalistic 
approach of asking for permission to effect improvements to bring a dwelling in a 
habitable condition has been dealt with in light of Daniels. Now occupiers can improve 
the dwelling in the form of preserving it without the consent of the property owner, but 
after proper meaningful engagement with the landowner (or person in charge) to 
ensure the property’s habitability and that a balance of the conflicting rights and 
interests of occupiers and owners is maintained.50 This is because the matter was 
considered in light of the Constitution and not in isolation. When it comes to 
usufructuaries, the formal, but not rigid, common-law regulating the construct of a 
usufruct is still intact. As emphasised the common-law construct of a usufruct is not 
necessarily in conflict with constitutional rights such as human dignity, security of 
tenure and access to adequate housing. Consequently, the common law cannot be 
easily changed or developed on the basis that an outcome of a case was fair or 
unfair.51 However, the courts should in future cases continue to take cognisance of 
the Constitution in matters relating to habitability in the common-law construct of a 
usufruct. One thing is certain: The prospect of habitability in the context of dwellings 
made available for residential use is exciting as there remains room to question the 
 
48 See the Preamble of the Constitution; section 1 of the Constitution. 
49 For countries where habitability of dwellings for tenants is already a statutory requirement, 
see for instance the United Kingdom and the United States of America. For details on how 
habitability works in these countries, see generally S Viljoen The Law of Landlord and Tenant 
(2016) 201-206. 
50 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 60-62. 
51 Van der Walt The Law of Servitudes 38 and 42. 
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state of affairs and to understand the notion of habitability to ensure that people live in 
dignified and adequate dwellings as we look forward to the future. 
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